VOTING IN A NEW ZEALAND LOCAL ELECTION

THE CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL ELECTION OF 1974

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to investigate a series of problems of electoral behaviour that were first studied using the social-psychological approach to political science. These problems are voter turnout, the surge and decline of electoral participation, the role of party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting. They are particularly relevant to the study of New Zealand local elections mainly because local elections provide the only opportunity for the New Zealand voter to vote for the party leader and the other members of his ticket. It is argued that these problems can be explained using both social-psychological theories and rational choice theories based on the economic approach to political science. The problems are examined using data collected at the 1974 Christchurch City Council election. A survey research project was carried out in the North ward of Christchurch City just prior to the 1974 election, and a post-election analysis of the master roll of electors was carried out for West and Pegasus wards. The findings reveal that voter turnout was quite closely related to psychological variables but less so to sociological and political variables. The variations in voter turnout and the partisan division of the vote in the 1968, 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City Council elections are explained with reference to psychological variables and economic variables. Party identification is shown to be a major influence on voting behaviour. There are strong relationships between voting in a local election and voting in a parliamentary election. Personal voting and coattail voting in the 1974 election are investigated, and some explanations for straight and split ticket voting are suggested. In conclusion the thesis argues that social-psychological and rational choice theories can together provide explanations for electoral behaviour.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Two fundamental theoretical tasks facing students of electoral behaviour are to explain the voting decisions of individual voters and to explain election outcomes. To perform these tasks psephologists use various theories of electoral behaviour, for as yet there is no simple 'theory' of elections. Instead there are many theoretical interpretations of the electoral process dealing with voter choice, electoral outcomes, the composition of the electorate, and so forth. A basic assumption of research into these topics is simply stated: "An election is a multivariate phenomenon".[1] In other words, it is more complicated than a simple summary of individual preferences for parties A and B. To understand how elections are won and lost, one must consider not only the influence of parties, personalities and issues on the voter, but also the influence of such institutional arrangements as election laws. Of course it is extremely difficult for any one study to unravel all the various influences which operate on voters' choices and election outcomes. Studies normally concentrate on the possible influence of just one or a few factors using appropriate theories.

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1. Richard Rose, "Comparability in Electoral Studies", in Richard Rose (ed.), Electoral Behaviour : A Comparative Handbook (New York : Free Press, 1974), p. 8.

Research into individual voting decisions and election outcomes has tended to centre around two alternative general theories which can be labelled the 'social and psychological determinism' and 'rationality' theories of voting. Theories of social and psychological determinism imply that to a large extent social and psychological characteristics structure the vote. In contrast rationality theories imply that individuals are free to use individual perception and motivation in making their voting decisions. The key question is: 'Does the voter choose the candidate or party which best represents his interests, or does he merely respond to given socio-economic circumstances and environmental and psychological factors?' Kenneth J. Arrow argued that since there are so many alternative parties, personalities and issues facing the voter, it is impossible for him to act rationally in casting his single vote.[1] Early voting studies in the United States attempted to predict preferences by relying primarily on either socio-economic variables[2] or psychological variables.[3] A major advancement in voting research was made with the 'Funnel of Causality' model in The American Voter. This model focussed a range of social, psychological and political variables leading to the voting decision, but still said little about the voting decision being a

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1. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: John Wiley, 1951).

2. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

3. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954).

rational choice.[1] In contrast, the findings of V.O. Key, Jr. and others aim to show that voters are indeed rational in their voting decisions. "Voters are not fools", as Key succinctly put it.[2] Rational voting is not, however, incompatible with social or psychological influences on the vote. For the voter who votes the same way as his usual party leaning or as his parents or friends, it can be argued that this is a rational means of reducing the personal costs of participating, while still expressing a general opinion on the government or opposition.[3]

During the past twenty years students of the electoral process have made increasing use of rational choice models, and their findings make it clear that a model of voting choice should include rational choice theory as well as socio-economic and psychological factors.[4] The broad aim of this thesis is to apply theoretical concepts of

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1. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964) [1st ed. 1960].

2. V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960 (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 7. See also Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975).

3. Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 5-25.

4. See, for example, Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting", American Political Science Review LXII (1968), 25-42; William C. Stratman, "The Calculus of Rational Choice", Public Choice XVIII (1974), 93-105; Gordon Tullock, Toward A Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967).

rationality to some specific problems of electoral behaviour which have important influences on individual voting choices and election outcomes. The theoretical concepts are derived from public choice theory and the 'economic approach' to political science. Public choice theory with its assumption of rational political behaviour on the part of individuals has been widely acknowledged for providing valuable insights into various aspects of the political process. In the economic approach to the study of political participation attempts are made to examine the economic rationality (in the sense of consistency) with which voters choose, at election time, on the basis of their own perceptions of the policy stands of the candidates or parties. Party identification, for example, is not conceptualised as a traditional attitude passed down through generations, but instead as a problem-solving device learned from one's parents that is instrumental for the advance of the voter's own particular set of values.[1]

The specific problems to be investigated in this study are: voter turnout, the surge and decline model of electoral participation, the role of party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting. These problems will be examined using survey data from a New Zealand local election - the 1974 Christchurch City Council election - and it will be argued that they can in part be explained using rational choice theory. Although these problems were initially

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1. Goldberg, "Social Determinism", p. 5.

studied by advocates of the social-psychological approach, this thesis employs rational choice theory in order to apply a different perspective to the same problems. The social-psychological studies have raised interesting theoretical problems which lend themselves to further investigation using rational choice theory. It is argued that the problems raised are particularly relevant to New Zealand local elections. Their examination should provide a greater understanding of the influences upon individual voters' choices in New Zealand local elections and the outcomes of such elections.

Rational choice models have been applied especially to the problem of voter turnout at both the individual level and at the level of the political system. Little is known about who participates in New Zealand local elections by voting and why. In order to gain a greater understanding of local election outcomes,we need to build up a picture of the active electorate and also to understand the influences that lie behind the decision to vote.[1]

The theory of surge and decline tries to account for

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1. Theoretical studies on voter turnout include, for example, Yoram Barzel and Eugene Silberberg, "Is the Act of Voting Rational?", Public Choice XVI (1973), 51-58; Riker and Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting", who give economic explanations of turnout and Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960); Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) who emphasise sociological and social-psychological perspectives.

variations in voter turnout and the partisan division of the vote at successive elections.[1] It is considered particularly appropriate to the study of recent Christchurch City Council elections because the election results display a similar pattern to that originally observed by V.O. Key, Jr. in his research into American presidential elections.[2]

No discussion of voting would be complete without consideration of the role of party. Its importance both as an influence on voting behaviour and as an analytical variable have long been recognised and recorded.[3] Party politics dominate local elections in New Zealand's four main cities although to a lesser extent than in general elections.

Personal voting results from voters' perceptions of the personal qualities of the candidates, rather than their party labels or the policies they espouse. Studies have shown that an impressive

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1. Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline : A Study of Electoral Change", in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 3.

2. V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 4th ed., 1958), p. 638.

3. Berelson et al., Voting; David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain : The Evolution of Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974) [1st ed. 1969]; Campbell et al., American Voter; Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order; Campbell et al., Voter Decides; Lazarsfeld et al., People's Choice.

personality can disrupt traditional party loyalties.[1] New Zealand local government elections have in general, traditionally been non-partisan and, although the reverse is true in the four main cities, there is still a strong feeling that electors should 'vote for the person not the party'.

Straight and split ticket voting are possible where an election offers the voter a choice between competing teams of candidates. Coattail voting occurs when the personal appeal of the party leader produces votes for his running mates who are then said to be 'riding into office on the presidential (or mayoral) coattails'. The influence of personality can lead to split ticket voting or coattail voting. Studies using the social-psychological approach[2] have raised interesting questions and

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1. Campbell et al., American Voter, chap. 2; Walter De Vries and V. Lance Tarrance, The Ticket-splitter : A New Force in American Politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1972); David Mervin, "Personality and Ticket Splitting in U.S. Federal and Gubernatorial Elections", Political Studies XXI (1973), 306-310; Arthur H. Miller et al., "A Majority Party in Disarray : Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election", American Political Science Review LXX (1976), 753-778.

2. Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", American Political Science Review LI (1957) 293-312; Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails : A Study in Political Myth and Methodology", Public Opinion Quarterly XIX (1955), 353-368; Malcolm C. Moos, Politics Presidents and Coattails (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952); Charles Press, "Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails", American Political Science Review LII (1958), 1041-1050.

problems regarding ballot-splitting and coattails which are quite relevant to the study of multi-candidate local elections in New Zealand. In most New Zealand municipal elections voters have the opportunity to vote for a number of councillors as well as for mayor. This is the only chance the New Zealand voter has to split his ticket and vote for two or more parties in one election. In parliamentary elections each elector has only one vote. Voting for the local mayor and council in New Zealand is thus analogous to voting for the president and congress in the United States.

As well as providing some insight into general theoretical problems of electoral behaviour,this thesis aims to describe and explain electoral behaviour at three levels: (1) New Zealand local elections, (2) using Christchurch City as an example,and (3) giving special attention to the 1974 Christchurch City Council election. Some general characteristics of local government elections in New Zealand will be described; a closer look will be taken at Christchurch City Council elections: the parties, recent trends, and the influence of personalities. Attention will, of course, be focused mainly on the 1974 election, the influences on the voters, and the election outcome.

Christchurch City has been chosen as the object of this study for two main reasons. It is the city I have lived in for twenty-four years and through observation and previous study of its elections I have a strong interest in its politics. The second reason is the availability of data; a survey research project had been carried out in the city just prior to the 1974 election

under the supervision of Mr Nigel Roberts of the Department of Political Science at the University of Canterbury, and I was able to use the raw data from this survey. Christchurch is a particularly good city in which to carry out this study. It is typical of New Zealand's four main cities in that its politics are dominated by two main parties - a Citizens group and the Labour Party. Elsewhere in New Zealand party politics in local elections are quite rare. The 1974 election in Christchurch was the first occasion a ward system of voting had been tried out in a major New Zealand city for many years.

Studies of local government in New Zealand generally are sparse, but it is in the field of local elections in particular that New Zealand political scientists lack precise knowledge of the electoral processes going on around them. City administrations have come and gone or perpetuated forever without any detailed analysis of the democratic processes that permit such a state of affairs.[1]

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1. Two theoretical studies have been published using data from New Zealand local elections. See John C. Blydenburgh,"The Effect of Ballot Form on City Council Elections", Political Science XXVI (July 1974), 47-55; "Innovation in New Zealand Local Body Election Campaigns", Political Science XXIV (September 1972), 57-62.
Some limited analyses have been proved by G.W.A. Bush in a number of short articles surveying local election results from all parts of the country. See G.W.A. Bush "Cogitating on the 1974 Local Body Election Results", New Zealand Local Government X (December 1974), 3-6; "Local Body Elections", New Zealand Local Government IV (1968), 293-295; "Local Elections : Democracy or Farce?", New Zealand Local Government VII (1971), 330-335; "Local Election Trends : What the Figures Tell", New Zealand Local Government VIII (1972), 550-555; "1968 Local Election Trends : The Evidence of the Statistics", New Zealand Local Government VI (1970), 202-204; "1974 Local Body Trends : What the Figures Reveal", New Zealand Local Government XII (July 1976, August 1976), 21-35, 33-38.

Recently, however, local elections in New Zealand's two largest cities, Christchurch and Auckland, have been the subject of research projects that have explored different facets of electoral behaviour and political participation at the local level.[1] Studies in Christchurch have examined the elected personnel of local government,[2] the history, organisation and decision-making of the party that has held power for most of the post-war period,[3] and spatial elements in voting patterns.[4] As can be seen relatively

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1. For the Auckland studies see G.W.A. Bush, Decently and in Order: The Government of the City of Auckland 1840-1971 (Auckland: Collins for Auckland City Council, 1971), chap. 13; "Informal Voting in a New Zealand Local Election", Historical and Political Studies I (1970), 84-88; Labour's Lost Loves and the 1971 Auckland Local Body Elections (Auckland: Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland, 1974); "The 1968 Auckland City Mayoralty Contest", Political Science XXII (December 1970),23-42; "The Non-vote in a Local Body Election", Political Science XXIV (September 1972), 45-56; 23-42; Ewen C. Marjoribanks, "Spatial Variations in Voting in Five Selected Auckland City Council Elections : 1953, 1956, 1959, 1971 and 1974", M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1975.

2. Gerard Cheyne, "Christchurch - The Men Who Govern : A Study of Councillors and Board Members", M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 1966; Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), chap. 11 "Who Runs Local Government : Christchurch".

3. David A. Hyslop, "The Christchurch Citizens' Association: History, Organisation, and Decision-making", M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 1973.

4. R.J. Johnston, "Local Effects in Voting at a Local Election", Annals, Association of American Geographers, LXIV (1974), 418-429; "Spatial Elements in Voting Patterns at the 1968 Christchurch City Council Election", Political Science, XXIV (April 1972), 49-61; "Spatial Patterns and Influences on Voting in Multi-candidate Elections : The Christchurch City Council Elections, 1968", Urban Studies X (1973), 69-81.

few studies of Christchurch City Council elections have been made; this was the first time survey research had been used to analyse a particular election.

Analysis of voting behaviour at local elections is an important task for three main reasons. Firstly, while it is realised that there is little evidence that voters can directly affect public policy through voting,[1] elections do play the important role of deciding which party or persons will become the government and thus hold political power. Elections are an opportunity for the masses to render judgement on the past political conduct of the government and opposition. It is not always clear what issues a new government is committed to, but nevertheless the efforts of politicians and commentators to read some clear mandate into election results signify that elections are assumed to have the function of identifying citizen interests. Elections are also important as a symbolic ritual identifying and linking the voter with his party, his social group and the community.[2] Secondly, to understand the forces that are acting to

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1. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261; Robert E. Dowse and John A. Hughes, Political Sociology (London: John Wiley, 1972), pp. 325-327. On the role of elections see also David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of February 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1974), chap. 1; Thomas R. Dye and L. Harman Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy : An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics (Belmont,Calif.: Wadsworth, 2nd ed., 1972), chap. 6.

2. See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

produce a specific election outcome we need to explain inter alia voting behaviour. That is, we need to examine the voters' perceptions of the candidates, parties and issues, how they evaluate them, how they react to them and why. The third reason relates to the importance of local government and local elections. Strong local government is a healthy sign that access to the decision-making channels is close to the people in their local political communities and that power is not over-concentrated within the central government. The study of voting behaviour at local elections in New Zealand is important if we are to further our knowledge of why certain people gain greater access to the decision-making channels by being elected to local authorities. Christchurch City Council elections are important because the distribution of benefits from the council depends in part on the party in power. Recent city council elections have shown that who gets elected affects the allocation of resources in terms of both geography and class. Each party with a majority on the council likes to feed the areas and groups that it hopes will give it electoral support in the future. This explains why the Citizens Association tends to neglect the eastern working class area of the city and talks of benefits for the business community, while the Labour Party - when it was in power - built an expensive sports stadium in the eastern suburbs and promoted an active social welfare policy. Local elections are important because they select the decision-makers who then decide on the distribution of resources and this distribution changes when the party in power changes.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter the background to Christchurch City Council politics and the 1974 election is described,and in Chapter II the research design is presented. In Chapter III developments in the study of electoral behaviour are discussed and the theoretical approach is outlined. Chapter IV analyses voter turnout with Chapter V looking at the associated problem of the surge and decline of turnout. Chapter VI examines the role of party,and Chapter VII investigates the importance of personalities in voting, ticket-splitting and coat-tail voting. Chapter VIII contains conclusions.

BACKGROUND

New Zealand has had some form of local government since 1840.[1] Local government in the context of the New Zealand political system means the body of elected local governing authorities to which Parliament has delegated some administrative, executive and limited legislative powers to deal with matters that can best be administered at a level below the national level. All sovereign power, however, rests with Parliament; every local authority derives its powers from Parliament. New Zealand local authorities have fewer major functions than those in many overseas countries. They do not provide education or police services, for example. Functions undertaken by local authorities in New Zealand are various ranging from town planning, water supply and drainage, pensioner housing, civil defence, recreation and environmental

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1. "Report of the Local Government Committee", Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (Wellington: Government Printer, 1945), I. 15, p. 3.

health to traffic control, airports, harbours and energy distribution.[1] Territorial local authorities are those responsible for a broad range of functions in the district within their jurisdiction. They at present fall into two main categories - municipalities and counties, with new categories envisaged in the Local Government Act 1974. Special-purpose (or 'ad hoc') authorities differ from territorial authorities in that each is charged with only one major function. Only rarely do the boundaries of ad hoc authorities coincide with territorial authority boundaries. The number of local authorities in existence at 30 November 1974 was 1 952.[2] This total includes 136 city and borough councils and 105 county councils while the vast bulk are mainly ad hoc authorities. The need for local government reform in New Zealand has been widely recognised for the past century, but, with the exception of the 1972-75 Labour Government,[3] successive governments have lacked the courage to overcome resistance to change. W.B. Sutch summed up the history of local government reform in New Zealand when he called it a history of defeat.[4]

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1. J.H. Gray, An Outline of Local Government in New Zealand (Christchurch: Hillside Publications, 1976), pp. 44-49.

2. N.Z. Department of Statistics, New Zealand Official Yearbook 1976 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1976), pp. 50-51.

3. See John Roberts, "Local Government", in Ray Goldstein and Rod Alley (eds.), Labour in Power : Promise and Performance (Wellington: Price Milburn for N.Z. University Press, 1975), pp. 150-160.

4. W.B. Sutch, "Local Government in New Zealand : A History of Defeat", in R.J. Polaschek (ed.), Local Government in New Zealand (Wellington: N.Z. Institute of Public Administration, 1956).

Local government elections in New Zealand are held triennially with all elections for each authority taking place on the one day. Ward systems are uncommon so that almost all local authority members are elected 'at large' on a first-past-the-post system. For example, when there are nineteen vacancies the nineteen highest polling candidates are elected. The 1974 elections were conducted under the Local Election and Polls Act 1966, the Municipal Corporations Act 1954 and the Counties Act 1956. In general the franchise extended to all persons aged eighteen years or over who possessed either a rating qualification or a residential qualification in the district of the local authority concerned. Ratepayers (property owners) were enrolled automatically by the local authority when they bought property in the local authority district. They did not have to be resident in the district. Residential electors were obliged by law to apply for enrolment if they had resided in New Zealand for one year and in the local authority district for three months. They also had to be British subjects. Every qualified elector was eligible to seek election to a local authority. There was provision for postal voting and for polling to be spread over a few days prior to polling day. Turnout at local elections in New Zealand is generally low: the national average at the 1974 elections was 50 per cent.[1] Party politics are not a predominant feature of New Zealand local government elections. Except for the major cities nearly all local authority members stand as Independents. Where parties do

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1. N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority Elections 1974", Wellington, 1976 (mimeo), Table 17.

exist the tight party discipline characteristic of parliamentary politics is rare. Party affiliations did not appear on the ballot papers for the Christchurch City Council elections in 1974, although they did in the Auckland and Wellington City Council elections.

Within the Christchurch Urban Area in 1974 there were as many as ten territorial local authorities providing local government for 292 520 people.[1] Christchurch City is the largest of these local authorities; its 1974 population was 170 600[2] which made it the largest city in New Zealand. The number of electors on the 1974 electoral roll was 98 039.[3] The city council consists of the mayor and nineteen councillors. Party politics have dominated Christchurch City Council politics for many years; there has not been an Independent elected to the council since 1933. Two main parties contest the elections: the Citizens Association and the Labour Party.

The Citizens Association was established in 1911[4] to "counter the intrusion of a disciplined Labour party into local

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1. New Zealand Official Yearbook 1975, p. 62. The local authority districts which are wholly or partly included in the Christchurch Urban Area are: Christchurch City, Eyre County, Heathcote County, Kaiapoi Borough, Lyttelton Borough, Mount Herbert County, Paparua County, Rangiora County, Riccarton Borough and Waimairi County.

2. Ibid., p. 64.

3. Christchurch City Council, District Electors' Roll for the City of Christchurch 1974 (Christchurch: 1974).

4. Hyslop, "Citizens' Association", p.4. On the Citizens Association, see also: Cheyne, "The Men Who Govern"; Warren P. Head, "A City Decides : The General Election of 1966 in Christchurch", M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 1967, pp. 270-272.

politics."[1] One of its objectives is "to rouse and direct resistance against use of the civic administration for furthering sectional interests."[2] As Austin Mitchell has noted: "This might be reworded as 'to oppose the Labour party'".[3] The Association consists mainly of businessmen, and its activity is directed principally towards winning elections with far less emphasis on organisational and membership aspects. The Association has been at pains to point out that: "We are not a political party, but an association whose only interest is the good of the city and whose sole function is to promote sound independent candidates for the local body elections."[4] Claims such as this have not dampened the feeling that the Citizens Association is merely the National party in disguise. In Cheyne's 1965 study all but one of the Citizens councillors were members of the National Party.[5] Of the 1974 Citizens candidates three had stood as National Party candidates for the parliamentary elections and two others had been active members.[6] Even the President of the Association once said that "while it is not tied up with the National Party its views were generally along the same lines."[7] The National Party

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1. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 301. (Labour candidates first contested the 1909 Christchurch City Council Election. Hyslop, "Citizens' Association", p. 2).
2. "Rules of the Christchurch Citizens Association", quoted in Hyslop, "Citizens' Association", p. 18.
3. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 301.
4. M.O. Holdsworth (Chairman, Christchurch Citizens Association), quoted in Christchurch Star, 9 July 1974, p. 1.
5. Cheyne, "The Men Who Govern", chap. 4.
6. Christchurch Star, 11 July 1974, p. 1.
7. E.B.E. Taylor, Address to Annual Meeting of the Christchurch Citizens Association, 27 April 1970, quoted in Christchurch Star, 11 July 1974, p. 1.

does not control the Citizens Association. Any connection that exists is at the individual level and not at the formal organisational level. The main reason why National has not stood candidates in local elections is probably because its interests are already well represented by people who identify with the National Party's aims and policies and who are National Party members.

The Labour Party is a local version of the parliamentary party. As such it has a wider range of membership than the Citizens Association,and there is influence from the affiliated trade unions in matters such as candidate selection. Local body membership is often regarded by Labour councillors and candidates as a stepping stone to Parliament. While Labour lacks the financial backing of the Citizens Association, there is more emphasis on loyalty and service to the party. In contrast to the Citizens Association whose organisation really only comes into existence to contest elections every three years, the Labour Party organisation is in permanent day-to-day existence. As a nationally-based political party Labour has had to continually justify its role in local government,for there is a strong feeling that political parties should not nominate candidates for local elections.

Citizens have been more successful in winning election to the city council than have Labour. From 1947 until 1971 Citizens members held a majority except between 1950 and 1956 (see Table 1.1). Labour candidates have had to struggle to gain a foothold on the council,and once there they have had to fight to maintain their position. Labour has won only three council elections since World

TABLE 1.1 DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS ON CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL: 1947-1974

YEAR	COUNCIL		MAYORALTY
	Citizens	Labour	
1947	14	5	Cit
1950	7	12	Lab
1953	9	10	Lab
1956	12	7	Lab
1959	19	0	Lab
1962	12	7	Lab
1965	12	7	Lab
1968	16	3	Cit
1971	8	11	Lab
1974	11	8	Cit

War II. In mayoral elections, on the other hand, Labour has done consistently well. Christchurch had a Labour mayor for twenty-one of the twenty-seven years between 1947 and 1974. That Labour has been able to win the mayoralty so frequently while Citizens have controlled the council demonstrates that ticket-splitting has been a commonplace political phenomenon. Voters have been quite prepared to vote for a Labour mayor while at the same time splitting their ballots to vote for Citizens councils. It appears that voters' local party identifications have been weak enough to allow this kind of behaviour to occur. This history of ticket-splitting suggests that Christchurch City Council elections offer a fruitful area for research into the phenomenon.

Prior to the 1968 election the Labour candidate, the popular Sir George Manning, had won two elections with large majorities - yet voters simultaneously split their tickets to re-elect Citizens councils. In 1968 Manning had retired, yet the mayoral election was largely decided once again on personalities. This time it was the Citizens candidate Mr A.R. Guthrey, a prominent businessman, who strongly defeated an ageing former Labour Cabinet Minister,Mr Jock Mathison (Table 1.2). The swing was also away

TABLE 1.2 1968-1974 MAYORAL ELECTIONS

	CITIZENS		LABOUR		TWO PARTY
	Votes	%	Votes	%	SWING
1968	23 273	64.3	12 910	35.7	
1971	23 212	48.0	25 121	52.0	16.3% (to Labour)
1974	29 482	52.0	27 237	48.0	4.0% (to Citizens)

from Labour in the council election for they managed to win only three seats (Table 1.3).

TABLE 1.3 1968-1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS

	CITIZENS			LABOUR			TWO PARTY
	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	SWING
1968	337 973	56.5	16	260 213	43.5	3	
1971	380 877	49.0	8	397 184	51.0	11	7.5% (to Labour)
1974	106 639	53.5	11	92 754	46.5	8	4.5% (to Citizens)

For the first time in years the 1971 election gave the voters a real choice in terms of different party policies. Rarely do policies capture the electorate's attention in local elections, but in Christchurch in 1971 there were two specific, exploitable issues couched in everyday language. These were the proposed road through Hagley Park and the venues for the 1974 Commonwealth Games. Both issues were perceived and easily understood; there was a deep intensity of feeling about the road through the park and the differences between the parties were clearly defined. The Citizens were for the road and wanted the Games at an existing smaller stadium, while Labour was against the road and wanted to build a big new Games stadium in the New Brighton area. Labour led by its mayoral candidate, Mr Neville Pickering, won the election, with Guthrey, the sitting Citizens mayor and seven Citizens councillors defeated (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). Labour's promise of a Games stadium and its stand against the Hagley Park road won it the election. As the Christchurch Star commented: "Anyone who tampers with the park does so at his peril - a fact of life that has never before been so evident."[1]

City council elections prior to 1974 were conducted under the 'at large' system with the city as a whole regarded as one electorate. This system had its drawbacks in that voters had to

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1. Christchurch Star, 11 October 1971, p. 8. On the 1971 election see Andrew MacKenzie, "The Ward System in Christchurch City : The 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City Council Elections", Stage III essay, Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1974.

FIGURE 1.1 WARD BOUNDARIES FOR 1974 CITY COUNCIL ELECTION



Source: The Press, 26 June 1974, p. 3.

choose up to nineteen candidates from a ballot paper containing as many as forty-eight. In their manifestoes for the 1971 election both parties included promises to implement a ward system of voting for the 1974 election.[1] This promise was fulfilled by Labour and all voters in 1974 faced the new system of electing three or four councillors to represent them on the new council. The city was divided into five wards namely: West, North, Pegasus, East and South (Figure 1.1).

Four of the wards elected four councillors each and the

1. Christchurch Star, 4 September 1971, p. 2.

smaller West ward elected three. The mayoral election was unaffected by the ward system and was conducted over the city 'at large' as before.[1] The ward system became a minor issue in the election because of the manner in which the ward boundaries were drawn. They were determined by a group of Labour councillors who refused to allow an independent committee to decide the matter.[2] The shape of the wards suggested an attempt to gerrymander the election; the area of strongest Citizens support was made the smallest ward and there were numerous 'wiggly' lines in Labour strongholds.[3]

The 1974 election was contested by full tickets from Citizens and Labour. There were eight Values Party candidates (including a mayoral candidate) and three Independents (including a mayoral candidate). Voting was spread over four days - from Wednesday 9 October to Saturday 12 October. In sharp contrast to 1971, the 1974 election offered no big issues which separated the parties. Instead attention was directed to the race for the mayoralty between two quite different personalities: the Labour incumbent Mr Neville Pickering and his Citizens challenger Mr Hamish Hay. Pickering was

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1. As well as voting for the city council, all electors had the opportunity to vote for members of five ad hoc bodies. They were the Christchurch Drainage Board, Christchurch Transport Board, Lyttelton Harbour Board, North Canterbury Catchment Board and North Canterbury Hospital Board.

2. The Citizens Association councillors were offered one representative to Labour's three on a committee of the council. They refused.

3. On the ward system see Andrew MacKenzie, "The Christchurch City Council Election of 1974", M.A. (Hons.) essay, Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1975, pp. 33-42; "Submissions to Christchurch City Council Special Committee on Ward System", Christchurch, 1976 (mimeo); "Ward System"; David Mitchell, "The voting system that came back from the past", Christchurch Star, 14 September 1974, p. 5.

a controversial out-spoken mayor while gaining a reputation as a 'go-ahead' person who wished to see the city develop in a big way. In the election campaign he was described both as "a vigorous, decisive man with a highly tuned political awareness",[1] and as "a politically motivated hustler [who had] clawed his way to power."[2] In sharp contrast, Hay's image was very low key; being "neither forceful nor thrusting"[3] his personality was overshadowed by that of his opponent. With regard to the policy manifestoes offered by the two parties, it seemed like a case of 'Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dee'. If the electors were intending to make intelligent voting decisions based on policy differences, then their efforts would be frustrated because of the similar positions adopted by the parties on almost all the major issues.[4]

The election resulted in a defeat for Pickering and for Labour. Hay won by a comfortable margin and Citizens gained an 11-8 majority on the council (Tables 1.2 and 1.3).[5] Even Labour's attempt

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1. The Press, 14 September 1974, p. 12.

2. Christchurch Star, 10 October 1974, p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 8.

4. See Christchurch Citizens Association, Give Christchurch Back to the Citizens [Policy Manifesto], Christchurch, 1974; Labour Party, An Outstanding Record of Achievement [Policy Manifesto], Christchurch, 1974.

5. For full detailed results see Andrew MacKenzie, A Summary of Statistics Relating to the 1974 Christchurch City Council Election (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, Department of Political Science publication, 1976). (This is reproduced as Appendix A). For an analysis of the 1974 council election using aggregate statistics see MacKenzie, "Christchurch City Council Election of 1974".

to gerrymander the ward boundaries did not save it from the swing to Citizens. It seemed that Christchurch voters preferred the promises of a steadier and less controversial administration rather than the abrasive style of the deposed Mayor. Labour was not rewarded for fulfilling its former election-winning promises to build Queen Elizabeth II Park and stop the Hagley Park motorway. As The Press commented before the election: "The public memory is short : its gratitude even shorter-lived."[1]

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis draws on rational choice models to help investigate and explain problems of voting behaviour using data collected at the 1974 Christchurch City Council election. These problems are: voter turnout, the surge and decline of electoral participation, the role of party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting. Each of these problems was selected for its theoretical significance and its relevance to the understanding of local government elections in New Zealand. Analysis of voting behaviour at local elections is important because of the role elections play in the political system, because of the need to explain behaviour in order to understand election outcomes, and because local elections in New Zealand select the decision-makers who decide on the distribution of local resources. There are a large number of local authorities in New Zealand whose elections are conducted under the Local Elections and

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1. The Press, 7 October 1974.

Polls and other Acts. Party politics feature only in the major cities including Christchurch City where the Citizens Association and the Labour Party are the two main parties. Citizens have generally always been in power on the city council,and the 1974 election saw a return to a Citizens majority after three years of Labour in power led by the controversial Mayor Neville Pickering.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN

The aim of this chapter is to present the research design of the thesis, that is, the sources of data, methods of data collection and methods of data analysis. A chapter has been devoted to explaining the research design because of the central place it occupies in the research process. Firstly the advantages and limitations of the main sources of data are pointed out. Then the two surveys are described and other sources of data are listed. Finally the methods of data analysis are summarised.

SOURCES OF DATA : ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS

Three main methods of studying elections have been pointed out by Austin Ranney. One is to employ historical/journalistic/ descriptive techniques, the second is to analyse aggregate statistics, and the third is to use individual data collected in survey research.[1] However, this does not mean that any one method is to be preferred over the others. Rather than relying on a single 'best' method researchers often use two or more complementary

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1. Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behaviour", in Austin Ranney (ed.), Essays in the Behavioural Study of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1962), pp. 93-95.

methods. For sources of data this study has used mainly survey research with some aggregate statistics.

Aggregate data describing elections are useful because they are generally easily available, it is possible to use them in comparative studies, and they are usually the 'hardest' data available. The main disadvantage of aggregate data is, of course, their extreme crudeness in describing and explaining the behaviour of individual voters. The fallacy of ecological correlation prohibits the use of aggregate ecological data as a substitute for individual level data.[1] This is where survey research comes in, for it is in the analysis of individual data that political attitudes and partisanship can be measured and related to voting behaviour. From individual data survey research aggregates the characteristics of the sample in order to describe the population. Survey research is "indispensable in gaining information about the human condition and new insights into social theory."[2] The main advantage of survey research is, then, the ability to collect theoretically relevant data on individuals which is amenable to rigorous statistical analysis.[3]

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1. W.S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlation and the Behaviour of Individuals", American Sociological Review XV (1950), 351-357.

2. Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Survey Research (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967), p. 149.

3. For more on survey research see, for example, Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 1973); Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursch, Survey Research (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963); Mildred Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples : Practical Procedures (New York : Cooper Square, 1966).

There are, however, limits and disadvantages to the use of survey research, and possible sources of error should be realised in evaluating the research design. Given that there does exist a reality, the several stages of the research process can distort the 'real truth' into an 'apparent truth' by the time the final analysis is completed. The size of the sample and the methods used affect the sampling error and the confidence limits. The correct questions have to be asked in order to obtain the desired information, and in order to avoid certain questions prompting answers to other questions,the questionnaire must be suitably designed. The interviewer can project his biases into the system by his manner, the tone of his voice, and the accuracy with which he records the responses. Different respondents can give different meanings to the same question by their selective perception. The completed questionnaires are coded by the researcher who gives most of the information a numerical value to enable computer analysis. The researcher can unwittingly impose his own middle class/social science perspective onto reality in designing a questionnaire and coding the responses. The authors of Unobtrusive Measures have noted:

> "Interviews and questionnaires intrude as a foreign element into the social setting they would describe, they create as well as measure attitudes, they elicit atypical roles and responses, they are limited to those who are accessible and will co-operate, and the responses obtained are produced in part by individual differences irrelevant to the topic at hand." 1

What comes out of this research process is the social scientist's version of reality which hopefully is not too far removed from the

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1. Eugene J. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures : Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 1.

'real truth'.

NORTH WARD SURVEY

The Honours class in electoral behaviour in the Department of Political Science at the University of Canterbury chose the Christchurch City Council election as its research project for 1974. Mr Nigel Roberts who supervised the survey kindly made available the completed questionnaires.[1] The survey was specifically designed to investigate four of the problems to which this thesis directs itself, namely: the role of party in local elections, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting.[2] Investigation of the surge and decline model was a secondary topic of the survey. The survey was not planned with the study of voter turnout specifically in mind, and this is why an additional source of data was used to collect information on turnout.

The universe for the survey was the adult population of Christchurch City aged 18 years and over.[3] The population chosen to be sampled was the adult population of North ward aged 18 years and over. North was a very good choice for a number of reasons.

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1. The writer of this thesis was not a member of the 1974 Honours Class and therefore did not take part in planning the survey. However, all the coding of the questionnaires and subsequent analysis (including computer analysis) were completed by the writer.

2. Just prior to and following the election two preliminary analyses of the survey data were published. See "Survey gives Mr Hay slender lead on mayor", Christchurch Star, 8 October 1974, p.1; Nigel S. Roberts, "City Elections - what they really showed", Christchurch Star, 26 October 1974, p. 6.

3. For full details of the sample design see Appendix B.

Unlike West, Pegasus or South wards it was not obviously an area of one particular social class. Rather, North appeared to be a cross-section of the city containing some higher status neighbourhoods, some lower status neighbourhoods and some that were in between. As well as being a social cross-section of the city, North appeared to contain a political cross-section in that it was obviously neither a Citizens nor a Labour stronghold. It was hoped that these factors would mean that the survey sample would be representative of the whole city. Before the election North appeared to be a marginal ward that could go either way on election day. Indeed, it was said that North held the balance of power in the 1974 council election. Writing before the election I commented: "North is the ward that could determine the outcome of the whole election",[1] while the Press observed: "The ward has already been labelled by candidates and commentators alike as the 'vital' ward."[2] But why was only one ward surveyed rather than surveying the whole city? Looking at only one ward enables valuable resources such as sample size, time and money to be concentrated into one particular area. A close examination of one ward should tell us a great deal more than a thinly spread survey of the whole city. To paraphrase Nigel Roberts' remark about an earlier survey in the Lyttelton electorate, each ward has its own candidates, character and problems, and if we are to learn

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1. Andrew MacKenzie, "The Ward System in Christchurch City : The 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City Council Elections", Stage III essay, Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, July 1974, p. 25.

2. "Wards with the key to power", The Press, 7 October 1974.

more about politics in Christchurch City, we will have to learn more about the individual parts that go together to make up the whole electoral map of the city.[1]

The number of registered electors in North was 20 277 which was about the same as in Pegasus, East and South wards.[2] The total population of North ward was 34 366 at the 1971 census and 34 425 at the 1976 census.[3] In deciding on the sample size there are a number of principles available which direct the researcher towards selecting an optimum sample size for his particular needs. In general, returns by way of increasing precision diminish sharply after quite small sample sizes are reached.[4] The question for the researcher to answer is how much of his resources is he prepared to use for each increase in precision. The resources available for the North ward survey in terms of personnel, time and money suggested a sample size of between 200 and 250. A sample between these limits would allow an analysis with acceptable precision. The sample size for the North ward survey

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1. Nigel S. Roberts, "Getting It Right", in Brian Edwards (ed.), Right Out : Labour Victory '72 - The Inside Story (Wellington: Reed, 1973), p. 202.

2. For full details of the number of registered electors in each ward see Appendix A, Table 15.

3. Christchurch City Council, "Report of the Special Committee on the Ward System", Christchurch, 10 August 1976 (mimeo).

4. Bernard Lazerwitz, "Sampling Theory and Procedures", in Hubert M. Blalock and Ann B. Blalock (eds.), Methodology in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 285-287; C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, Survey Methods in Social Investigation (London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 146-151; Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples, chap. 9.

was chosen to be 240. However, one interviewer failed to carry out his set of interviews and the number of completed interviews - and thus the sample size - was reduced to 231. This gives a sample fraction of about 1 in 100 (i.e. 1 per cent).

The sampling method was a combination of random, cluster and quota sampling techniques. The method of selecting the sample cases was a three stage systematic selection. The first stage involved cluster sampling, with the random selection of the appropriate number of starting points for the interview clusters from the North ward electoral roll. Random selection provided a spread of clusters throughout the ward. Each starting point determined the beginning of a random route along the footpath around a block of houses without crossing any streets. Each interviewer was required to carry out five interviews beginning at each of two starting points. The second stage was the systematic selection of dwelling places at each cluster. A random-walk pattern was used to select every third dwelling beginning from the starting point until five interviews were completed. The third stage involved the quota sampling of respondents by sex. The interviews were alternately with a male, a female, a male etc. (All respondents had to be 18 years or over). If there was more than one male or female over 18 years within a household, the respondent was randomly selected. If the required respondent was not available for any reason (such as no one home, refusal to be interviewed, wrong sex or no one over 18), then the interviewers missed two dwellings and tried the third. The random-walk pattern

and the alternate male/female interviewing procedure were followed until the quota of five interviews from each starting point were successfully completed.[1] The interview questionnaire was pre-tested in Pegasus ward on 14 September. All the interviews for the actual survey[2] were carried out on Saturday 28 September which was 11 days before voting began and 14 days before polling day itself. It should be remembered that this one survey can only give a 'snap-shot' static picture of political opinion on this one day during the election campaign.

This sampling method has its advantages in that the resources of personnel, time and money are put to their optimum use while preserving the randomness of the sample. By interviewing in clusters of dwelling places interviewers do not have to waste time travelling around to each house. The random-walk pattern and the random sampling of dwellings instead of people helps to ensure that all the interviews will be completed in one day, and that the interviewers will not have to call back if the required respondent is not at home. Since all the interviews can be completed in one day, the survey date can be close to election day - allowing some time for analysis prior to the election. The

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1. Certain elements of this sampling procedure are the same as those used by the National Research Bureau in their regular, national, political opinion surveys. See Brian D. Murphy, "Political Polling in New Zealand", in Stephen Levine (ed.), New Zealand Politics : A Reader (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1975), pp. 163-167.

2. Appendix C contains the text of the questionnaire.

selection of the sample does not rely on what might be an incorrect electoral roll, and therefore interviewers do not have to spend time searching for recently deceased people or persons who may have shifted. The main disadvantage of the sampling method is the quota element which meant that the interviewers called at every third house until five interviews were obtained. Thus the unavailability of respondents for whatever reason (such as no one home, refusal to be interviewed, wrong sex or no one over 18 years) was disregarded. (However, the method does not mean they have to be. The method can permit call-backs to the same house). It could be that those who refused to be interviewed were less interested in politics than those who were interviewed. This could affect the representativeness of the sample.

The method of sampling also means that the possible levels of sampling error are hard to determine. Using Parten's sample size tables the possible error for a sample size of 231 is between 6 and 7 per cent with confidence limits of 95 chances in 100 of accuracy to within the specified limits of error.[1] However, Nigel Roberts has pointed out that:

> "We do know from the results of the election in the North ward that the survey seemed to be an extremely accurate picture of opinion in the North ward, and I would conclude that the quota element in the sample (and its consequent disregard of refusals and unavailables) did not affect the accuracy and reliability of the study. The election results were out best guide to the accuracy of the survey." 2

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1. Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples, pp. 314-315.

2. Nigel S. Roberts, Letter to the author, 19 October 1976.

A comparison of some of the survey findings and the election results illustrates the accuracy, reliability and validity of the survey. The survey findings for the mayoral election and the actual results are compared in Table 2.1. Despite the small

TABLE 2.1 1974 MAYORAL ELECTION AND NORTH WARD SURVEY COMPARED

	CITIZENS Hay		LABOUR Pickering	
	%	N	%	N
Result in Christchurch City	52.0	29 482	48.0	27 237
Result in North Ward	52.4	5 315	47.6	4 821
North Ward Survey	50.6	83	49.4	81

sample size the accuracy of the survey is remarkable. Not only is it representative of the votes cast in the mayoral election in North, but it is representative of the votes cast in the city as a whole. There are other indications that the sample in North was a very good one. Only 5 per cent of those interviewed intended to vote for the Values Party mayoral candidate. He came at the bottom of the poll with 3.5 per cent of the mayoral vote. The city council candidate best-known to the sample polled the highest number of votes in North . The second best-known candidate was the only Labour candidate elected. The Values council candidates who were almost completely unknown came at the bottom of the poll. A comparison of respondents' recall of their voting behaviour in the 1971 mayoral election and the result of that election over the

city as a whole[1] again shows the astonishing accuracy of the survey (Table 2.2).

TABLE 2.2 1971 MAYORAL ELECTION AND NORTH WARD SURVEY COMPARED

	LABOUR Pickering		CITIZENS Guthrey	
	%	N	%	N
Result in Christchurch City	52.0	25 121	48.0	23 212
North ward survey	52.0	65	48.0	60

It is acknowledged that there is a risk that respondents may be inaccurate or possibly biased in their recall of their past behaviour and that they may change their minds about their intended behaviour in the period between the interview and the election. However, the comparison between election results and survey results shows that these kinds of non-sampling error must have been at a minimum. Consequently it is felt that considerable confidence can be placed in the findings of the survey.

MASTER ROLL SURVEY

The second major source of individual level data was the master copy of the 1974 electoral roll which shows whether each elector voted in the election. As the North ward survey was not

1. North ward did not exist as such in the 1971 election.

designed to investigate voter turnout and since the intention to vote can be overstated in survey interviews, it was thought that an additional source should be tapped to provide further data on turnout. The idea for this survey came from G.W.A. Bush who analysed the entire electoral roll for the 1971 Auckland City Council election;[1] and in another study I suggested that: "Computer analysis of the master roll would yield a rich return in terms of the social characteristics of voters and non-voters."[2] It is not widely known that political scientists (or any person) may carry out analyses of local authority electoral rolls pursuant to the Local Elections and Polls Act. Section 45 of the 1966 Act provided that: "Any elector of the district may inspect the master roll at the office of the local authority ...." Computer analysis of the entire roll similar to Bush's method was impracticable because the computer cards used to compile the roll had been destroyed. It was thus decided to sample the roll and record the data by hand. The Returning Officer for the election agreed to provide facilities for the sampling process which took a number of days.

The data retrieved for each elector sampled and the corresponding coding categories are listed in Table 2.3.

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1. G.W.A. Bush, "The Non-Vote in a Local Body Election", Political Science XXIV (September 1972), 45-56.

2. Andrew MacKenzie, "The Christchurch City Council Election of 1974", M.A.(Hons.) essay, Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1975, p. 48.

TABLE 2.3 DATA RETRIEVED FROM MASTER ROLL AND CODING CATEGORIES

DATA	CATEGORIES
Ward	West Pegaus
Sex	Male Female
Marital Status (females only)	Married Single Widow
Occupational Status*	Professional Business White Collar Farmer Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled Student Retired
Age	Student (young) Retired (old)
Electoral Qualification	Resident Ratepayer Nominee
Voted?	Yes No
Place of voting	By polling booth number
Time of Voting	Early (Wednesday to Friday) Polling day (Saturday)
Special Vote?	Yes No

* Occupational status was coded according to the seven point Congalton-Havinghurst scale of occupational status adapted for New Zealand by Peter Davis, An Occupational Prestige Ranking Scale for New Zealand (Christchurch: Department of Psychology and Sociology, Research Project 24, University of Canterbury, 1974). See also A.A. Congalton, Status and Prestige in Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1969); Cora Vellekoop, "Social Strata in New Zealand", in John Forster (ed.), Social Process in New Zealand (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1969), pp. 233-271. Students and retired people are not included on the scale and are therefore listed separately.

As can be seen from this list the master roll contains a great deal of information that is useful for helping us understand more about participation in local elections.

The main advantages of using the master roll are that the data are easily available and relatively accurate. The researcher does not have to rely on survey respondents' honesty in stating their intention whether to vote, nor on their recall of turnout in past elections. In this respect the data are as 'hard' as one can possibly get and almost certainly more accurate than survey research. The master roll is not, of course, a totally accurate list of all those eligible to vote in the city council elections. Although the roll was purged in the months prior to the election, it is very likely that it still contained the names of dead people and other persons who had moved out of the district. It is also likely that the roll did not contain the names of many eligible electors. The accuracy of the roll is an unknown factor over which the researcher has no control, but the advantages of the method far outweigh this particular disadvantage.

The universe for the survey was the total number of registered electors appearing on the District Electors' Roll for the City of Christchurch (master copy) compiled for the election of the city council held from 9 October to 12 October 1974.[1] The roll contained the combined rolls for the five electoral wards ordered

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1. For full details of the sample design see Appendix B.

alphabetically. The populations chosen to be sampled were the electors' rolls for West and Pegasus wards containing 14 956 and 20 273 names respectively. The entire roll was not sampled because - like the North ward survey - it was considered that more could be learnt by concentrating resources into smaller areas. The sampling of two wards was considered feasible because of the availability of the data and the relative ease with which it could be collected. North was not chosen because data had already been collected from that ward and it was considered wiser to use scarce resources to look at other wards. West and Pegasus were selected because they are contrasting areas of the city both politically and socially. West is the strongest Citizens' ward in the city; in 1974 the Citizens mayoral candidate won 68 per cent of the votes. Pegasus is the strongest Labour ward in the city; in 1974 the Labour mayoral candidate won 60 per cent of the votes.[1] The two wards also provide a contrast in neighbourhood status. West is an area of high status, middle class suburbs and Pegasus is an area of lower status working class suburbs. As well as being representative of the two wards it was thought that the total sample might be representative of the city as a whole through being a mixture of both high and low status electors, and Citizens and Labour followers. The selection of West and Pegasus along with North gives us three different wards (out of five) from which data has been collected for this study: a strong Citizens ward, a strong Labour ward and a marginal ward.

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1. For more data describing the political nature of the wards see Appendix A, Tables 7, 8 and Figure 3.

The same principles behind the selection of the sample size for the North ward survey were applied to the master roll survey. Since the data could be relatively easily collected,it was thought that a larger sample somewhere in the range 1 000 to 2 500 would be feasible bringing increased precision to the findings. Another important factor influencing the choice of a large sample size was the expectation that about 40 per cent of the sample would be women with no known occupation. (Instead of having their occupation listed in the appropriate column in the electoral roll women usually had their marital status in the form Mrs, Miss, or widow). Therefore,the occupational categories in the analysis would have to be sufficiently large to give significant results without these 'occupation-less' women. The sample size was thus larger than would otherwise be necessary. The turnout at the election was 60.5 per cent and the division between the voters and the non-voters in the sample was thus expected to be 60 : 40. Using Parten's sample size tables the appropriate sample size giving an acceptable level of error and confidence limits was 1 769.[1] This gives an error of $\pm$ 3 per cent with confidence limits of 99 chances in 100 of accuracy. As the sample population consisted of two wards, it needed to be divided or stratified into two strata. From each stratum the same proportion was sampled so that the total sample would represent the proportions of the total population.[2] Given a total sample size of

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1. Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples, pp. 314-315.

2. On stratified and proportional sampling see Leslie Kish, Survey Sampling (New York: John Wiley, 1965), chap. 4; Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples, chap. 7.

1 769 and given that the two subsamples were to be in the proportion 20 273 : 14 956 (or 203 : 150), the subsample size for Pegasus was calculated to be 1 018 which happens to be 1 in 20 (i.e. 5 per cent) of the ward population. Similarly the subsample size for West was calculated to be 751 which is also 5 per cent of the ward population.

The cases comprising each subsample were selected separately; that is, the West subsample was drawn first followed by the Pegasus subsample. For each subsample the selection method was a three stage systematic selection.[1] The first stage was the systematic selection of pages of the roll. Starting at either page 1 or 2 (chosen by random selection) every second page was selected. Then for the West subsample starting again at page 1 or 2 every fourteenth page was selected. Since the West subsample required 751 cases and the roll had 1 308 pages this procedure left 3 pages to be selected at random. A similar procedure was used to select the pages for the larger Pegasus subsample. The second stage was the selection of the electors in West or Pegasus wards on each of the pages drawn in the first stage. This was easy because - although the entire roll was ordered alphabetically - each elector's ward appeared next to his/her name. The third stage was the selection of each case from the electors in West or Pegasus wards on the page selected. Problems arose here because each page of the roll contained different numbers of electors from the two wards. During the

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1. The selection method was planned using: Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); Kish, Survey Sampling, chap. 4; Lazerwitz, "Sampling Theory"; and Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples.

preliminaries to the actual sampling 50 pages of the roll were randomly selected and the number of West electors, for example, on each page ranged from 5 to 24 with a mean of 13 and a standard deviation of 4.63. It would have been possible to count the number of electors from West (or Pegasus) on each page selected and then randomly select a case from within this range. However this procedure would take too long and a shortcut was necessary. The average number of electors on each page ($\bar{x}$) from West and Pegasus wards was calculated over 50 pages. A random number (k) was chosen so that it fell in the range $1 \leqslant k \leqslant \bar{x}$. This number k was to be the selection interval for each page; that is, on every page selected the kth elector from the appropriate ward would be systematically selected as the subsample case. On pages where there were less than k electors from the particular ward, the page following the selected page was regarded as part of that page and counting of electors continued until the kth one was found.

One of the problems arising from this use of systematic selection is that departures from randomness in the sampling method can occur through 'periodic fluctuations' in the ordering of the population on the electoral roll. There may be significantly more electors from either of the wards on a particular page. However, since a large number of pages were sampled it is thought that any random errors would cancel each other out.[1] In theory there are solutions to this problem - such as shuffling the cases,

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1. Kish, Survey Sampling, pp. 120-121.

or making a random selection within each page, or drawing every kth elector regardless of where pages begin and end - but these solutions are not practical and are outweighed by the advantages of the method used. The chief advantage of using a systematic selection method (that is, choosing every kth sampling unit after a random start) is that its application is "easy, 'foolproof' and flexible."[1] The selection of 1 769 cases from a list containing 98 039 units requires a systematic plan that - because of the repetitive nature of the sampling task - must be simple to operate. Another advantage of systematic selection is that it can easily yield a proportionate sample. "A systematic sample over an alphabetical list of names will yield about the same proportion of names from each letter."[2]

The aim of this whole process was to obtain a random probability sample that is representative of the population. The best test of the accuracy, reliability and validity of the sample and sampling method is how well the sample findings compare with the population. A comparison of some of the findings from the master roll survey with the known statistics for the city as a whole and the sample populations show the survey was an extremely accurate one (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Not only is it representative of West and Pegasus wards,but the total sample is representative of the city as a whole. (Further meaningful comparisons between the

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1. Ibid., p. 114.

2. Ibid., p. 114.

TABLE 2.4 ACCURACY OF THE MASTER ROLL TOTAL SAMPLE

	Master Roll Total Sample	City Total
Voter Turnout		
- Resident	55.7%	54.4%
- Ratepayer & Nominee	58.7	61.4
- All electors	57.0	60.5
Electoral Qualification		
- Resident	56.1%	55.9%
- Ratepayer	43.6	43.4
- Nominee	0.3	0.7
	100.0	100.0
Sex		
- Male	50.0%	48.2% (1971
- Female	50.0	51.8 census)
	100.0	100.0

TABLE 2.5 ACCURACY OF THE MASTER ROLL SUBSAMPLES

	Master Roll subsample	Ward Total (Sample Population)
West: Electoral Qualification		
- Resident	61.6%	60.3%
- Ratepayer	37.9	39.2
- Nominee	0.5	0.5
	100.0	100.0
Pegasus: Electoral Qualification		
- Resident	52.1%	52.5%
- Ratepayer	47.8	47.4
- Nominee	0.1	0.1
	100.0	100.0

survey findings and the sample population or the city totals are not possible because of the lack of corresponding data). Consequently it is felt that considerable confidence can be placed in the findings of this survey.

AGGREGATE STATISTICS AND OTHER SOURCES OF DATA

The aggregate statistics used have been the official published results of the election, polling booth returns,and statistics published by the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs relating to local elections throughout the whole of New Zealand. Unfortunately local election statistics are not collected and published in New Zealand in the way that general election statistics are. To find the results of a particular local authority election the researcher must either search newspapers or ask the local authority concerned. The Department of Internal Affairs has published statistics but only since 1959.[1] These reports first dealt mainly with voter turnout in territorial authorities,but the 1974 report includes statistics from a wide range of local authorities and the results of council elections in major cities by party affiliation. Appendix A contains a full summary of aggregate statistics from the 1974 and other recent Christchurch City Council elections.

Other sources of data for this study included: correspondence with C.L. Sugden and M.O. Holdsworth (present and former Chairmen,

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1. N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority Elections 1959, 1962 and 1965/1968/1971/1974", Wellington, 1967/[no date]/[no date]/1976 (mimeo).

Christchurch Citizens Association); interviews with M.W. Atkinson (Associate Town Clerk and Returning Officer, Christchurch City Council), Vicki Buck (Candidate 1974, Councillor 1975-), N.G. Pickering (Mayor 1971-74); newspaper reports; party manifestoes; party political advertisements; personal observations of the 1974 election; the report of the special committee appointed to review the ward system in 1976; and the Returning Officer's report on the 1974 election.

METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

The North ward survey questionnaires and the master roll data were all coded by the writer,and computer analysis was carried out also by the writer using the library of computer programmes called the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).[1]

In this study the main method of analysis used to find meaningful relationships between two or more variables is cross-tabulation. This is "the most commonly used analysis method in the social sciences."[2] The distributions obtained are analysed by the chi-square (χ^2) test of significance which shows whether a distribution is due solely to sampling error or whether there is a statistically significant relationship. It does not measure the

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1. See Norman H. Nie, Dale H. Bent and C. Hadlai Hull, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970); Statistical Package for the Social Sciences User's Manual (Davis, Calif.: Social Sciences Data Service, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California [no date]).

2. Nie et al., SPSS, p. 116.

strength of association nor can it show causation.[1] It only indicates that there could be a relationship between two variables subject to the confidence levels in the chi-square tables. Chi-square is appropriate for this study because many of the variables used have only nominal values (that is, the values are merely labels (eg. Citizens/Labour) without any assumption of ranking or of equal intervals between values).[2] The second method of analysis used is correlation which refers to the strength or degree of relationship between two variables. A correlation coefficient is a single statistic summarising the degree of association or covariation between two variables. The correlation coefficients used in this study are Spearman rank order correlations (r_S) which assume that the variables are at least ordinal in scale. As long as the variables can be ranked then the Spearman coefficient closely approximates the Pearson product-moment correlation.[3]

Some of the problems that are often encountered in data analysis are operationalising the appropriate variables, isolating the desired information from the mass of data, and avoiding spurious correlations by controlling for third variables. These problems are discussed as they arise.

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1. On causal inferences see Arthur H. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behaviour", American Political Science Review LX (1966), 913-922.

2. Blalock, Social Statistics, chap. 15.

3. Blalock, Social Statistics, chap. 18; Nie et al., SPSS, chap. 13; SPSS User's Manual, pp. 89-91.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Survey research complemented by aggregate statistics are the main sources of data for this study. Survey research enables a close look at individual behaviour, but it is disadvantaged by the possible distortion of reality in the processing and analysing of data. The North ward survey was a research project carried out just prior to the 1974 Christchurch City Council election and consisted of 231 interviews using a prepared questionnaire. The master roll survey was an analysis of the electoral roll to find out more about voter turnout. Other sources of data are used as well to provide further information on the 1974 election. It is considered that these methods provide an outstanding opportunity for a detailed examination of a New Zealand local election. Various sources of data are used but it is the North ward survey upon which this thesis relies most for data, and the accuracy of the survey has been demonstrated. The research design is an important part of scientific method but so too is theory which provides a means for organising and explaining the data collected in research.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL APPROACH

This chapter aims to explain the theoretical framework of the thesis. After describing developments in the social-psychological approach to the study of electoral behaviour the economic approach to political science is examined. Then a model drawing on public choice theory is presented.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

Early Studies

Early studies of electoral behaviour were mainly concerned with the effects of social group characteristics on the vote. This was largely a result of the availability of aggregate data concerning a population's social characteristics. Since aggregate analysis was limited either to variables that could be associated with political subdivisions or to data about the voter that were part of the voting record, the demographic and social characteristics of the voters naturally became the focus of aggregate analysis.[1]

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1. For a summary of early developments in the study of electoral behaviour see Angus Campbell, "Recent Developments in Survey Studies of Political Behaviour", in Austin Ranney (ed.), Essays on the Behavioural Study of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 31-46; Peter Rossi, "Four Landmarks in Voting Research", in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behaviour (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 5-54.

Thus the first studies of political behaviour were principally concerned with the voting of men and women, people of different age, occupation, class, residence and so on.[1] When survey techniques reached the point of development where they could be applied to the study of the vote, the studies which were conducted tended to emphasise these same variables. Thus the pioneering Erie County study of the 1940 United States presidential election went so far as to conclude that: "A person thinks politically what he is socially; social characteristics determine political preference."[2] Lazarsfeld et al. investigated the sociological antecedents of voting behaviour and found that the three most important social indicators of the vote were socio-economic status, religion and residence which combined to give the 'Index of Political Predisposition'. A similar conclusion was arrived at by Berelson et al. in their 1948 study of Elmira, New York.[3] However, this heavy emphasis on social structural variables by the 'Columbia (or Sociological) School' led to criticism that such surveys threatened to take the politics out of the study of electoral behaviour.[4]

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1. H. Tingsten, Political Behaviour : Studies in Election Statistics (London: King, Stockholm Economic Series No.7, 1937).

2. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 27.

3. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

4. V.O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision : The Case of Indiana", in Burdick and Brodbeck, American Voting Behaviour, pp. 281-299.

The first nationwide survey was carried out by the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan in 1952.[1] In what became known as the 'Michigan (or Psychological) School', Campbell et al. investigated the psychological influences on the vote. They found that of all the variables in the voters' minds, three stood out as being of overriding importance in influencing the vote. These were party identification, candidate orientation, and issue orientation. Campbell et al. concluded that psychological variables determine political preference. However the psychological approach was criticised by Peter Rossi who justifiably argued:

> "It helps us little to know that voters tend to select candidates of whom they have high opinions. Voting for a candidate and holding a favourable opinion of him may be regarded as alternative definitions of the same variable. The more interesting problems start where the author's analysis ends. Why does a voter develop a favourable opinion of a candidate?" 2

The Survey Research Centre and "The American Voter".

The contrasting approaches to the study of electoral behaviour by the Columbia and Michigan Schools were later reconciled and balanced together by the Survey Research Centre in what is often called the 'classic' portrait of the American electorate - The American Voter.[3] Here the authors establish a model of voting behaviour in the form of the 'Funnel of Causality' which focuses a range of political, psychological and sociological variables

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1. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954).

2. Rossi, "Four Landmarks", p. 41 .

3. Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964) [1st ed. 1960].

leading to the voting decision including social group influences, political socialisation, party identification, candidate orientation, issue predisposition and personal attitudes.

Taking the individual's voting act as a starting point, the model moves back over time tracing the sociological antecedents of the political variables which affect the vote. They assume that the direction of a person's vote is dependent on his immediate sense of his perceptions and evaluations of the things he sees in national politics: parties, candidates, issues, and contending group forces. From measurements of political attitudes and their relation to voting behaviour Campbell et al. define six dimensions of 'partisan attitude' that can, to a large degree, successfully explain individual voting choice.[1] The decision of the individual voter to actually turnout on election day is explained by reference to the same attitude forces which influence partisan choice and a number of psychological variables including interest in the campaign, concern over its outcome, sense of political efficacy, and sense of citizen duty. These psychological factors combine to give the 'Intensity of Political Involvement'. Party identification and social characteristics are viewed as long-term influences on the vote, while attitudes towards candidates and issues are short-term factors which can account for shifts in voting preference between elections. The authors ask what conditions

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1. See also Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision", American Political Science Review LII (1958), 367-387.

lead to the formation of partisan allegiances initially, and to answer this they trace over time the influence of social groups and categories on electoral behaviour. Finally The American Voter attempts to account for the decision of the electorate as a whole by shifting attention "from the voter to the full electorate and from individual choice to the collective decision."[1] Voting is an individual act, yet it is the collectivity of voters that makes the electoral decision, and the Survey Research Centre team use their knowledge of individual motivation to describe the forces on the decision of the total electorate.

Elections and the Political Order followed The American Voter and contains a collection of articles focusing on the aggregate properties of the electorate, the party system, the division of the vote, and problems of a wider political order.[2] A key question which permeates much of the analysis is: How much shift of which types of voters relates to which electoral outcome? Later studies utilising the theoretical framework established in The American Voter have covered the 1960, 1964, 1968 and 1972 presidential elections.[3]

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1. Campbell et al., American Voter, p. 267.

2. Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

3. Philip E. Converse et al., "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating election", American Political Science Review LV (1961), 269-280; Philip E. Converse, Aage Clausen and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality : The 1964 Election", American Political Science Review LIX (1965), 321-336; Philip E. Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues at the 1968 Election", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 1083-1105; Arthur H. Miller et al., "A Majority Party in Disarray : Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election", American Political Science Review LXX (1976), 753-778.

The contribution of the Survey Research Centre to the study of electoral behaviour is immense. Kenneth Prewitt and Norman Nie have observed that the Survey Research Centre scholars

> "have made substantial contributions, theoretically as well as empirically, to our understanding of American political processes....Most of our systematic, empirical understanding of voting and elections in the U.S. can be directly traced to studies by this group. Indeed so many of their insights and findings have been absorbed into conventional wisdom that it is difficult to imagine the condition of our theories about American politics if we were to factor out their contribution." 1

Recent Studies

The Changing American Voter by Norman H. Nie et al.[2] contrasts sharply with the findings of The American Voter. The American Voter along with other studies of the 1950s[3] described the American electorate as only mildly involved in politics. They thought about politics in relatively simple and narrow terms; they were allied with one or another of the major parties by ties that were more a matter of habit than rational selection; and they were

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1. Kenneth Prewitt and Norman H. Nie, "Review Article : Election Studies of the Survey Research Centre", British Journal of Political Science I (1971), p. 479.

2. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).

3. For example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture : Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Berelson et al, Voting; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961); Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties : A Cross-section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963).

basically satisfied with the workings of the system. With the aid of a series of survey findings from 1952 to 1972 - which enable Nie et al. to trace patterns of attitudes and behaviour over time - the authors depict a changing and increasingly dissatisfied and disillusioned citizenry. Voters feel more alienated not only from political parties but from politics as a whole. As the nature of politics has changed from the 1950s to the 1970s so has the public's response changed. The public of the 1970s is much more involved, politically aroused, more detached from parties, and deeply dissatisfied with the political process. The 'classic' portrait of the American electorate as presented in The American Voter is drawn largely from a study of the 1956 presidential election supplemented by data from the 1952 and 1958 elections. Nie et al. suggest that 1956 might have been an unfortunate base-line - an atypical year with few crucial and divisive issues. The studies of the 1950s did not predict the divisive issues of the 1960s and 1970s: Vietnam, civil rights and Watergate. However Nie et al. also point out that:

> "The notion that The American Voter established a fixed model of electoral behaviour that could then be applied across subsequent elections without consideration of the changing content is a nation more to be found among the readers of the writers of the 1950s than among the writers themselves." 1

In their reinterpretation of the American Voter's 'classic' portrait Nie et al. argue that the dynamics of the electoral system depend on the interplay of long-term partisan commitments and political issues facing the nation. More weight is assigned to

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1. Nie et al. Changing American Voter, p. 8.

political issues in structuring behaviour than in the 'normal vote' model of the Survey Research Centre.

Nie et al. have been joined by other revisionists who have questioned the adequacy of the social-psychological model.[1] They argue that certain components such as issues always were or have become more important than generally believed, while other components such as candidate personalities, or long-term forces such as party identification always were or have become less important than generally believed. With V.O. Key, Jr. the revisionists maintain that the voter is a reasonably rational fellow.[2]

Political Change in Britain can be considered as an extension of the Survey Research Centre studies.[3] Three fundamental kinds of change are considered: changes resulting from the physical replacement of the electorate through natural causes, changes resulting from the rise and decline of class influence, and transient movements in response to events, issues and leaders. Butler and Stokes focus on both individual electors and the full

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1. See, for example, Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate", in Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (eds.), The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage, 1972); Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice : Varieties of American Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975); Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man : A Synthesis of Economic and Socio-Psychological Perspectives", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 1106-1119.

2. V.O. Key, Jr., The Repsonsible Electorate : Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

3. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974) [1st ed. 1969].

electorate. Attention is directed to individual citizens, to the place of politics in their world, to their changing political responses as they age, to the imagery by which they link politics and class, and to their views of the parties and their place in the party system. Yet the reasons for behaviour often lie in a wider political or social milieu. The consequences of individual change can be known only by aggregating the behaviour of individual electors to see what is true of the electorate as a whole.

One of the underlying themes running through Political Change in Britain is the role played by party identification in voter choice and electoral outcomes. Findings about party identification in Britain are similar to those reported in the United States. In large proportions British voters report always having supported the same party, and their voting choices reflect long-standing party loyalties. Partisan self-images are acquired in Britain similarly to the way they are acquired in the United States - through parental socialisation - and their persistence and stability result not so much from the age of the voter as from the duration of the party tie. Party identity functions for the British voter much as it does for voters elsewhere. It is a means of "sorting political leaders into the worthy and less worthy, and of making judgements on the merits of conflicting party claims whose full evaluation could require a lifetime of study."[1] However,

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1. Ibid., p. 81.

it is from the perspective of partisanship that Butler and Stokes contribute the most to our empirical and theoretical knowledge of elections. They manage to blend into the analysis of partisanship two additional factors - the class support for the two major parties and the procession of age-cohorts through the electorate. The social basis of party support is thus connected with the pattern of partisan loyalties in the society. Over time parties vary in their mass support because party identifications are distributed differently within age-cohort groups, a distribution influenced by the political values and arrangements prevailing when the age-cohort was socialised and when it came of political age. Thus the waxing and waning of party strength is related to the movement of age-cohorts into and out of the electorate.

The Social-Psychological Approach and the Problems to be Investigated

Several important studies which grew out of the social-psychological approach are used in this thesis to provide the theoretical approach to the problems raised in Chapter I. These studies are reviewed here in order to provide links between the problems to be investigated and the social-psychological literature.

According to the social-psychologists voter turnout in an election is the result of the intersection of social and group forces and/or psychological factors. The social factors include socio-economic status, education and social involvement while

the psychological factors include political interest, political efficacy, sense of citizen duty and psychological cross-pressures. Persons are more likely to vote if they have high socio-economic status, higher education, a high social involvement and if they have a high interest in politics, political efficacy, citizen duty and are not cross-pressured.[1] Whether these sorts of variables were related to voter turnout in the Christchurch election will be investigated. The conditions leading to the surge and decline of voter turnout were identified by Campbell of the Michigan Survey Research Centre.[2] The variables used in Campbell's model are mainly psychological (for example, political stimulation, political interest and party identification). The model proposes that changes in turnout are mainly due to short-term political stimulation which - when added to the underlying level of political interest - moves the partisanship of the vote to either of the parties. That the decision to turnout to vote can have great influence on the party fortunes can be seen in Christchurch where changes in turnout have been accompanied by equally large changes in party strength (in percentage terms).

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1. See Campbell et al. American Voter, chap. 4; Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation : How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

2. Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change", in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 3.

The concept of party identification and the linkages between that identification and electoral behaviour were first systematically elaborated by Belknap and Campbell in 1952.[1] The utility and power of the concept of psychological attachment to political parties as a property separate from voting was developed in The Voter Decides and The American Voter. In Elections and the Political Order Campbell et al. demonstrate how party identification, along with actual voting patterns, can be used to understand the nature of elections and the flow of voting. The concept of party identification will be explored in the Christchurch election; its influence on the voters will be measured and the relationship between party identification in a local election and in a national election will be examined.

Candidate orientation - one of the key variables in the Michigan studies - is the principal factor leading to personal voting.[2] However, candidate orientation tends to be closely involved in the voter's mind with party and with issue factors. The problem then becomes one of identifying and isolating candidate orientation as a factor from the whole range of political, psychological and sociological variables acting on the voting choice. One of the first studies of ticket-splitting grew

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1. George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy", Public Opinion Quarterly XV (1952), 601-623.

2. Campbell et al., American Voter, chap. 2.

out of the Survey Research Centre studies.[1] Split-ticket voting is hypothesised to be the result of the intersection of three political motivations: party identification, candidate partisanship and issue partisanship. When these motivations are at their lowest or when they conflict, split ticket voting is the result. Coattail voting is an expression of candidate partisanship; it occurs when the personality of the party leader produces votes for the other members of the party ticket.[2] The problem for this thesis is to isolate coattail influenced, straight ticket voting in the Christchurch election from straight ticket voting influenced by factors such as party identification and issue orientation.

THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

The revisionists who have questioned the mainstream social-psychological model of voting behaviour have found allies in scholars who advocate 'economic' explanations. Recent theoretical developments by several economists have suggested that the 'economic approach' to political science is capable of casting

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1. Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", American Political Science Review LI (1957), 293-312.

2. See Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails : A Study in Political Myth and Methodology", Public Opinion Quarterly XIX (1955), 353-368.

considerable light on a wide range of political activities.[1] Rigorous logical and mathematical models drawn basically from economics have been developed and applied to various aspects of the political process. The approach has encouraged the building of simple formal models with explicit predictions which can be tested empirically. Operating with simple premises regarding rational behaviour, the economic approach enables interesting conclusions regarding political behaviour to be deduced by logic. The results are not only clearer and more logical than traditional approaches to political problems, they are more realistic. Pioneers in the field of economic analysis were Downs, Buchanan and Tullock were were joined by Olsen and Hirschman. The works of these authors are distinctive landmarks in the development of the economic approach. They showed that testable hypotheses regarding political behaviour could be formulated from the assumption of rational, wealth-maximising behaviour on the part of individual voters. Political participation is interpreted as a problem-solving device induced by costs and

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1. See especially Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Albert O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty : Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Gordon Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). For a commentary on the economic approach see: Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970).

benefits of political activity. Using theoretical notions of choice and rationality, the economic approach attempts to provide an 'economic' answer to the fundamental question: 'Why do people participate in politics?'

Every individual is constantly faced with the problem of choice - a choice out of several alternative actions. Public choice theory and the economic approach attempt to derive conceptually refutable predictions regarding political outcomes from the rational behavioural calculus of individuals. The notion of choice recognises that people who desire scarce resources make choices between the available options. Political participation in the form of voting involves the making of choices by each individual voter. At a minimum these choices involve decisions whether to register and vote and for whom to vote. For the voter who wishes to make the most of his vote these choices present dilemmas: How should political choices be made? The principles a voter should use in making his choices are elaborated in detail by the economic theorists. Such a framework for making voting choices includes estimates of costs and benefits stemming from the choices, the estimated probability of success, and the likely impact the individual's vote will have on the electoral outcome.[1]

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1. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting", American Political Science Review LXII (1968), p. 28; Tullock, Toward a Mathematics, p. 109.

In making a choice, the notion of rational maximising behaviour assumes that, given full information, people will chose more of what they want instead of less. Electoral behaviour is conceived of as a rational decision-making process, and voters as rational decision-makers cast their votes, as a function of their self-interest, for the party or candidate from whom they expect the greatest amount of satisfaction. In this way rational choice models can be used to explain why an individual votes for one candidate or another, or why one candidate wins and another loses.

A PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

An Economic Theory of Democracy

Anthony Downs offers a simple economic model to explain why people vote. He develops a model of party government and a calculus of rational choice based on three fundamental assumptions: that both voters and parties behave rationally at all times, that parties are guided only be the desire to win and hold office, and that every voter tries to promote his own self-interest with the ballot.[1] Each party's immediate goal is to maximise its voting support by selling policies; the parties sell policies for votes in order to win elections. Under the realistic condition of imperfect information, party policies are conveyed more in the fashion of an ideology, that is, in "verbal images",[2] of how to create the good society. Because parties must

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1. Downs, An Economic Theory, chaps. 2 and 3.

2. Ibid., p. 96.

maintain ideological continuity, they become 'locked in' along a left-right dimension. The parties move along this dimension seeking to maximise their voting support by adopting policies that are favoured by a majority of voters. The result is that the parties in a two-party system tend to converge ideologically upon the centre overlapping each other in terms of policies so that the parties closely resemble each other. This results in a certain amount of tension in the model for "party policies may become so vague, and parties so alike, that voters find it difficult to make rational decisions. Nevertheless, fostering ambiguity is the rational course for each party in a two-party system."[1]

According to Downs the voting act is a process by which the individual differentiates among alternatives on the basis of expected utility benefits. Rational behaviour is implied by the voter's ability to calculate logically the benefits that the various alternatives might be expected to yield, and rational choice is effected when the voter opts for the alternative he thinks will provide the greatest benefits. Down's definition of rationality assumes that voters as decision-makers have the ability to identify and order goals and preferences, that voters use the most efficient means available to them, and that their behaviour is oriented purposefully to maximise their self-interest - whether economic or political. That is, rationality as an economic concept refers to the selection of means rather

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1. Ibid., p. 141.

than ends. Conversely, any behaviour which employs a non-political means to achieve a political end is irrational.

The Role of Political Information

To make a rational voting decision a person must know (1) what his goals are, (2) what alternative ways of reaching these goals are available, and (3) the probable consequences of choosing each alternative, that is, how different parties and candidates will affect his flow of benefits. To solve these dilemmas information is required but such information is costly to the voter. The main steps of rationally deciding how to vote are as follows:[1]

1. Gathering relevant information.
2. Selecting from all this information that which will be used in the voting decision.
3. Analysing the facts selected to arrive at conclusions about possible alternative policies and their consequences.
4. Appraising the consequences in light of relevant goals.
5. Co-ordinating the appraisals into a net evaluation of each party.
6. Making the voting decision by comparing the net evaluations of each party.
7. Actually voting or abstaining.

The main scarce resource consumed in the steps above is the time used for processing the information and weighing alternatives, but many other resources may be involved especially in the gathering of information. The resources any citizen can devote to paying for and assimilating data are limited and he must select only a few sources from which to tap. Thus only part of the total

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1. Ibid., p. 209.

information available is used in making choices. Three factors determine how much information the rational decision-maker will invest in: the value to him of making a correct decision, the relevance of the information, and the cost of the data. If the costs of becoming informed are greater than the estimated value of the effect of the issue on the voter, then the rational decision-maker will not bother to invest in the information.[1]

Downs includes in his model an assumption that there is a basic amount of free political information available to all citizens.[2] This information can come from any of the following sources: political parties, mass media, pressure groups, friends and acquaintances. Free political information is of two types: "accidental" and "sought-for". Accidental data are the by-products of the non-political activites of citizens, and may be acquired at home, work or while engaged in leisure pursuits. Sought for data are generally more costly in terms of time and effort than accidental data. Not all citizens receive the same amount of free data due to their different abilities to bear the non-transferable costs inherent in all information, the different nature of their informal social contacts and their social positions, and the extent to which government action directly affects them. Thus society's free information stream systematically provides some citizens with more politically useful information than it provides others; and in any society which contains uncertainty

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1. Tullock, Toward a Mathematics, pp. 102-103.

2. Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 12.

and a division of labour, the cost of information is bound to be different for different people. Hence the amount of data it is rational for one person to acquire may be greater or smaller than the amount it is rational for another person to acquire. All information is costly: therefore those with high incomes can better afford it than those with low incomes. Hence people will not be equally well-informed politically, no matter how equal they are in all other respects.[1]

The value of information in enabling the voter to cast an informed vote must be discounted by the value of the vote itself, which is the probability that his vote will be decisive. Since each person's vote is only one drop in a vast sea this means that the value of political information and the vote value become very, very small and that:

> "[There is] an enormously diminished incentive for voters to acquire political information before voting....It seems probable that for a great many citizens in a democracy, rational behaviour excludes any investment whatever in political information per se. No matter how significant a difference between parties is revealed to the rational citizen by his free information, or how uncertain he is about which party to support, he realises that his vote has almost no chance of influencing the outcome. Therefore, why should he buy political information?" 2

Thus, it is rational for voters to be politically ignorant. It is not, however, rational to be ignorant about all aspects of government policy. In some instances it is quite rational to be well-informed.

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1. Ibid., pp. 221, 236.

2. Ibid., p. 245.

Downs uses the variable of party differential which is the strength of the voter's desire to see one party win instead of the others. The rational voter estimates his party differential after which he is interested only in information which might change this decision. Downs further argues that the larger a voter's party differential, the less likely he is to invest in information. "In other words, the more a voter originally favours one party over another, the less likely he is to buy political information."[1] Thus the greater a voter's partisan attachment, the less informed he is likely to be. For the non-partisan voter whose party differential is zero, the incentive to acquire information is larger than that of a highly partisan voter, since any new information may cause him to switch his vote from one party to another. But since it does not make much difference to him who wins, it is irrational for him to acquire costly information. Therefore, Downs concludes that:

> "(1) Information is relatively useless to those citizens who care which party wins and (2) those citizens for whom information is most useful do not care who wins. In short, nobody has a very high incentive to acquire political information." 2

Instead people rely on the stream of free information they acquire accidentally in the course of their non-political pursuits.

The Voting Decision

Downs argues that in deciding who to vote for the voter supports his more preferred party-candidate alternative, where

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1. Ibid., p. 243.

2. Ibid., p. 244.

preference results from a comparison of the alternative social states (ie. platforms) the two candidates promise to implement.[1] And the rational citizen votes if

$$pB - C > 0$$

where

p.= the probability of affecting the outcome,

B = the difference between the citizen's utility for the platform of his more preferred candidate and his utility for the platform of his less preferred candidate,

C = the cost of voting.

In mass elections one would expect p to be so small that the slight costs of voting (time, effort, travel costs, etc.) normally will outweigh the expected benefits of doing so. Thus as Tullock has shown, it is rational for citizens to abstain from voting even if they have party preferences.[2] If voting is typically irrational what, then, prevents democracy from collapsing through massive abstention at elections? Downs answer to this is that rational citizens will be motivated by their "sense of social responsibility"[3] into voting in order to ensure the larger goal of preserving the system.

The conclusion that voting is an irrational act disturbed a number of theorists so much that a reformulation was attempted by Riker and Ordeshook.[4] These two attempt to improve the Downsian

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1. Ibid., chaps. 3,13,14.

2. Tullock, Toward a Mathematics, chap. 7.

3. Downs, An Economic Theory, p. 267.

4. Riker and Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting".

model by blending some social-psychological ingredients into it. They propose that a citizen votes if

$$pB - C + D > O$$

where D = the fixed benefits of voting.

Riker and Ordeshook contend that fixed benefits as well as fixed costs accompany the act of voting. D summarises these benefits. Among other things D incorporates a sense of citizen duty. By voting, the citizen fulfills the duty to which he has been socialised and thereby experiences a psychological satisfaction which may outweigh the costs of voting. These psychic benefits are independent of any benefits derived from helping to elect the voter's most preferred candidate. Thus the benefits of voting outweigh the costs and the act of voting is rendered rational. The Riker-Ordeshook reformulation is valuable in that it reminds us that the voting decision has both instrumental and expressive components. The Downsian formulation is purely instrumental: the citizen's vote has value only insofar as it helps his preferred candidate to win. More traditional political science has made us aware of the expressive component of the voting decision. One may vote to express solidarity with one's class or peer group, to affirm a psychic allegiance to a party, or simply to enjoy the satisfaction of having performed one's civic duty.

The view of rationality put forward by Downs conflicts sharply with the traditional idea of citizenship in a democracy. This is because of the simultaneous truth of two seemingly contradictory propositions: (1) rational citizens want democracy to work well so as to gain its benefits, and it works best when

the citizens are well informed and when they turnout to vote, and (2) it is individually irrational to be well-informed and to turnout to vote.[1] That is, the goals men seek as individuals contradict those sought as members of the collective. This paradox exists because the benefits derived from efficient social organisation are indivisible: they are collective goods. A collective good is any good that cannot be withheld from any member of a specified group once it is supplied to one member of that group.[2] Examples of collective goods are the benefits that citizens receive from governments: law and order, social security, political order, defence and so on. Economists have stressed the difficulties of achieving an adequate supply of collective goods. Olsen has summarised the central dilemma:

> "...even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest." 3

This argument leads to the conclusion that groups will often fail to organise to achieve their common interests in the supply of collective goods. Where a group is already organised, this

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1. See Downs, An Economic Theory, pp. 245-246.

2. This definition follows closely the discussion in Olsen, Logic of Collective Action.

3. Ibid., p. 2. For discussion of the collective dilemma surrounding the supply of public goods see also: James M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Collective Goods (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968); Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer and Oran R. Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); John M. Orbell, "On the Logic of Doing Unto Others", Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1974.

pattern of individual motivation gives rise to what is known as the 'free-rider' problem. That is, since it is possible for individuals to receive collective goods without contributing to their supply, the rational citizen has an incentive to withhold contributions to the cost of the goods hoping that the efforts of others will be sufficient to provide the good to the whole group.[1] In our model this means that since many people do vote and since the individual's vote is not decisive, whether he is well informed or not, or whether he participates in voting has no impact on the benefits he gets. Therefore, the individual is motivated to shirk his share of the costs of providing a democratic government; he refuses to obtain enough information to become well-informed and it is rational for him to abstain from voting.[2]

The theory that voters act rationally at elections to maximise their benefits has received empirical support from a number of sources. Marion R. Just in her analysis of British voters concludes that: "Aspects of the models support the propositions of rational voting in the literature and comfort those who optimistically believe in man's free will and the ordinary citizen's rational judgement."[3] Brody and Page studied

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1. A more formal treatment of this problem is set forth in Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, "I Get By With a Little Help from My Friends", World Politics XXIII (1970), 104-120.

2. See Downs, An Economic Theory, p. 246.

3. Marion R. Just, "Causal Models of Voter Rationality, Great Britain 1959 and 1963", Political Studies XXI (1973), p. 56.

the effects of voters' evaluations of candidates on turnout and "confirmed a central proposition from rational theory by showing that people act so as to maximise their expected utility."[1] Stratmann tried to predict voters' choices as a function of their self-interest with respect to issues and candidates, and his findings support Downs' model.[2] Key concluded that "in the large, the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it.[3]

Rational Choice Theory and the Problems to be Investigated

The problems to be investigated in this thesis (which were raised in the social-psychological studies) lend themselves to analysis using rational choice theory. (A rational choice explanation for voter turnout has already been presented in this chapter.) A rational choice approach to the phenomenon of surge and decline emphasises the costs of political information at high and low-stimulus elections. In high-stimulus elections there is a large amount of information available at low cost and thus turnout increases. In low-stimulus elections the cost of

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1. Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "Indifference, Alienation and Rational Decisions : The Effects of Candidate Evaluations on Turnout and the Vote", Public Choice XV (1973), p. 16.

2. William C. Stratman, "The Calculus of Rational Choice", Public Choice XVIII (1974), 93-105.

3. Key, Responsible Electorate, p. 42.

information increases, and those who cannot afford the costs drop out. Consequently the turnout decreases. Using either party identification or candidate orientation as guides to voting behaviour can be efficient means for the voter to reduce his voting costs while still expressing a general opinion on the government or opposition. For the voter with a strong party loyalty a straight ticket, party oriented vote is his rational choice. For the voter without a strong party identification and who knows and likes a candidate of the opposing party,splitting his ticket to give a personal vote may well be a rational choice. Voters often know more about the party leaders than about the other candidates on the party ticket and they may make their voting decisions on this knowledge. Once the vote for the party leader has been decided, for those voters without much knowledge of the candidates for lower office and without a strong party identification, a cost-reducing choice is to vote a coattail vote; that is, to vote for the remaining members of the leader's ticket.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Empirical voting behaviour theory is rooted in the sociological and social-psychological tradition. These models hold that citizens choose their preferred candidates on the basis of long-term factors such as party identification and enduring group loyalties and more short-term influences such as candidate qualities and the issues. Similarly the decision to participate by voting depends on psychological variables such as political interest, political efficacy, sense of citizen duty,

and psychological cross-pressures. In recent years revisionists have questioned the adequacy of the social-psychological model and have argued that citizens vote in a rational manner consistent with their perceptions of the issues. On a formal theoretical level these views have found support from economic theorists who stress rational choice explanations of voting behaviour. Electoral behaviour is conceived of as a rational decision-making process, and voters as rational decision-makers cast their votes as a function of their self-interest, for the party or candidate from whom they expect the greatest amount of satisfaction. To make rational political decisions electors require costly political information. Since it is unlikely that any one person's vote will be the decisive one in an election, the value of political information becomes very small and the rational citizen will not buy political information. Downs argues that voting is typically irrational, but Riker and Ordeshook show that voting has its expressive aspects and that people turn out to vote to express their citizen duty.

This thesis uses both social-psychological and rational choice theories of voting behaviour for in many ways they complement each other. The social-psychological model of the Survey Research Centre emphasises the role of partisanship in the voting decision, but says little about the implications for voter rationality. Anthony Downs and other economic theorists present models which examine the rationality of the voting

decision, but say little about the role of partisanship as a rational means of reducing the costs of voting. The model used in this thesis represents a convergence of the two strands of theory by merging the deductive power of economic models and the empirical richness of voting behaviour research.[1] On the one hand Downs emphasises the instrumental benefits of voting and on the other the social-psychologists emphasise the expressive benefits. Both are components of the voting decision.

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1. Other writers who take note of this relationship include: Butler and Stokes, Political Change, p. 37; Morris P. Fiorina, "The Voting Decision : Instrumental and Expressive Aspects", Journal of Politics XXXVIII (1976), 390-415; Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 5-25; Pomper, Voters' Choice, pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER IV

VOTER TURNOUT

People participate in politics in many different ways, with different degrees of emotional involvement and at different levels of the system, but voting is the one type of participation that is the most widely practised by all levels of society. For many people casting a ballot is the only time that they ever participate in national or local politics. Thus the act of voting is both an important variable to be explained and to be employed in the analysis of other political behaviour. Predicting the individual decision to vote and the level of voting turnout have become major themes in election studies, and measures of voter turnout have been used as important building blocks in many theories of electoral behaviour. The authors of The American Voter have pointed out that: "No aspect of voting is of more fundamental importance that the individual's decision whether to vote at all."[1] Voter turnout in an election can be viewed as a consequence of a number of social, psychological and political circumstances. However, prior to examining these it is necessary to explain the problems of measuring the turnout in Christchurch using the North ward survey.

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1. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964), p. 14.

MEASURING THE TURNOUT

Table 4.1 shows the official turnout for Christchurch City and the turnout for each of the five wards using two different methods of estimation.[1] The first, using polling booth returns, is only an estimation because it is based on where

TABLE 4.1 VOTER TURNOUT BY WARD

WARD	METHOD OF ESTIMATION	
	Polling Booth Returns	Sampling
West	66%	64%
North	52	81
Pegasus	51	52
East	55	
South	58	
CITY TOTAL	61	

people voted not where people lived; that is, electors did not always vote at polling places within their ward. Special (absentee) votes are excluded from these turnout figures and they are thus smaller than the unknown real turnout statistics. The second method of estimation is by sampling: survey research for North ward and analysis of the voting roll for West and Pegasus. The figures for West and Pegasus from the master roll analysis accord very well with the figures based on polling booth returns, and thus quite a lot of confidence can be placed in the master roll figures.

1. Official turnout figures for the wards were not published.

The figure for North obtained from the survey is remarkably high (81 per cent) when compared to the city turnout of 61 per cent and the North turnout calculated from polling booth returns (52 per cent). However it is thought that some of this difference can be accounted for.

For a start the figures of 52 and 61 per cent are proportions of the number of voters to the number of electors on the electoral roll, and if the roll is inaccurate, then these turnout figures are inaccurate. The roll is likely to include the names of people who are ineligible to vote (for example, deceased persons and others who have moved out of the district) and to exclude the names of many eligible but not enrolled electors.[1] The turnout figures of 52 and 61 per cent would be higher if the roll did not contain the names of ineligible electors, but they would be lower if the roll contained the names of all eligible electors. The accuracy of these turnout figures is therefore unknown.

A second source of the difference in turnout figures is the disparity between the population sampled and the population of electors qualified to vote who are listed in the voting roll. The first of these populations is substantially smaller than the second because several groups that are most unlikely to vote are not included in the sample population. The sample excluded the

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1. G.W.A. Bush has estimated that in Auckland City in 1971 when the roll was 85 800, there were 15 000 who were eligible but not on the roll. See "The Non-vote in a Local Body Election", Political Science XXIV (September 1972), p. 55.

'floating' population - for example, people with no fixed addresses, travelling salesmen, and people in transit to new addresses. The authors of The American Voter in trying to account for the difference between the official presidential election turnout and the reported turnout of their sample attribute as much as half the difference to this source.[1] However, for a New Zealand local election where different factors operate to different extents,it is not really possible to estimate with any amount of confidence the size of this second source of error.

A third source of the difference stems from the fact that the figure of 81 per cent from the survey is based on voting intention in a pre-election survey. The American Voter in interviews both before and after presidential elections found a difference of about 12 percentage points between the actual turnout and the reported turnout,[2] and Richard Rose in a post-election survey in Britain found a difference of 11 per cent.[3] These differences are considerably less than the difference for North ward,and this can be partly attributed to the different times of interviewing relative to the time of the election. In the American and British interviews which took place after the election, it is easy for

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1. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley , 1960), pp. 93-96. (However, Campbell et al.'s sample excluded the institutional population (people in hospitals for example) as well as the floating population. The North ward survey did not exclude institutionalised people).

2. Ibid., p. 94.

3. Richard Rose (ed.), The Polls and the 1970 Election (Glasgow: Survey Research Centre, Occasional Paper No. 7, University of Strathclyde, 1970), p. 16.

voters to report something they have actually done. In the North ward interviews it is very easy for voters to say they 'intend' to do something in the future without really meaning it. People may well 'intend' to vote at the time of the interview, but when election day comes around they forget, are too busy, or are out of town. There is not nearly the same publicity and interest in local elections in New Zealand as there is in a general election. Consequently many people may unintentionally fail to vote.

Fourth, it is possible that those who refused to be interviewed are less likely to be interested in politics and to vote, and that those who were interviewed are more likely to be interested in politics and to vote. This would exclude a number of non-voters from the sample.

Fifth, it is possible that people misled the interviewer by saying they intended to vote when they really had no such intention, probably because voting is conceived of as a democratic duty and some sense of guilt attaches to non-performance. Since the interviews were conducted without the respondents being asked their names, it is impossible to check voter intention with actual turnout using the master roll. However, overseas studies that have made such a comparison have discounted the importance of this sort of error.[1]

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1. Hugh J. Parry and Aden M. Crossley, "Validity of Responses to Survey Questions", Public Opinion Quarterly XIV (1950), 61-80; Mungo Miller, "The Waukegan Study of Voter Turnout Prediction", Public Opinion Quarterly XVI (1952), 381-398. See also Aage Clausen, "Response Validity : Vote Report", Public Opinion Quarterly XXXII (1969), 588-606.

A final source of error is the fact that some voters are not counted as having turned out in the official count. Informal votes are included in the official turnout figure, but it appears that not all persons who were issued with special voting papers are included as well. The Returning Officer's Report on the election lists 5 880 people as being issued with special ballot papers, but only 4 443 are included in the figure that is used to calculate the percentage turnout.[1] This difference amounts to 1.47 per cent and would increase the city turnout from 60.51 per cent to 61.98 per cent.

To conclude, a number of factors have been suggested to account for the difference between the North ward survey voting intention figure and the turnout calculated using polling booth returns, but it is impossible to measure the extent of all these sources of error. The large difference between the two figures must place some restraints on the use of the North ward survey findings regarding voter turnout. Conclusions therefore from the survey can only be tentative. This restriction on using the North ward data does not, however, limit its use when analysing other aspects of voting behaviour in North. The survey may not be very accurate with regard to turnout, but as Chapter II shows the survey was extremely accurate with regard to the partisan division of the vote.

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1. Christchurch City Council, "Returning Officer's Report 1974 City Council Election", Christchurch, 1974 (mimeo), p. 7.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND VOTER TURNOUT

Ever since Lazarsfeld et al. concluded that "social characteristics determine political preference"[1], most voting studies have reported on the relationship between various demographic variables and voter turnout and voting choice. More recent research has emphasised a wider range of variables leading to the decision to vote,[2] but it is still important to describe and explain the social correlates of voting participation. Higher levels of voting turnout have been reported for those with greater political resources: higher socio-economic status people generally, residents of higher status neighbourhoods, those with higher-status occupations, the middle classes, the better educated, certain age groups (forty-five to fifty-four years), men, married people and residents who have lived longer in a community. Lower levels of turnout have been reported for those with fewer political resources: lower socio-economic status people generally, residents of lower status neighbourhoods, those with lower-status occupations, working class people, the less well-educated, the young (twenty-one to twenty-four years), the old (over seventy-five years), women, single people and newcomers to a community.[3]

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1. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 27.

2. For example, Campbell et al., American Voter.

3. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., chap. 15; Robert E. Dowse and John A. Hughes, Political Sociology (London: John Wiley, 1972), pp.297-299; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 184; Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation : How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 116.

Such findings have proved of importance in providing a picture of the active electorate and, more specifically, a description of the proportional electoral influence of major social groupings.

Why do some people vote more than others? There is no general theory explaining why people expend their resources in voting rather than in other ways. Lester Milbrath's concepts of the 'centre' and the 'periphery' of political life approach an explanation that can perhaps account for different levels of voter turnout. According to Milbrath, the factors associated with high political participation (such as education, high social involvement and high socio-economic status), represent advantaged locations within the social system for receiving political information, having a better leverage on politics, and a greater contact with political life.[1] Rational choice theory provides a different explanation. If we, like Downs, assume that acquiring information and voting are costly, then it can be shown that high-income citizens vote at a greater rate than low-income citizens.[2] The cost of voting is harder for low-income citizens to bear, therefore, even if the returns from voting among the two groups are the same, fewer members of low-income groups vote. The cost of information is harder for low-income citizens to bear since they cannot afford as much as high-income citizens; hence more of them are likely to be uncertain because they lack information. Since political uncertainty reduces the returns

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1. Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 116.

2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), chap. 14.

from voting, a lower proportion of low-income groups would vote even if voting costs were equally difficult for everyone to bear. Since income is usually very closely related to occupational status, class and neighbourhood status ,this argument is appropriate to explain the different turnout rates within these groups as well.

Downs' model is also useful in accounting for the lower participation by women and the higher participation by older people, the better educated, and by those who have lived longer in a community.[1] Women are often less exposed to political discussion than men, and their social role, especially in working-class life, is often defined as non-political. Hence, the chances of accidentally acquiring political information are greater in the case of men. An inference is that for women to acquire the same amount of political information as men they must make greater sacrifices. Hence, their lower participation is explained, as is the tendency to follow the husband's lead in voting.

Similarly, the higher participation by older people - up to the age when the physical effort is too great - can be explained, in part, by referring to Downs' concept of accidentally acquired free information. The older one is, the more likely one is to have acquired more free information and, other things being equal, the lower is the cost of voting. The better educated person acquires a

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1. See also Dowse and Hughes, Political Sociology, pp. 303-304.

stock of free political information as a by-product of his education. This gives him a free context within which to assess new information. Hence, the costs of participation for the better educated are lower and therefore the rates of participation are likely to be higher. Residents who have lived longer in a community are likely to have acquired more political information about local events, than newcomers, therefore their costs are less and their voting turnout rate is higher. This would be especially relevant for local elections.

The question for this section to try and answer is: 'Can a rational choice model explain the different rates of voting participation among different social groups and categories in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election?' If the model can help build a picture of the active electorate in Christchurch then this should help answer the fundamental question: 'Who participates in elections and why?'

The Findings

As predicted by rational choice theory and by Milbrath and others, the turnout was highest in the middle class neighbourhoods of West ward (66 per cent)[1] and lowest in the working class neighbourhoods of Pegasus ward (51 per cent). The similarly low turnout in North (52 per cent) is surprising; the

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1. The turnout figures in this paragraph are based on polling booth returns.

ward contains some higher status neighbourhoods, some lower status neighbourhoods and some that are in between. Since the turnout in middle class West was high and the turnout in working class Pegasus was considerably lower, the mixed class area of North should have a turnout somewhere in between but at neither extreme.

Looking at occupation, the trend in each of the three wards is generally the same (Table 4.2); turnout increases as occupational status increases - although the correlations are quite weak. In North there are exceptions to the trend in the farmer and white collar categories. In West and Pegasus there is a cluster from farmer to unskilled and the lowest turnouts are recorded by students. The high turnout of the retired people is unexpected since previous studies already mentioned have found that turnout decreases past the age of sixty. It may be that party activists helped to lower the costs of voting for the elderly by providing them with transport to the polls and assisting them with special votes, for example. Included in the occupational categories in Table 4.2 are two general categories which present a simple picture of the influence of occupational status on turnout. The first three groups on the scale of occupational status have been combined under the heading 'higher' status and the last four (excluding student, retired and housewife) have been called 'lower' status. The greater association between occupation and turnout in West can thus be seen at a glance,although the corresponding figures for North show that oversimplification can be misleading.

TABLE 4.2 TURNOUT BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS* BY WARD

Occupational Status	North %	North (N)	West %	West (N)	Pegasus %	Pegasus (N)
1. Professional	100	(3)	77	(30)	69	(16)
2. Business	80	(15)	83	(40)	62	(13)
3. White Collar	72	(32)	73	(63)	55	(42)
4. Farmer	91	(42)	62	(81)	47	(98)
5. Skilled	79	(67)	62	(113)	50	(248)
6. Semi-skilled	77	(39)	60	(89)	54	(287)
7. Unskilled	60	(5)	56	(9)	50	(48)
Student	78	(9)	53	(55)	39	(13)
Retired	100	(11)	71	(38)	59	(46)
Housewife	100	(8)				
	χ^2 NV		χ^2=15.54 .01<p<.05		χ^2=6.28 .50<p<.70	
	r_s=.06		r_s=.14		r_s=-.01	

Occupational Status	North %	North (N)	West %	West (N)	Pegasus %	Pegasus (N)
Higher status (1-3)	76	(50)	77	(133)	59	(71)
Lower status (4-7)	81	(153)	61	(292)	51	(681)
	χ^2= 0.32 .50<p<.70		χ^2= 9.37 .001<p<.01		χ^2= 1.26 .20<p<.30	

* Occupational status for all three ward samples is coded according to the seven point Congalton-Havighurst scale of occupational status adapted for New Zealand by Peter Davis, "An Occupational Prestige Ranking Scale for New Zealand", Department of Psychology and Sociology, Research Project 24, University of Canterbury, 1974. See also A.A. Congalton, Status and Prestige in Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1969). Students, retired people and housewives are not included on the scale and are therefore listed separately.

χ^2 Chi Square

p Probability that the relationship is random.

r_s Spearman correlation coefficient.

NV χ^2 not valid because expected frequencies less than five.

Comparing the turnout for West and Pegasus for each occupational group it can be seen that turnout in West was higher for each occupational category. This underlines the importance of neighbourhood status; it seems to exert an influence independent of occupational status. Persons with low occupational status were more likely to vote if they lived in West (a higher status area) than if they lived in Pegasus (a lower status area).[1] Possible explanations for this centre around two theories. The first relates to the role of spatial influences and social context. Lower occupational status persons living in an area of high neighbourhood status are under pressure to 'conform' to the majority viewpoint. Studies have shown the majority often 'convert' the minority to their views, especially when the latter have friends in the area and belong to local voluntary organisations (such as churches).[2] It is proposed that part of this'conversion' process includes group pressures to accept the ethic of voting by turning out on election day to do one's 'civic duty'. The second explanation relates to party organisation. The Citizens Association which relies on West ward for a large amount of its support was very active on election day getting out the vote' because they realised that this was where the votes were for their mayoral candidate and for their candidates for the ad hoc bodies. Labour's organisation in Pegasus was less efficient than Citizens organisation in West in

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1. This finding is confirmed by Bush, "The Non-vote", p. 50.

2. Kevin R. Cox, "The Spatial Structuring of Information Flow and Partisan Attitudes", in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 157-186. This phenomenon is also noted by David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974), pp.130-133.

getting people to the polls,[1] and for the Citizens Association in Pegasus, "the aim is not to get everyone out to vote because in doing so you only help the Labour cause because of the general bias of the ward."[2] These two reasons help to account for the difference between the wards.

Table 4.3 shows whether the relationship between occupational status and turnout in West and Pegasus remains when sex is controlled for. However, the relationship remains only for men in West and Pegasus. Sex disrupts the relationship for women; in West the turnout for women is similar regardless of occupational status (with one exception), and in Pegasus there seems to be no relationship between occupational status and turnout for women. Looking across the rows of Table 4.3, in West men have higher turnouts in the higher status occupations (except 'business'), the turnouts are similar for the middle status people of both sexes, while the situation is reversed in the lower status occupations with women voting more heavily. In Pegasus there is no consistent relationship between sex and turnout. In conclusion, it appears that when sex is controlled for, occupational status loses some of its power as an explanatory variable.

The relationship between class and turnout was investigated in North. Eighty-two per cent of the middle class respondents said they intended to vote and 81 per cent of the working class respondents

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1. N.G. Pickering (Mayor of Christchurch, 1971-74), Interview 16 December 1977.

2. M.O. Holdsworth (Chairman, Christchurch Citizens Association, 1974), Letter to the author, 20 January 1978.

TABLE 4.3 TURNOUT BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY SEX BY WARD

Occupational Status	Men %	Men (N)	Women %	Women (N)
WEST				
1. Professional	82	(22)	63	(8)
2. Business	79	(29)	91	(11)
3. White Collar	79	(29)	68	(34)
4. Farmer	62	(52)	62	(29)
5. Skilled	62	(61)	62	(52)
6. Semi-skilled	58	(57)	63	(32)
7. Unskilled	50	(6)	67	(3)
Student	58	(36)	42	(19)
Retired	67	(21)	77	(17)
	χ^2= 11.05 .10<p<.20		χ^2 NV	
Higher status (1-3)	80	(80)	72	(53)
Lower status (4-7)	60	(176)	62	(116)
	χ^2= 8.77 .001<p<.01		χ^2= 1.09 .20<p<.30	

Occupational Status	Men %	Men (N)	Women %	Women (N)
PEGASUS				
1. Professional	80	(10)	50	(6)
2. Business	55	(11)	100	(2)
3. White Collar	52	(23)	58	(19)
4. Farmer	47	(60)	47	(38)
5. Skilled	48	(140)	53	(108)
6. Semi-skilled	50	(173)	61	(114)
7. Unskilled	51	(35)	46	(13)
Student	30	(10)	67	(3)
Retired	50	(30)	75	(16)
	χ^2= 5.86 .50<p<.70		χ^2 NV	
Higher status (1-3)	59	(44)	59	(27)
Lower status (4-7)	49	(408)	55	(273)
	χ^2= 1.23 .20<p<.30		χ^2= 0.05 .80<p<.90	

NV χ^2 not valid because expected frequencies less than five.

said they would vote. The Spearman correlation coefficient (r_s) is .01. This lack of relationship between class and turnout contrasts with overseas findings. It is difficult to suggest why this is so without investigating the relationship between class and variables such as party preference. The distribution of self-assigned class was 48 per cent working class and 41 per cent middle class with the rest either refusing to accept a class identification or not knowing.

The findings for education are almost exactly opposite to what other studies have shown. In the North ward survey turnout was greater for those without higher education than for those with higher education and greater for those who left school in their early teens (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). As this was not predicted in the

TABLE 4.4 TURNOUT BY EDUCATION (NORTH WARD)

Education	%	(N)
Primary only	92	(13)
Some secondary	93	(44)
Completed secondary	74	(57)
Technical or commercial	79	(62)
Some university or teachers' college	85	(26)
Completed university or teachers' college	76	(29)

$\chi^2 = 8.29$ $.10<p<.20$
$r_s = -.11$

theoretical discussion earlier, further investigation is warranted. Since educational background is usually fairly closely related to occupational status, and since occupation was related to turnout,

TABLE 4.5 TURNOUT BY AGE LEFT SCHOOL (NORTH WARD)

Age Left School	%	(N)
11-13 years	88	(17)
14-16 years	86	(128)
17-19 years	73	(86)

$\chi^2 = 6.03$ $.01<p<.05$

this suggests we should examine the three-way relationship between turnout, occupation and education. Table 4.6 reveals that, with two exceptions, education is indeed related to occupational status for the North ward sample. Education is controlled for in Table 4.7 which shows that for almost each occupational category

TABLE 4.6 EDUCATION BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS (NORTH WARD)

Occupational Status	Higher Education	No Higher Education	(N=)
Professional	75	25 = 100%	(4)
Business	71	29 = 100%	(7)
White Collar	87	13 = 100%	(24)
Farmer	88	12 = 100%	(34)
Skilled	48	52 = 100%	(50)
Semi-skilled	24	76 = 100%	(25)
Unskilled	20	80 = 100%	(5)

χ^2 NV

turnout is greater for those without higher education. The fact that a respondent had some higher education does not seem to have

TABLE 4.7 TURNOUT BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY EDUCATION (NORTH WARD)

Occupational Status	Turnout for those with higher education		Turnout for those without higher education	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
Professional	100	(3)	100	(1)
Business	60	(5)	100	(2)
White Collar	67	(21)	100	(3)
Farmer	90	(30)	100	(4)
Skilled	71	(24)	81	(26)
Semi-skilled	67	(6)	79	(19)
Unskilled	100	(1)	75	(4)

χ^2 NV

increased the propensity to vote. Controlling for education disrupts the relationship between occupation and turnout especially for the higher educated. It does seem that while occupation is directly related to turnout education is inversely related to turnout - although this conclusion can only be tentative because of the small numbers involved.

There is a fairly strong relationship between age and turnout (Table 4.8); the older one is, the more likely it is that he or she voted.

It is at first surprising that the turnout for men and women (Table 4.9) was similar for the differences between the sexes in political behaviour have been well-documented in many overseas studies.

TABLE 4.8 TURNOUT BY AGE BY WARD

Age	North %	North (N)	West %	West (N)	Pegasus %	Pegasus (N)
18-25 years	69	(58)				
26-40	73	(56)				
41-55	89	(63)				
56-70	94	(36)				
Over 70	94	(18)				
	$\chi^2 = 18.10$					
	$.001<p<.01$					
	$r_s = .26$					
Student (young)	78	(9)	53	(55)	39	(13)
Retired (old)	100	(11)	71	(38)	59	(46)

TABLE 4.9 TURNOUT BY SEX BY WARD

Sex	North %	North (N)	West %	West (N)	Pegasus %	Pegasus (N)
Men	83	(115)	64	(350)	51	(535)
Women	80	(115)	63	(400)	55	(483)
	$\chi^2 = 0.11$		$\chi^2 = 0.003$		$\chi^2 = 1.46$	
	$.70<p<.80$		$.90<p<.95$		$.20<p<.30$	
	$r_s = .03$		$r_s = .007$		$r_s = -.04$	

However, as Nigel S. Roberts has noted, "In New Zealand ... the situation ... is certainly not as pronounced as overseas."[1] The

1. Nigel S. Roberts, "The Female Kiwi as a Political Animal", Politics IX (1974), p. 200.

influence of neighbourhood status can be seen again in the difference between the turnout in West and Pegasus. Notably women in West have a turnout rate which is more than 10 per cent greater than that for men in Pegasus. Other research has shown that the turnout rates for men and women respectively at the 1960 General Election were 94 and 93 per cent, the 1962 Waitaki By-election - 79 and 76 per cent, and the 1971 Auckland City Council Election - 36 and 35 per cent.[1]

Looking closer at the participation of women, an interesting picture arises when their marital status is examined (Table 4.10). In

TABLE 4.10 TURNOUT BY MARITAL STATUS BY WARD

Marital Status	West		Pegasus	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
Married women	71	(202)	55	(357)
Single women	64	(39)	50	(12)
Widows	58	(55)	65	(34)
Unspecified (women)	51	(105)	47	(81)
	$\chi^2 = 11.89$ $.001<p<.01$		$\chi^2 = 3.47$ $.30<p<.50$	

West married women voted more regularly than single women or widows followed by the unspecified. However, in Pegasus widows voted 10 per cent more than married women. Further analysis of the sample shows that there are more widowed ratepayers living in Pegasus

1. Bush, "The Non-vote", p. 54; A.V. Mitchell, Waitaki Votes (Dunedin: University of Otago, 1962), p. 47.

than West. Since, as we shall see later, ratepayers vote more regularly than residents this helps to explains why the widows in Pegasus are more active.

The North ward findings show that newcomers to Christchurch were less likely to vote than people who had lived longer in the city. Indeed turnout increased as length of residence increased (Table 4.11).

TABLE 4.11 TURNOUT BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE (NORTH WARD)

Length of Residence		%	(N)
Moved into ChCh	- during 1974	42	(19)
	- during '72 & '73	69	(13)
Lived in ChCh	- 3 to 15 years	80	(51)
	- 16 to 21 years	86	(29)
	- 22 years or more/ "All my life"	88	(119)

χ^2 = 24.78 $p<.001$

r_s = .24

To conclude this section on social characteristics, some social variables such as neighbourhood, occupation, age, marital status and length of residence were related to the propensity to vote as predicted by rational choice theory and consideration of the effects of information costs. Neighbourhood as defined by electoral ward is the strongest predictor of turnout. However, some variables which the theory strongly suggests should be related to turnout were not. These are class, education and sex. However,

before any thought is given to revising the theory, further testing in future elections would be very desirable. Our rational choice model has not been entirely successful in explaining the different voting rates of different social groups, but a more satisfactory analysis can be found in a consideration of psychological variables.

PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES AND VOTER TURNOUT

Working with the funnel of causality model employed in accounting for partisan choice, The American Voter has added to the demographic picture of voters and non-voters some important findings about psychological correlates of voting participation. The authors attempt to relate turnout behaviour to the individual's psychological involvement in politics:

> "We have felt that the individual develops a characteristic degree of interest and involvement in political affairs, which varies widely among individuals but which exhibits a good deal of stability for the same person through successive election campaigns. Postulating a dimension of this sort leads naturally to the hypothesis that the stronger the individual's psychological involvement the more likely he is to participate in politics by voting." 1

Campbell et al. designed a number of measures that would catch the individual's psychological involvement in politics. The joint relationship between intensity of partisan preference and campaign interest, concern over the election outcome, political efficacy, and citizen duty is able to account for over 75 per cent of the

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1. Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., p. 56. (emphasis added). See also Milbrath, Political Participation, chap. 3.

turnout, thus demonstrating the significant role of involvement in motivating turnout behaviour. Butler and Stokes recognise that the problem of explaining why people take the trouble to vote when voting has its costs and when a single vote can make so little difference, is a real one. They suggest three motives behind individual voting which further our understanding of the voting decision:

> "Electors have the instrumental motive of voting: the casting of their ballots may contribute to the election of a government whose outputs they value. They may also have the expressive motive of voting: the casting of their ballots shows support for the party they identify themselves with, and has an intrinsic value of its own. Yet we must also allow for the normative motive of voting: the casting of the voter's ballot may reflect primarily a sense of civic obligation. Blurred ideas of popular sovereignty and universal suffrage are so interwoven in the prevailing conceptions of British government that the obligation to vote becomes almost an aspect of the citizen's national identity. As a result, a number of people are drawn to the polling place who would be unlikely to get there otherwise." 1

While the North ward survey was not specifically designed to investigate the relationship between psychological involvement in politics and voter turnout, we are able to investigate the relationships between voting and strength of party identification, cross-pressures, interest in politics, and political awareness as measured by knowledge of the candidates and the issues.

The intensity of the individual's partisan preference is related to turnout. The Survey Research Centre present data to show

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1. Butler and Stokes, Political Change, pp. 38-39.

"the greater the strength of the individual's preference, the greater the likelihood he would vote."[1] Downs agrees on this: "Citizens who have definite party preferences are more likely to vote than those who cannot see much net difference between the parties."[2] This is because those who see a net difference are likely to feel more affected by the election result and hence are concerned that their preferences be taken into account.

Individuals experiencing cross-pressures have been found to vote less than those free of cross-pressures[3]. Cross-pressures are treated primarily in terms of attitude conflict. Conflict within the individual's psychological field may result from different psychological forces acting on the individual. For example, an individual may have a standing party identification towards a particular party but he is attracted by the personal qualities of the candidate of the opposing party; such a person is said to be experiencing cross-pressures on his decision to vote. This may result in the individual being so unsure of himself that he refuses to vote at all.

The Survey Research Centre authors also show that interest in politics is associated with voter turnout.[4] Persons who are

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1. Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., p. 53.

2. Downs, An Economic Theory, p. 299.

3. Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., p. 46; Lipset, Political Man, pp. 185-216.

4. Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., p. 61.

interested in an election are more likely to feel affected by the outcome than those who are not interested. They are voting to maximise their income.

Knowledge and awareness of politics has been found to be related to turnout.[1] Since informed persons already possess information (either free or costly), they may well use this to try and maximise their incomes by voting. For the less well-informed voting is irrational and abstention is rational behaviour since they have little or no information upon which to decide. They could end up voting in a manner that is not in their self-interest. Thus the hypothesis is that the more information a person has acquired about politics the more likely he will turnout to vote.[2]

The Findings

Just under half of the North ward sample identified themselves with either of the two main parties contesting the election. Seventy-nine per cent of 'not very strong' party identifiers said they intended to vote in the election; while 89 per cent of 'fairly strong' identifiers intended to vote, and 85 per cent of 'very strong' identifiers said they would vote. The Spearman correlation coefficient is .06. Strength of party tie does not seem to be a very good predictor of turnout for the sample.

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1. Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 64.

2. Derived from Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 14.

Cross-pressures could be experienced between parliamentary and local party identifications. There are two main parliamentary parties in national politics in New Zealand (Labour and National), but at the local body level only Labour nominates candidates for the city council elections. The Citizens Association candidates - who may have individual ties with the National Party - claim to be 'just a group of Independents'. Local politics are often seen as being divorced from parliamentary politics in New Zealand. For example, there is a strong feeling that political parties should not nominate candidates for local elections, and in local elections candidate personality can play a stronger role in influencing perceptions of politics. It is possible that persons identifying with one of the parties or saying they are Independent at the parliamentary level of politics will identify with another party or say they are Independent at the local level. The implication of Table 4.12 is clear, although due to small numbers it is not conclusive: controlling for parliamentary party identification reveals

TABLE 4.12 TURNOUT BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION (NORTH WARD)

LOCAL IDENTIFICATION	PARLIAMENTARY IDENTIFICATION					
	National		Independent		Labour	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Citizens	92	(38)	100	(5)	33	(3)
Independent	82	(34)	100	(1)	70	(43)
Labour	50	(2)	100	(17)	83	(59)

χ^2 NV

that cross-pressures were an important influence on voting behaviour. The turnout for those identifying with Citizens and National was 92 per cent, but for those identifying with Citizens at the local level and Labour at the parliamentary level the turnout was only 33 per cent. The extent to which electors are cross-pressured seems to influence the propensity to vote. Those who accepted a parliamentary identification but did not identify with any party at the local level - the local Independents - voted at lower rates than those who did accept the equivalent party tie. However, the local Independents voted at higher rates than those completely cross-pressured, that is, those who had a parliamentary identification but reverse loyalties at the local level. All of the parliamentary Independents intended to vote regardless of their local party identification. Since these people were not cross-pressured into abstaining,the survey suggests that being an Independent at the parliamentary level was more important in influencing turnout than local independence or party identification of any kind.

Table 4.13 shows the relationship between interest in Christchurch City Council politics and voting intention. The voting rate was more than twice as high for persons with a great deal of interest than it was for persons with no interest.

However, the problem is not merely to find relationships between psychological variables and turnout. Rather the problem

TABLE 4.13 TURNOUT BY INTEREST IN CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL POLITICS (NORTH WARD)

	INTEREST IN C.C.C. POLITICS			
	None	Some	Quite a lot	Great deal
Intend voting	47%	82%	94%	96%
(N=)	(30)	(129)	(48)	(24)

$\chi^2 = 32.07$ $p<.001$
$r_s = .33$

is to investigate whether the relationships discovered between social characteristics and turnout are improved by adding the psychological characteristics while controlling for the social characteristics. A presumption is that the association will either increase or decrease and this will demonstrate the independent effect of the psychological characteristics. To illustrate the independent effect of interest in politics, education is held constant in Table 4.14, and this shows that interest in politics appears to exert an independent effect in increasing the tendency to vote.

TABLE 4.14 TURNOUT BY INTEREST IN CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL POLITICS BY EDUCATION (NORTH WARD)

	INTREST IN C.C.C. POLITICS			
	None	Some	Quite a lot	Great deal
Turnout for those with higher education	29%	82%	92%	92%
Turnout for those without higher education	63	82	96	100
(N =)	(30)	(129)	(48)	(24)

χ^2 NV

Similar to interest in politics, political awareness is a good indicator of turnout. Forty-six per cent of those who could not name any of the three mayoral candidates[1] planned on voting while 71, 87 and 92 per cent of those who could name one, two and three candidates respectively intended voting. The Spearman correlation coefficient for the relationship is .31. As the number of issues respondents could mention increased so did the likelihood that they would vote. Sixty-eight per cent of those who could name no issues intended voting; while 87 and 89 per cent of those who could name one and two issues respectively signified they would vote, and 94 per cent of those who could name three or more issues declared they would turn out. The Spearman coefficient is .24. To obtain a more comprehensive picture of the relationship between political knowledge and turnout, a scale of political awareness was constructed. The number of mayoral candidates and council candidates (there were ten in North) that were correctly mentioned were added to the number of issues mentioned. Turnout measured using this scale of political awareness is shown in Table 4.15. The intention to vote rose steadily with

TABLE 4.15 TURNOUT BY POLITICAL AWARENESS (NORTH WARD)

	Score on Scale of Political Awareness						
	0	1	2	3	4	5	More than 6
Intend voting	47%	59%	67%	88%	89%	85%	100%
(N =)	(19)	(17)	(33)	(59)	(45)	(20)	(38)

χ^2 NV
r_s = .36

1. There were actually four candidates for the mayoralty but the fourth, an Independent gained only 325 votes, was unknown to our sample and is therefore ignored.

increasing awareness reaching a maximum of 100 per cent for those who scored six or more on the scale.

Looking at the four measures of psychological involvement that were investigated, interest in politics and political awareness were good predictors of turnout, while strength of party identification was of much less importance in explaining voter turnout. The incidence of cross-pressures appeared to be a significant factor. Most of the people in the North ward survey who said they would vote were those who were the most interested and the most informed about candidates and issues. These findings give support to the rational choice theory by showing that people act so as to maximise their expected utility, and to the social-psychological model by showing that psychological involvement is related to voting behaviour.

POLITICAL FACTORS AND VOTER TURNOUT

Political factors can be of the greatest importance in influencing the decision to vote. One of the most important of these is the type of election. National elections usually generate more interested and are regarded as more important than local elections, and consequently the costs of obtaining information are higher for voters at local elections. Also the party differential is apt to be small. This helps to explain why turnout is lower at local elections. This generalisation holds true for New Zealand where local elections consistently record lower turnouts and generate far less interest than national elections, and where partisan influences are often less important than in national elections.

Table 4.16 shows the consistent difference in turnout between local elections in New Zealand and Christchurch City, and parliamentary elections.

TABLE 4.16 TURNOUT IN LOCAL AND GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NEW ZEALAND

LOCAL ELECTIONS			GENERAL ELECTIONS	
Year	New Zealand	Christchurch City	Year	
1962	44%[a]	37%	1963	90%
1965	44[b]	34	1966	86
1968	46[c]	43	1969	89
1971	50[d]	59	1972	89
1974	50[e]	61	1975	83

a Excludes counties
b Includes counties
c Territorial local authorities only
d Territorial local authorities only
e All local authorities

Sources: N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority Elections 1959, 1962 and 1965/1968/1971/1974", Wellington (1967/[no date]/[no date]/1976 (mimeo); "The General Election 1963/1966/1969/1972/1975", Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (Wellington: Government Printer), 1964 H.33, 1967 H.33, 1970, H.33, 1973, E.9, 1976, E.9.

The type of voting system used can increase or decrease the costs to the elector of voting and hence influence the decision to vote. Cumbersome ballot papers with many names from which to choose in at-large, multi-candidate elections have greater costs associated with them than do say, ward systems or single member

electoral systems.[1] This problem is particularly applicable to this study for in an effort to decrease the costs of voting the electoral system in Christchurch was changed from an at-large multi-candidate election in 1971 to a ward system with four-member constituencies in 1974. The hope was that with fewer names to choose from on the ballot form, voting would be made easier, the costs would decrease, and turnout would increase.[2] Table 4.16 shows, however, that the turnout between 1971 and 1974 increased by only 2 per cent and this seemed to be more attributable to the closely fought battle for the mayoralty than the introduction of the ward system. Further elections under the ward system are necessary to test whether the type of voting system in Christchurch influences voter turnout.

Another deduction from Downs' theory relates the voting decision to the size of the constituency: in those seats with the most electors the cost of acquiring information about the likely impact of one's own vote would be higher than in seats with fewer voters, hence, other things being equal, the smaller the electorate the larger the turnout. This inference is quite strongly supported in Britain for turnout in local elections.[3] In Christchurch four of the five wards were of approximately equal size (20 000 electors) while the fifth had only 15 000 electors. This ward was West and as

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1. On the political consequences of electoral laws see Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

2. N.G. Pickering (Mayor of Christchurch 1971-74), Letter to the author, 31 July 1974.

3. Peter Fletcher, "An Explanation of Variations in 'Turnout' in Local Elections", Political Studies XVII (1969), 495-502.

Table 4.1 shows, the turnout in West was at least 8 percentage points greater than any other ward. However, this does not necessarily confirm the hypothesis. The high turnout in West is more likely to be due to the high proportion of high socio-economic status people living there than its smaller size.

Turnout in New Zealand local elections could be related to the type of electoral qualification an elector possesses. It is hypothesised that ratepayers are more likely to vote than residents for two main reasons. First, the enrolment requirements and procedures are more complicated for residents than for ratepayers. Ratepayers are automatically enrolled by the local council when they buy property in the district. They do not have to live in the district and they do not have to be British subjects. On the other hand residents have to apply for enrolment themselves, they have to live in the district for three months prior to the election, and they have to be British subjects.[1] There is a lack of general knowledge in Christchurch City concerning enrolment qualifications and procedures; just how many eligible people are not on the Christchurch roll is an unknown factor. The North ward survey revealed two elderly ladies who had not voted in any city council elections because they thought that only ratepayers could vote. The ease or difficulty of the voter registration procedure is important because it can raise or lower the costs of voting. One study using aggregate analysis shows that the proportion of voters registered resulting from

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1. These requirements applied to the 1974 local elections but have since been slightly amended.

the ease or difficulty of the registration procedure accounts for more variance in voter turnout than any other measure.[1] Another factor that suggests ratepayers would be more likely to vote than residents is that since ratepayers pay rates directly to the city council,they perceive that they have more to gain or lose through the election of certain candidates with certain policies. (Other residents also contribute to the city's rates but indirectly, via their landlord for example). An hypothesis derived from Downs' rational economic theory is that those citizens whose incomes are more directly affected by government policies are more likely to vote than those who incomes are less directly affected.[2] It is suggested that since ratepayers feel they are the ones who provide the money for the city to operate, they may as well have some say in how it is spent.[3] This can be seen as rational citizens attempting to maximise their utility from the city administration. Overall, it can be seen that ratepayers have lower costs to incur in voting and greater possible benefits to be gained from voting than residents, other things being equal. Confirmation of the initial hypothesis is presented in Tables 4.17 and 4.18. In all types of local authority except suburban cities and boroughs, and counties, the difference in turnout

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1. Stanley Kelly, Richard E. Ayres and William G. Bowen , "Registration and Voting : Putting First Things First", American Political Science Review LXI (1967), 359-379.

2. Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 14.

3. It is not widely known, however, that the income from rates is a relatively small proportion of the total income of the average city. In Christchurch the proportion is about 15 per cent. See J.H. Gray, An Outline of Local Government in New Zealand (Christchurch: Hillside Publications, 1976), p. 60.

between ratepayers and residents was 7 or 8 per cent. In West and Pegasus wards the difference was slightly less.

TABLE 4.17 TURNOUT BY ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION - 1974 NEW ZEALAND LOCAL ELECTIONS

Type of Local Authority	Ratepayer	Resident
Christchurch City	61%	54%
Four main cities	56	48
Provincial cities	53	45
Suburban cities & boroughs	42	41
Other boroughs	61	54
Counties	65	66

Source: N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority Elections 1974", Tables 1-5.

TABLE 4.18 TURNOUT BY ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION - WEST AND PEGASUS WARDS

Ward	Ratepayer	Resident
West	67%	61%
Pegasus	54	51

To summarise the importance of political factors, the fact that the Christchurch election was a local government election did influence the turnout; the type of voting system did not seem to be important, while electoral qualification is a factor that needs to be considered when accounting for local election turnouts.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The large discrepancy between the North ward survey turnout figure and the estimate based on polling booth returns suggest that conclusions from the survey should be regarded as tentative only. However, firmer conclusions can be drawn from the West and Pegasus turnout figures based on the master roll analysis. A number of social characteristics (neighbourhood, occupation, age, marital status and length of residence) are related to turnout in the three samples, although none of the relationships are very strong. Measures of psychological involvement (interest in politics, political awareness, cross-pressures) have stronger relationships with turnout. The political considerations of type of election and electoral qualification are related to turnout. According to the analyses in this chapter, a person is more likely to vote if he or she has lived in a higher status neighbourhood for some length of time, has a high occupational status, is over forty years old, married (women only), interested in and aware of politics, not cross-pressured by different party allegiances and a ratepayer.

It is possible to apply a number of theoretical notions regarding the voting decision to the study of a New Zealand local election. An attempt is made to show how a theory of rational wealth-maximising behaviour can explain why people bother to vote. The rational choice model is not entirely successful in explaining the different rates of voting participation among different social groups and categories in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election.

Some variables which the theory strongly suggests should be related to turnout are not; these are class, education and sex. With regard to social groups the model does not provide a very clear picture of the active electorate in Christchurch, nor does it provide a very adequate answer to the question: 'Who participates in elections and why?' The results of the investigation into psychological involvement and voting participation support both rational choice theory - by showing that people act so as to maximise their expected utility - and the social-psychological model - by showing that psychological involvement in politics is related to voting behaviour. Most of the voters in the sample were the most interested and the most informed about candidates and issues. Psychological variables were more closely related to turnout than sociological variables. Psychological variables provided a relatively clearer picture of the active electorate and some of the answers to the question: 'Who participates in elections and why?' Political factors and rational choice theory were partially successful in accounting for different rates of turnout. The type of election and electoral qualification were related to turnout, yet the type of voting system and size of constituency were not. The political variables tested in this study give some answers to the question 'who participates and why?' This chapter as a whole does not provide a clear answer to the central question: 'Who participates in elections and why?' for such an answer must be almost impossible. However some possible answers have been suggested. We now examine more closely voter turnout at successive elections, its relationship to the partisan division of the vote and the consequences for election outcomes.

CHAPTER V

SURGE AND COUNTER-SURGE

Angus Campbell has put forward a theory of political motivation and electoral change that tries to account for variations in voter turnout and the partisan division of the vote at successive elections.[1] He seeks to explain two interesting phenomena in United States electoral politics. These are: (1) the tendency for a sharp increase in voter turnout to be associated with a strong increase in the vote for one party, while there is little change in the vote for the other, and (2) the tendency for the party which has won the Presidency to lose seats in the House of Representatives in the off-year election which follows.[2] The aim of this chapter is to use Campbell's model to help explain the variations in voter turnout and the partisan division of the vote which were first observed through aggregate data at the 1968, 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City Council elections. Between the 1968 and 1971 elections there was a sharp increase in voter turnout accompanied by an equally large increase in the vote

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1. Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline : A Study of Electoral Change", in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 3.

2. These regularities were pointed out by V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 4th ed., 1958), p. 638.

for the Labour Party. Between the 1971 and 1974 elections there was another increase in turnout accompanied this time by a large increase in the vote for the Citizens Association. Data from the North ward survey will be used to shed light on these trends. First, the elements of the model are explained and a rational choice explanation of surge and decline is offered; then the relevant empirical evidence from the North ward survey is analysed.

THE MODEL OF SURGE AND DECLINE

Campbell begins with a general proposition about the nature of electoral change:

> "Fluctuations in the turnout and partisanship of the vote in the national elections are primarily determined by short-term political forces which become important for the voter at election time. These forces move the turnout by adding stimulation to the underlying level of political interest of the electorate, and they move the partisanship of the vote from a baseline of 'standing commitments' to one or the other of the two parties." 1

Campbell goes on to present a number of specific propositions which elaborate this general statement and these are summarised below. He then applies the model to a series of United States presidential and congressional elections.

Short-term political stimulation in an election derives from several sources: candidates, especially party leaders; issues; and other events and circumstances of the moment. The intensity and character of this stimulation varies from one election to the next

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1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 41.

resulting in the classification of low-stimulus elections and high-stimulus elections. The essential difference between a high-stimulus and a low-stimulus election lies in what Downs calls the voter's party differential,[1] that is, the importance the electorate attaches to the choice between the various party-candidate alternatives offered.

The notion of underlying political interest is used to describe the individual's level of concern with political matters. It is regarded as an enduring personal characteristic - the result of political socialisation.

Party identification derives primarily from a basic psychological attachment to a political party. It is generally stable over time and tends to influence political perceptions, attitudes and acts in a partisan direction.

Differences in turnout between elections are brought about by changes in non-political circumstances (such as bad weather on election day) and/or changes in the level of political stimulation. Campbell describes three types of electors: (1) 'core voters' who comprise a large proportion of the turnout and whose level of political interest is sufficiently high to take them to the polls in all elections, including low-stimulus elections; (2) 'peripheral voters' whose level of political interest is lower, but whose

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1. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), chap. 3.

motivation to vote has been sufficiently increased by the stimulation of the election situation; and (3) non-voters who do not vote even in high-stimulus elections because of non-political factors or because their political interest is too low to motivate them. The turnout in any one election is largely dependent on the number of peripheral voters who are sufficiently stimulated to vote. A high-interest election will bring them to the polls, while a low-interest election will be decided largely by core voters.

The partisan division of the vote in any one election is a consequence of the partisan forces on the voters. Superimposed on the underlying party identifications are the contemporary elements of politics which tend to swing votes either way. In a low-stimulus election these elements are weak resulting in a low turnout and a division of the vote which follows party lines. In the absence of strong pressures from candidates or issues, party loyalty holds the voters to their respective tickets. In a high-stimulus election candidates and issues exert strong influences on the vote and motivate a surge of peripheral voters to the polls. This increase in the motivation to vote "will also swing the partisan division of the vote toward the party which happens to be advantaged by the circumstances of the moment."[1] It is very unlikely that a high-stimulus election will favour the different party-candidate alternatives equally. "Increases in turnout will consequently be accompanied by shifts in the partisanship of the vote."[2]

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1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 44.

2. Ibid., p. 44.

The partisan surge which characterises a high-stimulus election consists of two components:

> "(1) those peripheral voters for whom the stimulus of highly differentiated party-candidate alternatives provides the needed impetus to move them to the polls and who, depending on the strength of their party identification, are swung towards the ticket of the advantaged party, and (2) those core voters who are drawn from their normal position as Independents or identifiers with the disadvantaged party to the candidate of the party which is advantaged by the political circumstances of the moment." 1

If a high-stimulus election is followed by a low-stimulus election, there will be a decline in the total vote, and a decline also in the proportion of the vote received by the party advantaged by the political circumstances of the preceding election. The two components of this decline are: (1) the dropout of those peripheral voters who had voted previously, and who had given the advantaged party a majority of their votes; and (2) the return to their usual voting positions of those core voters who had moved to support the advantaged party in the surge election, the identifiers with the disadvantaged party moving back to the support of that party, and the Independents back to a position between the parties. Of those whose normal identification was with the advantaged party, the peripheral voters would drop out in the low-stimulus election and the core voters would continue their support. Campbell calls this whole electoral process the 'cycle of surge and decline'.

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1. Ibid., p. 44.

A RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATION

Rational choice theory can help explain the phenomenon of surge and decline. In high-stimulus elections there is a greater amount of political information flowing around about parties, personalities and issues, and because of this there is a greater likelihood of low-interest peripheral voters picking up accidentally a reasonable amount of 'free' information. As well the overall costs of obtaining information are reduced for everyone, but especially for the peripheral voters. Hence with their costs reduced, the turnout of peripheral voters increases.[1] As Campbell points out, it is unlikely that all this extra cheap information will favour the party-candidate alternatives equally. Hence the large decrease in the costs of obtaining information that comes from a high-stimulus election is associated with a strong increase in the vote for one party. Thus the hypothesis follows that if there is a large decrease in the costs of obtaining information, then there will be a strong increase in the vote for one party. The other component of the partisan surge at high-stimulus elections is due to those core voters who are drawn from their normal positions as Independents or identifiers with the disadvantaged party to the advantaged party. Since the distance between the parties increases at high-stimulus elections, one party will be seen by these core voters to offer more benefits than the other. Thus their party differential increases, that is, they see a bigger

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1. This conclusion follows from Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 14.

choice between the alternatives offered, and they vote for the party offering them the greatest benefits - the advantaged party.

If a low-stimulus election follows a high-stimulus election, then the costs of obtaining information will increase and the peripheral voters who supported the advantaged party of the previous election will drop out because they cannot bear the costs involved. Also those core voters who moved from their normal voting positions to vote for the advantaged party will move back as the perceived difference between the parties decreases. In a low-stimulus election, the vote with the least cost and greatest benefits is the vote consistent with one's standing party loyalty. Hence there will be a decline in the total vote and a decline in the share of the vote received by the advantaged party at the preceding election.

1968-1971 : A CASE OF ELECTORAL SURGE

Campbell notes that:

> "We think it likely that the basic concepts which we have relied on in this analysis ... are equally applicable to the understanding of political behaviour in other democratic systems." 1

Indeed, the basic concepts are particularly applicable to the understanding of recent Christchurch City Council elections. As in the United States the phenomenon of surge and decline in Christchurch was first suggested by aggregate data. Table 5.1 shows the results of the 1968 and 1971 Christchurch mayoral elections.

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1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 62.

TABLE 5.1 1968 AND 1971 MAYORAL ELECTIONS (TWO-PARTY VOTE)

	Citizens		Labour		Difference	Turnout	Difference
1968:	23 273	64%	12 910	36%		43%	
					+16%		+16%
1971:	23 212	48%	25 121	52%		59%	

Judging by the level of turnout 1968 was a low-stimulus election in which only 43 per cent of the voters were attracted to the polls. The retiring Mayor had done little to create any controversy and both mayoral candidates failed to produce any great enthusiasm for a large turnout. The winner in 1968, A.R. Guthrey (Citizens) was an activist mayor who antagonised many people with his controversial statements and actions. In the 1971 election he supported the Citizens proposals for the controversial Hagley Park road and the use of Porritt Park as the venue for the 1974 Commonwealth Games. (These two items were very big issues in that election. Even three years later when the North ward survey was conducted,42 per cent of the sample could recall the Commonwealth Games site as an issue in 1971, while 35 per cent could recall the Hagley Park road as an issue). At the 1971 election there was a sharp increase in turnout of 16 per cent accompanied by a 16 per cent increase in the vote for the Labour candidate, Mr Neville Pickering. While Labour's vote almost doubled, Guthrey's vote did not reduce; it remained steady at 23 200. The sharp increase in turnout characteristic of a high-stimulus

election was thus "associated with an increase in the vote for one party [Labour], with little change in the vote for the other."[1]

The Increase in Turnout

Respondents in the North ward survey were questioned about their turnout at the 1968 and 1971 elections. Analysis of the responses of those eligible to vote in both elections (N= 109) reveals that there were four components to the 1968-71 increase in turnout:

(i) 71 per cent voted in both 1968 and 1971;

(ii) 1 per cent voted in 1968 and not 1971;

(iii) 13 per cent voted in 1971 and not 1968;

(iv) 15 per cent voted in neither election.[2]

The social characteristics of these four segments were examined to see if there were any significant differences between core voters, peripheral voters and persistent non-voters. With regard to occupational status, the core voters who voted in both elections and the peripheral voters who voted in one election but not the other did not differ in any significant way. However, the persistent non-voters were more likely to be of lower occupational

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1. This is the description of surge given in Ibid., p. 40.

2. There is a discrepancy between these reports and the actual turnout figures for 1968 and 1971. The suggested reasons why the North ward survey reports of turnout are higher than the actual turnout are discussed in Chapter IV. In the present case the recall of both the 1968 and 1971 turnouts appear to be overstated. This introduces some distortion into the relative size of the different components of the vote and some restraints on the conclusions that can be drawn from the data.

status. There were no significant differences with respect to social class. The core voters tended to have had some higher education whereas both the peripheral and non-voters tended not to have had higher education. Core voters came equally from young and old age groups, peripheral voters were mainly younger, and non-voters were almost all younger persons. Core voters tended to have lived longer in the community whereas both peripheral and non-voters tended to have lived in the community for shorter lengths of time. There were slight differences between the sexes. Core and peripheral voters were more often women and the non-voters contained more men. The biggest difference between the core and peripheral voters, however, was in their respective levels of political interest.

Table 5.2 shows that the core voters were by far the most interested in Christchurch City Council politics in general. Nineteen per cent of the core voters had a 'great deal' of interest in Christchurch City Council politics, whereas none of the peripheral voters had this high level of interest. Core voters were also more interested in the 1971 election itself. Twenty-four per cent of those who voted in both 1968 and 1971 said they had a 'great deal' of interest in the election, but only 13 per cent of those who voted in one election but not the other reported a similarly high level of interest. None of the non-voters said they had a 'great deal' of intrest in the 1971 election. Those responsible for the major difference in turnout between 1968 and 1971, while not always distinct

TABLE 5.2 INTEREST IN CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL POLITICS BY 1968-1971 TURNOUT

INTEREST IN POLITICS*	TURNOUT		
	Voted in both 1968 and 1971	Voted in one election but not the other	Voted in neither election
Great Deal	19%	0%	6%
Quite a lot	27	13	13
Some	50	67	50
None	4	20	31
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=78)	(N=15)	(N=16)

χ^2 (Chi-square) not valid (NV) because expected frequencies less than five.

* Based on responses to the question, "How much interest do you generally have in what goes on in Christchurch City Council politics - a great deal, quite a lot, some or none at all?"

with respect to their social group characteristics, were distinctly less interested in city council politics and the 1971 election. The 1968-1971 surge in turnout was thus mainly due to low-interest peripheral voters who were motivated to go to the polls by the high-stimulus election.

The Swing in Partisanship

Without the candidates and issues of 1971, the 1968 election was a low-stimulus election that generated a low turnout. In 1971 the turnout increased dramatically and there was a large shift in the partisanship of a large proportion of the 1968 voters

Table 5.3).[1] Those 1971 voters who did not vote in 1968 divided equally between the two parties in 1971, but Pickering's decisive margin came from the 1968 voters.

TABLE 5.3 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1968 TURNOUT

1971 MAYORAL VOTE	1968 TURNOUT	
	Voted	Did not vote
Guthrey	44%	23%
Pickering	55	23
Did not vote	1	54
	100%	100%
	(N=75)	(N=30)

$\chi^2 = 42.29$ $p<.001$

where p is the probability the relationship is random.

The model predicts, however, that in a high-stimulus election (such as 1971) the increase in the motivation to vote - which generates a surge of peripheral voters into voting - will also swing the partisan division of the vote toward the party which happens to be advantaged by the circumstances of the moment. It appears that the increase in the motivation to vote in 1971, which brought the surge of peripheral voters to the polls,did not swing the partisan division of the vote to Labour. Rather the swing to

1. Since the respondents in the North ward survey were not asked who they voted for in the 1968 mayoral election, it is not possible to pinpoint the swing in partisanship between 1968 and 1971. However, we do know that 64 per cent of the whole electorate voted for Guthrey in 1968.

Labour came from the core voters who voted in 1968. This suggests that while the surge in turnout did not contribute to Pickering's victory, the political circumstances that created the surge (the sharply defined issues and Guthrey's personality) acted decisively in Pickering's favour since they swung the votes of many of those who had (presumably) voted for Guthrey in 1968. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that a surge in turnout does not always on its own contribute to a swing in partisanship. It is easy to conclude from aggregate statistics that a surge in turnout (such as that between 1968 and 1971) is responsible for a swing in partisanship, but it is not until survey data are examined that more positive conclusions can be drawn.

More can be learnt about the nature of the changes between 1968 and 1971 by examining the party identifications of the 1971 voters (Table 5.4). Those who voted in 1968 and who voted Guthrey in 1971 contained a high proportion of Citizens identifiers. This confirms one of the hypotheses about a high-stimulus surge. When the tide is running against a party as it was for Citizens in 1971, it reduces that party mainly to its loyal partisans; the party loses support from the Independents. The advantaged party, in this case Labour, benefits especially from the Independents. Forty-four per cent of those who voted in 1968 and voted Pickering in 1971 were Independents,as opposed to only 31 per cent of those who voted in 1968 and voted Guthrey in 1971. However, 9 per cent of those who voted in 1968 and voted Guthrey in 1971 were Labour identifiers,

TABLE 5.4 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1968 TURNOUT BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Party Identification	1968: Voted Guthrey	Voted Pickering	Did not vote Guthrey	Did not vote Pickering
	1971:			
Very strongly Citizens	24%	0%	(1)	(0)
Fairly strongly Citizens	24	2	(1)	(0)
Not very strongly Citizens	12	0	(0)	(0)
Independent	31	44	(3)	(3)
Not very strongly Labour	3	10	(0)	(0)
Fairly strongly Labour	6	24	(1)	(1)
Very strongly Labour	0	20	(1)	(2)
	100%	100%	(N=7)	(N=6)
	(N=33)	(N=41)		

χ^2 NV

while only 2 per cent of the 1968 voters who voted Pickering in 1971 were Citizens supporters. While Pickering won more of the Independents' votes, Guthrey won more votes from supporters of the opposite party than Pickering did. (Due to small numbers it is not possible to make any generalisations about the party identifications of the 1971 voters who did not vote in 1968.)

Thus it appears that the 1968-1971 increase in turnout was mainly due to the high-stimulus election in 1971 which motivated

a surge of voters to the polls and that the shift in partisanship between 1968 and 1971 was mainly due to those Independent core voters who swung to Labour.

1971-1974 : A CASE OF COUNTER-SURGE

While he was mayor between 1971 and 1974 Pickering - like Guthrey - was an activist, but he was an even more controversial figure who antagonised people very easily. He was the focus of attention on the local political scene and his comments on many local issues frequently made the headlines. The Citizens candidate in 1974 was the well-known, long-serving councillor Hamish Hay whose mild-mannered personality was overshadowed by his opponent's. There were no obvious issues in 1974 that were similar to the big issues of 1971. Hence it was expected that there would be a corresponding decline in turnout.

According to the model of surge and decline a high-stimulus, high-turnout election tends to be followed by a low-stimulus, low-turnout election, for as Campbell argues: "Swings away from the basic division of party loyalties in high-turnout elections tend to swing back in the low-turnout election which follows."[1] Thus, according to the model, it was expected that the 1974 election would constitute the 'decline' component of the model. However the aggregate statistics tell a very different story as Table 5.5 shows.

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1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 62.

TABLE 5.5 1968-1974 MAYORAL ELECTIONS (TWO-PARTY VOTE)

	Citizens		Labour		Difference	Turnout	Difference
1968:	23 273	64%	12 910	36%		43%	
					+16%		+16%
1971:	23 212	48%	25 121	52%		59%	
					-4%		+2%
1974:	29 482	52%	27 237	48%		61%	

Instead of a pattern of surge and decline we have what looks like a pattern of 'surge and counter-surge'. The turnout, instead of decreasing, apparently increased slightly[1] and it was "associated with a strong increase in the vote for one party [Citizens], with little change in the vote for the other."[2] The 1974 election was another high-stimulus election which had the effect of increasing the turnout and maintaining the 1971 level of support for Labour. The crucial impact of the high-stimulus election, however, was to

1. This 'slight' increase in turnout is more apparent than real. In fact there were 10 000 more voters in 1974 than in 1971, but the number on the roll increased by 13 800. In 1971 there were 12 800 more voters than in 1968, but the number on the roll remained steady due to the first purging of the roll in eight years. The fact that the number on the roll remained steady between 1968 and 1971 means that the 12 800 increase in turnout shows up as a 16 per cent surge in turnout. If the number on the roll had remained steady between 1971 and 1974, then the 10 000 increase in turnout would also show up as a surge in turnout (of 11 per cent) rather than a small increase (of 2 per cent). The percentage turnout would then by 70 per cent instead of 61 per cent. It seems, then, that it would be fair to describe the increase in turnout between 1971 and 1974 as a 'surge' rather than as a 'slight increase'.

2. This is again Campbell's description of surge. See Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 40.

motivate another surge of voters into voting for the newly advantaged party of this election which was Citizens.

What stimulated the surge in turnout in 1974? The survey in North ward suggests that the influence of the candidates' personalities was a key factor. Twenty per cent of the sample in North spontaneously mentioned the personalities of the mayoral candidates as an issue in the election, and when asked why they were voting for their candidate, fully 59 per cent of the intending voters gave as their reason the personality of one or both of the mayoral candidates. It was Pickering the Labour candidate who polarised most of the voters into being either for or against him. Forty-one per cent of the intending voters gave Pickering's personality as a reason for voting either for or against him; in contrast only 18 per cent mentioned Hay's personality.

The Increase in Turnout

Respondents in North ward were asked about their voting behaviour at the 1971 and 1974 elections. Analysis of the responses of those eligible to vote in both elections (N= 161) shows that there were three components to the 1971-74 increase in turnout:

(i) 79 per cent voted in 1971 and intended to vote in 1974;

(ii) 0 per cent voted in 1971 and did not intend to vote in 1974;

(iii) 16 per cent intended to vote in 1974 and did not vote in 1971;

(iv) 5 per cent did not vote in 1971 and did not intend to vote in 1974. 1

The most interesting group is the 1971 non-voters who intended to vote in 1974. These are the peripheral voters who - although eligible - were not drawn to the polls in the high-stimulus election of 1971. The issues of 1971 failed to motivate them but the issues and events leading up to the 1974 election apparently provided the motivation.

The social characteristics of the three segments of the electorate were examined to see if there were any significant differences between them. Those who voted in 1971 and 1974 were more often of higher occupational status than those who intended to vote only in 1974, who were higher in status than the persistent non-voters. There were marked differences in social class - a variable that has not been associated with turnout until now. Fifty-two per cent of those who intended to vote only in 1974 said they were middle class, while 42 per cent of the voters in both elections and only 29 per cent of the non-voters were middle class. With regard to education there were no significant differences between the voters in both elections and those who voted in 1974 but not 1971, but the non-voters were less well-educated. Voters in both elections tended to be older than the 1974 voters who abstained

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1. Again there is a discrepancy between these reports and the actual turnout figures for 1971 and 1974. The intention to vote in 1974 appears to be quite overstated. This has the effect of inflating the size of the 1971 non-voters who intended to vote in 1974 and the group of voters who voted in both elections. It also has the effect of understating the size of the 1971 voters who dropped out in 1974 - no one was in this category.

in 1971, who were older than non-voters. There were slight differences with respect to sex. Voters in 1971 and 1974 were more often women, while those who intended to vote only in 1974 were more often men, and non-voters were equally divided between the sexes.

The differences in the various levels of political interest tell us more about the three types of electors. Those who voted in 1971 and 1974 had more interest in city council politics. Fourteen per cent of these voters had a 'great deal' of interest while 8 per cent of those who intended to vote only in 1974 and none of the non-voters had similarly high levels of interest. Similarly when asked about their interest in the 1971 election 19 per cent of those who voted in both elections had a 'great deal' of interest while 8 per cent of those who voted in 1974 but not 1971 and none of the non-voters had that amount of interest. Those people who increased the turnout in 1974, while not always distinct with respect to their social characteristics, clearly lacked an intrinsic interest in politics. However, this group had significantly more interest in the 1974 election compared to the 1971 election than did those who voted in both years (Table 5.6). For most of the consistent voters the 1974 election held about the same amount of interest.

Those who intended to vote only in 1974 had much less interest in city council politics generally and in the 1971 election in which they abstained, but they had a great deal more interest in

TABLE 5.6 INTEREST IN 1974 COMPARED TO 1971 BY 1971-1974 TURNOUT

INTEREST IN 1974 COMPARED TO 1971*	TURNOUT		
	Voted in 1971 and intended to vote in 1974	Did not vote in 1971 but intended to vote in 1974	Voted in neither election
More interest	30%	64%	38%
Same interest	55	28	25
Less interest	15	8	37
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=125)	(N=25)	(N=8)

χ^2 NV

* Based on responses to the question, "Would you say that you have more interest or less interest in this [1974] election, or about the same amount of interest?"

the 1974 election than in 1971. It is suggested that it was this increase in political interest in the one election that motivated the 1971 non-voters to the polls and produced the surge in turnout. Most noteworthy is the fact that this increase in interest did not correspond to a high level of interest in city council politics generally. It related to the one high-stimulus election. It is this kind of voter who is motivated only by the high-stimulus election; in a low-stimulus election he would probably abstain since he lacks an underlying interest in politics. It appears that the people who increased the turnout in 1974 were similar to the people who increased the turnout in 1971 in that they were both less interested in politics generally. Both groups were motivated by the circumstances of each

election rather than an intrinsic interest in politics itself.

Almost all of those 1968 non-voters who surged to the polls in 1971 voted again in 1974 (Table 5.7). As well most of

TABLE 5.7 TURNOUT IN 1974 BY TURNOUT IN 1968 AND 1971*

1974 TURNOUT	1968-1971 TURNOUT			
	Voted in both 1968 & 1971	Voted in 1971 & not 1968	Voted in 1968 & not 1971	Voted in neither election
Intend to vote	80%	93%	(1)	69%
Do not intend to vote	6	0	(0)	25
Don't know	14	7	(0)	6
	100%	100%	(N=1)	100%
	(N=78)	(N=14)		(N=16)

χ^2 NV

* Only those eligible to vote in all three election are included.

the 1968-71 core voters intended to vote again. The 1974 election also stimulated a very large proportion of the 1968-71 non-voters, although a small core still remained unmoved.

The Swing in Partisanship

Between 1971 and 1974 the number of votes won by the Citizens mayoral candidates increased from 23 000 to 29 000, while the number of votes won by Pickering, the Labour candidate, increased only

slightly from 25 000 to 27 000. The high-stimulus election of 1974 brought at least 10 000 voters to the polls who had not voted in 1971 and shifted the partisanship of the vote to Citizens.

Tables 5.8 and 5.9 contain the same basic data regarding mayoral voting in 1971 and 1974,but the percentages are calculated from different bases. In Table 5.8 Pickering has a slight edge over Hay among those voters who voted for the same party in both years. That is, even though the tide was running against him Pickering held on to a large proportion of his 1971 voters as Table 5.9 shows. In both tables Hay has a slim margin among those who switched their votes from 1971 to 1974. Both tables show the important impact of the 'new voters' of 1974 who were ineligible to vote in 1971. Those eligible to vote in both elections and who did not vote in 1971 divided equally between Hay and Pickering in 1974. However when the new voters are included, Hay's small but decisive margin can be seen. It appears from the survey that it was a small number of Pickering-Hay switchers plus a slightly larger number of 1974 new voters who gave Hay his slight but sufficient margin over Pickering. (The margin may appear to be quite small but it should be remembered that the election was as close in North as it was over the city as a whole. In North Hay won only 52.4 per cent of the two-party vote to Pickering's 47.6 per cent, and in the city Hay won 52.0 per cent to Pickering's 48.0 per cent). Hay in fact won a large majority among the new voters. Sixty-three per cent of them said they would vote for Hay while 37 per cent intended to vote for Pickering. Just over half

TABLE 5.8 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE

1971 vote	1974 voting intention	Includes only those eligible to vote in both elections	Includes those ineligible to vote in 1971 (ie. the 'new voters' in 1974)
Guthrey	Hay	33%	22%
Pickering	Pickering	35	24
Guthrey	Pickering	6	4
Pickering	Hay	7	5
Guthrey	Did not vote	0	0
Pickering	Did not vote	0	0
Did not vote	Hay	9	16
Did not vote	Pickering	9	14
Did not vote	Did not vote	1	15
		100%	100%
		(N=129)	(N=191)

TABLE 5.9 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE

1974 VOTING INTENTION	1971 VOTE			
	Guthrey	Pickering	Did not vote (A)	Did not vote (B)
Hay	84%	17%	46%	35%
Pickering	16	83	46	31
Will not vote	0	0	8	34
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=51)	(N=54)	(N=24)	(N=86)

χ^2 NV

(A) Includes only those eligible to vote in both elections.

(B) Includes those ineligible to vote in 1971 (ie. the 'new voters' of 1974).

these new voters were young people voting for the first time.

More light can be shed on the nature of the changes between 1971 and 1974 by looking at the party identifications of the 1974 voters (Table 5.10). Similar to the 1968-71 pattern, those who voted Pickering in both 1971 and 1974 contained a high proportion of Labour identifiers. When one party is advantaged by the circumstances of the moment, as Citizens was in 1974 (and Labour was in 1971), it reduces the losing party mainly to its loyal followers. As in 1971 the Independents moved to support the advantaged party; 38 per cent of the Guthrey-Hay voters were Independents as opposed to only 28 per cent of the constant Pickering voters. Those who switched their votes from 1971 to 1974 came from most party groups but were mainly Independents and weak identifiers.[1] Of the Guthrey-Pickering switchers, 33 per cent appear to be Labour identifiers returning back to the party they normally support while 22 per cent are Citizens identifiers voting for the Labour candidate. Similarly 37 per cent of the Pickering-Hay switchers appear to be Citizens identifiers returning to their usual party position while 13 per cent are Labour identifiers switching to Citizens. The party affiliations of the two groups of 1974 voters who failed to vote in 1971 suggest further insights into the interaction of party identification and the partisan pressures of a high-stimulus election. Those 1971 non-voters who voted for Pickering in 1974 were exclusively Labour identifiers and

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1. Due to small numbers in the remaining columns of Table 5.10 the following conclusions can only be tentative.

TABLE 5.10 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Party Identification	1971: Guthrey 1974: Hay	1971: Pickering 1974: Pickering	1971: Guthrey 1974: Pickering	1971: Pickering 1974: Hay	1971: Did not vote 1974: Hay	1971: Did not vote 1974: Pickering
Very strongly Citizens	18%	0%	11%	0%	0%	0%
Fairly strongly Citizens	28	0	0	25	45	0
Not very strongly Citizens	13	0	11	12	0	0
Independent	38	28	45	50	46	60
Not very strongly Labour	0	11	0	13	0	10
Fairly strongly Labour	0	35	22	0	0	10
Very strongly Labour	3	26	11	0	9	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=39)	(N=43)	(N=9)	(N=8)	(N=11)	(N=10)

χ^2 NV

Independents. They were motivated into voting but their party loyalty was strong enough to enable them to resist the swing to Citizens. In contrast 9 per cent of the non-voters who were motivated into voting for Hay were very strong Labour identifiers. They had been brought out of abstention and contributed to the surge to Citizens.

As well as examining the party identifications of the 1974 voters we can examine the consistency with which the 1971-74 voting groups supported the city council ticket of the mayoral candidate they preferred in 1974. This provides further information about the voting behaviour of the components of the 1971-74 swing. In Table 5.11 it can be seen that those consistent Pickering voters who withstood the surge to Citizens in 1974 were strongly committed to the support of the Labour Party as indicated by their high level of straight ticket voting. As well most of those who came out of abstention to vote for Pickering in 1974 voted a straight Labour ticket.[1] This supports the earlier observation that when the tide is running against a party it reduces that party to its partisans or straight ticket voters. The consistent Citizens voters also had a fairly high record of straight ticket voting. The Hay voters who abstained in 1971 contained a larger proportion of split ticket voters. Some of these 1971 non-voters who surged to vote for Hay were strong Labour identifiers as Table 5.10 revealed; these people did not go all the way to voting a straight Citizens ticket. Those

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1. Due to the small numbers in Table 5.11 these conclusions can only be tentative.

TABLE 5.11 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1974 MAYORAL AND COUNCIL VOTING PATTERN

1974 Mayoral and Council Voting Pattern	1971: 1974:	Guthrey Hay	Pickering Pickering	Guthrey Pickering	Pickering Hay	Did not vote Hay	Did not vote Pickering
Voted straight ticket		45%	65%	29%	33%	66%	63%
Voted straight ticket except for one council candidate*		36	16	14	33	17	37
Voted split ticket		19	19	57	34	17	0
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(N=31)	(N=37)	(N=7)	(N=6)	(N=6)	(N=8)

χ^2 NV

* Voters could vote for four council candidates in North ward.

who switched votes from 1971 to 1974 were far more likely to have voted split tickets. Only 29 per cent of the Guthrey-Pickering switchers went all the way to vote a straight Labour ticket. Similarly only one-third of the Pickering-Hay switchers voted a straight Citizens ticket. Table 5.10 revealed that these switchers were mainly Independents and weak identifiers and this lack of strong loyalty is consistent with their voting patterns.

Further analysis of the North ward data enables us to trace the voting behaviour over time of those 1968 non-voters who surged to vote in 1971. We know that they surged about equally to Guthrey and Pickering in 1971 but how did they behave in 1974? Since there was a swing to Citizens in 1974 it is perhaps surprising that Pickering held on to as many as 83 per cent of those who surged to vote for him in 1971 (Table 5.12).[1] Hay, however, managed to hold on to only 71 per cent of those who voted for Guthrey in 1968. A large proportion (29 per cent) of those 1968 non-voters who voted Guthrey in 1971 voted Pickering in 1974. These people could have been uninterested in the 1968 election, brought to the polls in 1971 because they liked Guthrey's activist style, and switched to Pickering in 1974 because they preferred his similar style of politics. The first two columns of Table 5.12 show how the true 'core voters' who voted in 1968 and 1971 voted in 1974. Most of them voted for the same party in 1971 and 1974. Those who did not vote in both 1968 and 1971 (although they were eligible to do so) voted heavily for Pickering in 1974.

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1. Due to the small numbers in Table 5.12 these conclusions can only be tentative.

TABLE 5.12 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY TURNOUT IN 1968 AND 1971

1974 VOTING INTENTION	1971 VOTE:	VOTED IN 1968 & 1971 Guthrey	VOTED IN 1968 & 1971 Pickering	VOTED IN 1971 & NOT 1968 Guthrey	VOTED IN 1971 & NOT 1968 Pickering	DID NOT VOTE IN 1968 & 1971
Hay		71%	13%	71%	0%	17%
Pickering		13	74	29	83	75
Don't know		16	13	0	17	8
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(N=31)	(N=38)	(N=7)	(N=6)	(N=12)

χ^2 NV

As in 1971 the high-stimulus election of 1974 brought a surge of voters to the polls who were motivated by the circumstances of the election rather than an underlying interest in politics. The swing in partisanship to Citizens between 1971 and 1974 was brought about by the new voters of 1974 together with the 1971-74 vote switchers. These people were mostly Independents and weak party identifiers who were likely to have cast split ballots in the city council election.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Angus Campbell has presented a theory of the nature of electoral change that seeks to explain regularities in American electoral behaviour. These are the highly partisan character of surges in turnout in presidential elections and the characteristic loss which the party winning the Presidency suffers in the following off-year elections. It is proposed that fluctuations in turnout and partisanship result from a combination of short-term political forces superimposed on the underlying level of political interest and on the long-term party identifications of the electorate. Rational choice theory centering on the effects of information costs at high and low-stimulus elections assists in the explanation of surge and decline. Data from three elections show that the basic concepts of the model are applicable to recent Christchurch City Council elections and that they assist in understanding the outcomes of those elections.

The 1968 election was a low-stimulus election in which less than half the eligible voters were attracted to the polls. The

1971 election was a high-stimulus election brought about by two significant issues and resulted in a sharp increase in turnout. Those responsible for this increase in turnout - the 1971 voters who did not vote in 1968 - were less interested in city council politics and the 1971 election than those who voted in both elections. The 1968 non-voters were motivated to the polls by the high-stimulus election which reduced the costs of voting by lowering the costs of obtaining information about the parties, personalities and issues. There was a greater chance that these low-interest peripheral voters would pick up a reasonable amount of 'free' information about the election. The swing in partisanship between 1968 and 1971 which gave Pickering his victory was brought about not by those 1968 non-voters who surged to the polls in 1971, but by the 1968 voters who presumably voted Guthrey in 1968. The increase in the motivation to vote in 1971 did not swing the partisan division of the vote to Labour; rather the political circumstances that created the surge swung the votes of the 1968 voters. Analysis of the party identifications of this group reveals that it was the Independents who contributed most to the partisan surge. The decrease in the costs of voting in the 1971 election certainly favoured one party at the expense of the other and resulted in a strong increase in the vote for the favoured party. The distance between the parties increased in the high-stimulus election and one party was presumably seen to offer more benefits than the other. It was the Independent core voters who were drawn to Labour because they presumably saw it as the party offering the greatest benefits.

The 1974 election was another high-stimulus election brought about by Pickering's personality which polarised voters into being either for or against him. The increase in turnout between 1971 and 1974 was due mainly to citizens who were without an underlying interest in city council politics but who had a great deal more interest in the high-stimulus election itself. A high-stimulus election once again lowered the costs of obtaining information about the election and thus increased the likelihood that citizens would become more interested in the election itself. The counter-surge in partisanship between 1971 and 1974 which favoured Hay came mainly from the new voters of 1974 and those who voted Pickering in 1971. An increase in the motivation to vote was once again associated with a swing in partisanship. Analysis of the party identifications and voting patterns of the groups of voters reveals that it was the Independents, weak identifiers and split ticket voters who contributed most to the swing. As in 1971 the low costs of voting in 1974 favoured one party at the expense of the other and resulted in a strong increase in the vote for the advantaged party. The distance between the parties increased and this time it was the Citizens who appeared to offer the greatest benefits and who therefore attracted the votes of the Independents and weak identifiers.

Despite the small numbers in the North ward survey, we know from a comparison of the survey findings and election results (Tables 2.1 and 2.2) that the survey was very accurate. A reasonable amount of confidence can thus be placed in the tentative conclusions in this chapter based on small numbers.

CHAPTER VI

THE ROLE OF PARTY

Two questions that are often raised regarding the role of party in local government elections are:to what extent is local party loyalty an influence on voting behaviour, and what is the relationship between voting behaviour in local elections and voting behaviour in parliamentary elections? Using the data gathered in the North ward survey and both social-psychological and rational choice theories, this chapter seeks to throw some light on these questions by examining the role of party in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election. In the following pages the importance of party identification is pointed out and the rationality of party voting is discussed. Before the empirical evidence is presented, some background about the role of parties in New Zealand local elections is given in order that the Christchurch data may be seen in perspective.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

The Importance of Party Identification

A central thread running through many studies of electoral behaviour is the concept of party identification which derives from a basic psychological attachment to a political party. Research mainly in the United States and Britain has found that most people have a party loyalty which remains stable for most of their

lives and grows in strength over time. Party identification has been found to be a powerful influence on electoral behaviour; citizens tend to vote for their party's candidates. Equally important are the findings relating party affiliation to other phenomena. Party loyalty is a guide to understanding the political system; candidates, issues and other elements of politics are often evaluated in party terms. Parties are objects of mass loyalty and affection; citizens express positive feelings towards their party. Partisanship is like a force mobilising citizens into political life; those citizens with a party identification are often the most active and involved citizens.[1] Recent research from the United States shows that partisanship is declining and that the trends outlined above are occurring less frequently than before.[2] However, these findings do not mean that party identification is no longer regarded as an important analytical variable.

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1. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain : The Evolution of Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974); Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964); Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

2. Walter Dean Burnham, "The United States : The Politics of Hetereogeneity", in Richard Rose (ed.), Electoral Behaviour : A Comparative Handbook (New York: The Free Press, 1974), chap. 13; Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice : Varieties of Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975).

Party identification is one of the most powerful determinants of voting behaviour. The behaviour of the electorate is shaped far more by generalised attitudes, beliefs, and images about parties than by any specific policy issues.[1] Voters have long been able to perceive a link between candidate and party even though they may know nothing else about him; a party provides a powerful set of cues about a candidate just by selecting him. The American Voter points out that "merely associating the party symbol with [a candidate's] name encourages those identifying with the party to develop a more favourable image of his record and experience, his abilities and other personal attributes."[2] The main rule of party voting is quite simple. When there is a choice between the candidate of the party a citizen identifies with and a candidate of an opposing party - he votes for his party. Party voting therefore requires the following conditions: The voter has a party identification that is long-term and extends across elections. There must be candidates from different parties contesting the election. Party affiliation must be at least the major criterion for voting choice. Without a party identification citizens cannot vote on the basis of party. A candidate not identifying with a party cannot receive a party vote.[3]

The Party Identifier as a Rational Voter

The notion of the rational voter, who selects the most

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1. Butler and Stokes, Political Change, chap. 16.

2. Campbell et al., American Voter, p. 73.

3. Nie et al., Changing American Voter, pp. 156-157.

attractive alternative only after evaluating the available options, appears to conflict with the evidence that party identification is a major determinant of voting behaviour and is established in childhood.before the individual has any knowledge of party policy.[1] However, there is not necessarily any incompatibility between the two. As Goldberg points out, party identification learned in childhood might prove to be a rationally sound guide to action in adulthood.[2]

The presence of a party affiliation simplifies the election for the elector. It assists him in working his way through a maze of events, issues and personalities presented to him that he knows very little about. In a world where information is difficult to obtain and imperfect when obtained, party identification becomes an organising precept enabling the individual to behave consistently with his basic political predispositions, without spending great efforts in either seeking information or reaching a voting decision. Instead of deciding each election which party to support, party identifiers can just continue to implement their "standing

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1. See, for example, Fred I. Greenstein, Children in Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1969); Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization : The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).

2. Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 5-25.

decision"[1] to support one party or the other. Such action can be an efficient means for the voter to reduce his voting costs by saving time and effort, while still expressing his general judgement on the government and opposition. Inherited partisan affiliations kept generally throughout life are, for many voters, a rational means of minimising the costs of voting, especially the costs of obtaining information and making decisions about the various issues, policies and personalities.[2]

The electoral context within which the voter makes his choice has its consequences for the rational voter. In an electoral situation partly characterised by vagueness, overlapping issue positions and ambiguous campaign statements, the rational citizen, after considering the parties' past performance, will often find that the groups to which he belongs have fared best under governments of the party which happens also to be the party of his parents. In most cases this party's candidate is an acceptable choice, the voter's party identification and group-

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1. V.O. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision : The Case of Indiana", in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behaviour (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 286.

2. This rational choice explanation of party identification follows from Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). See also Butler and Stokes, Political Change, p. 37; Goldberg, "Social Determinism"; Pomper, Voters' Choice, pp. 9-10; Kenneth Prewitt and Norman Nie, "Review Article: Election Surveys of the Survey Research Centre", British Journal of Political Science I (1971), pp. 486, 492. Campbell et al. (American Voter, pp. 72, 83), while not explicitly developing the idea of party identification as a rational guide to voting behaviour, do nevertheless imply that party loyalties act in this way.

based evaluations intersect, and he votes in a manner similar to that of his neighbours, fellow-workers, and parents. As Goldberg suggests:

> "Certain sociological determinants, specifically group norms regarding party identification, may, upon examination, prove to be rational guides to action. For the voter who is a reasonably rational fellow, it will be argued, these group norms may seem rather sensible." 1

Adhering to a party can be an effective expression of the voter's particular interests. Party identification can be seen as a problem-solving device learned from one's parents that is instrumental for the advance of the voter's own particular set of values.

In discussing the influence of party on voting in his economic model, Downs uses the variable "party differential". As rational citizens each voter votes for the party he believes will provide him with a higher utility income than any other party. To discover which party this is, he compares the utility incomes he believes he would receive were each party in office. The difference between these two expected utility incomes is the citizen's "expected party differential". However, the most important part of a voter's decision is the size of his "current party differential" which is the difference between the utility income he has actually received and the one he would have received had the opposition been in power. The greater the size of the citizen's party differential, the greater his desire to see one

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1. Goldberg, "Social Determinism", p. 5.

party win instead of the others because of the difference it will make to his utility income.[1]

The complexity of a multi-candidate election, such as the 1974 Christchurch City Council election with a very large number of available choices,[2] could be expected to force voters to rely heavily on cost-reducing decision rules in choosing candidates. Party identification is one such rule. To have a psychological identification with a political party and to follow it in voting is rational political behaviour.

THE ROLE OF PARTY IN NEW ZEALAND LOCAL ELECTIONS

Many studies have recorded the importance of party in New Zealand general elections,[3] yet few attempts have been made to

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1. Downs , An Economic Theory, pp. 39-40.

2. As well as the four mayoral candidates (Citizens, Labour, Values, Independent) there were ten city council candidates in North Ward (four Citizens, four Labour and two Values). Since voters did not have to vote for the maximum number of candidates (four) to cast a valid vote, the number of different ways of casting a valid vote for the city council election was 31, and for the mayoral and council elections taken together the number of choices was 124.

3. See, for example, R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson and A.V. Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action : The 1960 General Election (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Keith Jackson, New Zealand : Politics of Change (Wellington: Reed, 1973); Stephen Levine (ed.), New Zealand Politics : A Reader (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1975); Stephen Levine and Alan Robinson, The New Zealand Voter : A Survey of Public Opinion and Electoral Behaviour (Wellington: Price Milburn for NZUP, 1976); Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969).

examine the role of party in local elections.[1] New Zealand parliamentary party politics are of a highly developed kind, articulated through two tightly disciplined and well-organised mass parties. For many people in New Zealand stability in party choice at general elections is a life-long feature. Although recent findings reveal an increased instability in voting patterns,[2] it is still apparent that party loyalties are widespread, persistent, fairly strongly held and fairly evenly balanced between the two major parties. Survey researchers have found between two-thirds and three-quarters of their samples identifying with one or other of the two major parties.[3]

In contrast local politics present a completely different picture. One of the most distinctive features of local government in New Zealand as a whole is the complete absence of highly developed, tightly disciplined, well-organised mass parties. "The

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1. See G.W.A. Bush, "The 1968 Auckland City Mayoralty Contest", Political Science XXII (December 1970), 23-42; G.W.A. Bush, Labour's Lost Loves and the 1971 Auckland Local Body Elections (Auckland: Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland, 1974); R.J. Johnston, "Spatial Elements in Voting Patterns at the 1968 Christchurch City Council Election", Political Science XXIV (April 1972), 49-61; Mitchell, Politics and People, chap. 11, "Who Runs Local Government : Christchurch ".

2. R.M. Chapman, "The Politics of Change", National Business Review, 4 August - 13 October 1976; Levine and Robinson, New Zealand Voter, pp. 146-149.

3. Jackson, Politics of Change, p. 108; Levine and Robinson, New Zealand Voter, p. 18; Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 182.

whole ethos of local government in New Zealand ... militates against cohesive parties."[1] Most members of local authorities in New Zealand are elected not as nominees of political parties but as Independents. Following the 1974 local elections four out of every five councillors elected in all territorial local authorities were Independents; councillors with party affiliations accounted for only 15 per cent. However, when these figures are broken down according to the type of local authority, (Table 6.1), it can be seen that in the four main cities (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin) all the councillors except one were elected as political party candidates. Party politics dominate local elections in the four main cities although to a lesser extent than in general elections.

There is, however, uncertainty about whether political parties should become involved in local elections. There is the feeling that parties do not belong in local government and that they have nothing positive to contribute.[2] Austin Mitchell has observed that: "[In the counties and smaller boroughs] party plays no part. Both councillors and electors tend to recoil from the suggestion that it should."[3] This feeling is also quite common in the cities, even though parties have contested city elections for many years. In Auckland in 1971 G.W.A. Bush found that even amongst Labour Party

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1. David A. Hyslop, "The Christchurch Citizens' Association : History, Organisation, and Decision-making", M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 1973, p. 49.

2. See, for example, John Fitchett, "Say No to Parties", Why Bother About Local Government, (Wellington: National Youth Council, 1977). [No page numbers].

3. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 297.

TABLE 6.1 AFFILIATION OF COUNCILLORS ELECTED AT 1974 NEW ZEALAND LOCAL ELECTIONS

PARTY AFFILIATION	LOCAL AUTHORITY					
	Four Main Cities	Other Major Cities (13)[a]	Other Cities With Over 13 000 Electors (9)[a]	Other Cities & Boroughs (110)[a]	Counties (105)[a]	Total
Citizens	70%	4%	42%	7%	2%	11%
Labour	28	1	9	3	1	3.8
Values	1	1	1	0	0	0.2
Independent	1	94	45	87	97	83
Other	0	0	3	3	0	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=69)	(N=166)	(N=123)	(N=874)	(N=415)	(N=1647)

a Figure in parentheses shows number of local authorities.

b "Citizens" includes local ratepayers' groups fulfilling a similar role.

Source: Calculated from N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority Elections 1974", Wellington, 1976 (mimeo), Table 23.

identifiers, as many as one in three either disagreed or were uncertain whether Labour should nominate party tickets in local elections (Table 6.2). As well almost one in two of the supporters of 'no particular party' either disagreed or were uncertain about Labour's presence. The feeling against parties is sometimes seen in newspaper editorials at election time. In Christchurch in 1974 the Christchurch Star commented:

TABLE 6.2 RESPONSES TO THE STATEMENT 'LABOUR SHOULD PUT UP TICKETS IN LOCAL ELECTIONS' BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

'Labour should put up tickets in local elections'	PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
	Labour	National	No particular party
Agree	67%	44%	52%
Disagree	10	38	27
Uncertain	23	18	21
	100%	100%	100%
	(Number of cases not stated)		

Source: Bush, Labour's Lost Loves, p. 18.

> "Many people would prefer not to have party politics in local body elections at all and there is certainly nothing they contribute which would be described as useful." 1

In Auckland during the 1971 Auckland City Council election campaign the New Zealand Herald commented:

> "Whether politics in their national colours or affiliations should rule, or seek to rule, local government has long been a matter of controversy and a source of some suspicion." 2

Coupled with these attitudes against party involvement is the 'popular image' of local politics as politics where voters should (and do) vote for the person rather than the party. Mitchell has noted that:

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1. Christchurch Star, 7 October 1974.

2. New Zealand Herald, 30 September 1971, p. 6.

> "There are indications that while [the voter] takes the party ticket as a basic guide, he picks and chooses on the basis of the reputations, or at least the names, of the candidates." 1

Bush argues that:

> "It is commonly premised that, other things being constant, candidates with the best-known names poll the heaviest....The notion that a team of Tom, Dick and Harrys would entice out the faithful as much as would a team of Sir Edmund Hillarys is palpable nonsense." 2

In Auckland in 1971 the New Zealand Herald put forward that: "Candidates could well be assessed on personal attributes rather than party or ticket labels."[3] With regard to the 1974 Christchurch election, The Press editorialised:

> "Party affiliations will not always disclose the nature of the men and women seeking office. Electors can, and should, without a qualm, vote for board and council candidates in whom they have the greatest trust." 4

Whether the North ward survey data supported this popular image of local politics will be revealed in this chapter.

On the role of party in the larger cities,Mitchell has commented:

> "Party becomes necessary to give some coherence to policies and to group-label members whose individual characteristics and attributes, even names, can be known only to a small proportion of the electorate." 5

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1. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 298.
2. Bush, Labour's Lost Loves, pp. 5, 7-8.
3. New Zealand Herald, 30 September 1971, p. 6.
4. The Press, 11 October 1974.
5. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 297.

Parties play an important role in the larger cities because they provide a framework within which electors, local personalities and policies can operate. They give shape and direction to the political behaviour of councillors and individual citizens, yet it is an incomplete party system for their role hardly ever approaches the importance that it does in national politics. Political parties are important in local government for the development, presentation and implementation of policies, and in the elections they contest, their role is to structure the vote by providing party labels and simplfying the voter's choice.

Only a few studies have actually attempted to measure the extent of party identification and its influence on voting in New Zealand local elections. In the 1971 Auckland City Council election, G.W.A. Bush found that the distribution of parliamentary party identification was Labour 37 per cent, National 39 per cent and uncommitted 24 per cent.[1] Of the Labour Party identifiers, 39 per cent intended to vote a straight Labour ticket, and apart from 7 per cent who intended to vote a straight Citizens ticket, the rest intended to split their ballots. Of the National Party identifiers, half were going to vote a straight Citizens ticket and half were going to vote split tickets.[2] In an analysis of spatial patterns of voting in the 1968 Christchurch City Council election, R.J. Johnston found that "the party effect accounted

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1. Bush, Labour's Lost Loves, p. 13. Bush does not record whether his sample was asked if they had a party identification with respect to local politics.

2. Bush does not record voting intention by local party identification.

for 80 per cent of the variation in voting"; and he concluded: "... the positions of the various candidates would probably be determined, first by their party affiliation, secondly, by their degree of general exposure to the electorate, and thirdly, by their local support."[1] These meagre findings, however, can hardly provide the basis for any generalisations about the extent and influence of local party identifications.

INFLUENCE OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN CHRISTCHURCH

The public uncertainty about political party involvement and the lesser role that parties play in local government are reflected by the relatively small proportion of the North ward sample who accepted a local party affiliation (Table 6.3). Less than half of the sample identified themselves at the local level with either the Citizens Association or the Labour Party. Most of the remainder did not think of themselves in these terms or said they were Independents. On the other hand five out of every six people in the sample were willing to identify themselves with a parliamentary party at the national level. The number of respondents who claimed to have no loyalty to any of the parties contesting the Christchurch City Council election is enormous when compared to the proportion of the same sample who said they were Independents with regard to national politics (10 per cent). Previous surveys have shown very similar findings regarding the

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1. Johnston, "Spatial Elements", pp. 56, 60.

TABLE 6.3 PARTY IDENTIFICATION (NORTH WARD SAMPLE)

Local Party Identification[a]		Parliamentary Party Identification[b]	
Citizens	22%	32%	National
Independent (Don't think of self in party terms)	47	10	Independent
Labour	27	46	Labour
Values	2	4	Values
Social Credit	0	1	Social Credit
Other	0	1	Other
Don't know	1	3	Don't know
No answer	1	3	No answer
	100%	100%	
	(N=231)	N=231)	

a Based on answers to the question, "Getting back to local body politics, do you usually think of yourself as Labour or Citizens Association, or don't you think of yourself in these terms?"

b Based on answers to the question, "With regard to politics throughout the country as a whole, do you usually think of yourself as National, Labour, Social Credit, Values or what?"

proportion of parliamentary Independents. A survey in the Lyttelton electorate in 1972 found 8 per cent saying they were Independents, and Mitchell in two other Christchurch electorates

in 1966 found 11 per cent.[1] However in a nation-wide postal survey in 1975, 26 per cent of the respondents were not supporters of any party.[2] Some of the local Independents in Christchurch may not prove to be quite so 'Independent' when their voting behaviour is examined. A number of these self-described Independents may actually be straight ticket voters or 'partisans in disguise' as we shall see later on.

The Downsian model offers a possible explanation for the difference in party affiliations between the national level and the local level. New Zealand's system of policy-making and administration is highly centralised, and the tasks assigned to local government are more limited. Therefore, the impact of decision-making about these issues on the well-being of the individual is often quite low. For many citizens these issues fail to generate any party differential. That is, many citizens believe that their utility income will not differ no matter which party holds office.

Although local party loyalties were less widespread than parliamentary party loyalties, local identifications were as

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1. Nigel S. Roberts, unpublished research (1972); Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 182.

2. Levine and Robinson, New Zealand Voter, p. 18.

equally strongly held as parliamentary identifications (Table 6.4). Almost three-quarters of those who had a parliamentary party identification said they felt either very strongly or

TABLE 6.4 STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION (NORTH WARD SAMPLE)

STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION				STRENGTH OF PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION	
	Very strong	11%	6%	Very strong	
CITIZENS	Fairly strong	24	20	Fairly Strong	NATIONAL
	Not very strong	11	14	Not very strong	
	Not very strong	12	12	Not very strong	
LABOUR	Fairly strong	23	31	Fairly strong	LABOUR
	Very strong	19	17	Very strong	
		100%	100%		
		(N=112)	(N=176)		

fairly strongly towards the parliamentary parties, and three-quarters of those who had a local identification said they felt equally strongly towards the local parties. (The proportion who felt very strongly towards the Citizens Association was almost twice the proportion who felt very strongly towards the National Party). Not so many people felt attached to a local party compared to a parliamentary party, but for those that did, their loyalties

were no less weaker than those of the parliamentary identifiers.

The influence of local party identification on voting behaviour in a New Zealand municipal election can be examined by looking at voting in the mayoral election, whether a straight or split ticket was voted in the council election, and whether a straight or split ticket was voted in the mayoral and council elections combined. For those who had a party affiliation at the 1974 election, it seemed to exert a very strong influence on voting for the mayoral candidates (Table 6.5). Most party identifiers

TABLE 6.5 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

MAYORAL VOTE	PARTY IDENTIFICATION Citizens	Independent	Labour
Citizens	98%	56%	10%
Labour	2	44	90
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=41)	(N=64)	(N=52)

$\chi^2 = 71.93$ $p<.001$
$r_s = .68$ (with Independents included as a category of party identification).

χ^2 Chi-square

p Probability that the relationship is random

r_s Spearman correlation coefficient

intended to remain loyal to their party's candidate; the correlation coefficient of .68 indicates the relationship is quite strong. However, only just over half the voters in Table 6.5 appear to be voting on the basis of party; those who admitted no party attachment - the Independents - were divided about equally between the candidates with slightly more voting for Citizens. Strength of party identification appears to be a factor in party voting. With one exception the stronger the feeling of attachment to a party, the more likely it is the elector intended to vote in accordance with his party tie (Table 6.6). Considering the

TABLE 6.6 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION	MAYORAL VOTE Citizens	Labour	(N=)
Very Strongly Citizens	100	0 = 100%	(10)
Fairly Strongly Citizens	100	0 = 100%	(23)
Not Very Strongly Citizens	88	12 = 100%	(8)
Independent	56	44 = 100%	(64)
Not Very Strongly Labour	9	91 = 100%	(11)
Fairly Strongly Labour	5	95 = 100%	(22)
Very Strongly Labour	16	84 = 100%	(19)

χ^2 not valid (NV) because expected frequencies less than five

$r_s = .66$

popular image of local politics as politics where voters choose the person rather than the party, these results are surprising.

Voting for the city council candidates seemed to be less influenced by party than the mayoral voting (Table 6.7). Quite a number of party identifiers had loyalties that were not strong

TABLE 6.7 1974 CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

CITY COUNCIL VOTE	PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
	Citizens	Independent	Labour
Straight Citizens Ticket	53%	10%	2%
Split Ticket	44	79	27
Straight Labour Ticket	3	11	71
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=32)	(N=58)	(N=41)

$\chi^2 = 82.89$ $p<.001$

$r_s = .63$

enough to influence straight ticket voting. Yet one out of five of those who said they were 'Independent' intended to cast straight ticket votes. Some of these Independents may have no party identification and are not concerned with the election outcome, but are voting a straight party ticket because that alternative

appears the least costly. Some of the Independents may be voting a straight ticket to support an issue position or a candidate preference they may have. Yet many of the Independents were probably 'partisans in disguise'. That is, they say they have no party affiliation, but when it comes to voting behaviour they vote the party ticket all the way. Notably these partisans in disguise were just as likely to vote straight Labour as straight Citizens. Labour identifiers' support for the Labour ticket was stronger than Citizens identifiers' support for the Citizens ticket. That is, Citizens supporters were more likely to say that they intended to vote for some Labour candidates, than Labour supporters were to vote for some Citizens candidates. The stronger the feeling of attachment to a party, the stronger the influence of party loyalty in voting for the council (Table 6.8).[1] With a few exceptions those who had stronger loyalties to their party were more likely to vote a straight party ticket for the city council. Split ticket voting is notably highest amongst the weak party identifiers as well as the Independents.

When voting patterns at the mayoral and council elections combined are examined (Table 6.9), the pattern is similar to Table

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1. Due to the small numbers in some of the rows in Table 6.8 this conclusion is provisional.

TABLE 6.8 1974 CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION	CITY COUNCIL VOTE				
	Straight Citizens Ticket	Split Ticket	Straight Labour Ticket		(N=)
Very Strongly Citizens	50	38	12	= 100%	(8)
Fairly Strongly Citizens	67	33	0	= 100%	(18)
Not Very Strongly Citizens	17	83	0	= 100%	(6)
Independent	10	79	11	= 100%	(58)
Not Very Strongly Labour	0	71	29	= 100%	(7)
Fairly Strongly Labour	0	26	74	= 100%	(19)
Very Strongly Labour	6	7	87	= 100%	(15)

χ^2 NV

6.6, but the split ticket voters are now classified according to their mayoral votes. While a total of 43 per cent of the Citizens identifiers intended to vote split tickets, 40 per cent of them intended to remain loyal to their party's mayoral candidate. All the Labour supporters who were going to split their tickets

TABLE 6.9 1974 MAYORAL AND CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION*

MAYORAL AND COUNCIL VOTE	PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
	Citizens	Independent	Labour
Straight Citizens Ticket	57%	13%	0%
Citizens Mayor & Split Council Ticket	40	48	0
Labour Mayor & Split Council Ticket	3	28	26
Straight Labour Council	0	11	74
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=30)	(N=46)	(N=39)

χ^2 NV

* Only those who indicated their votes for both mayoral and council elections are included.

indicated they would remain loyal to Labour's mayoral candidate. Almost half of the Independents said they would split their ballots while voting for the Citizens mayoral candidate, but only 28 per cent intended to split their ballots and vote for the Labour mayoral candidate. Loyalty to Labour seems to be a stronger force than loyalty to Citizens because a greater proportion of Labour supporters intended to vote a straight Labour ticket, than Citizens supporters

intended to vote a straight Citizens ticket. When voting for the mayoral and council election by strength of party tie is examined (Table 6.10), the extent to which party loyalty exerts an influence

TABLE 6.10 1974 MAYORAL AND CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION	MAYORAL AND COUNCIL VOTE					(N=)
	Straight Citizens Ticket	Citizens Mayor & Split Council Ticket	Labour Mayor & Split Council Ticket	Straight Labour Ticket		
Very Strongly Citizens	63	37	0	0	= 100%	(8)
Fairly Strongly Citizens	65	35	0	0	= 100%	(17)
Not Very Strongly Citizens	20	60	20	0	= 100%	(5)
Independent	13	48	28	11	= 100%	(46)
Not Very Strongly Labour	0	0	67	33	= 100%	(6)
Fairly Strongly Labour	0	0	22	78	= 100%	(18)
Very Strongly Labour	0	0	14	86	= 100%	(15)

χ^2 NV

can again be seen. Those with weaker party ties were more likely to split their ballots.

That two-thirds of those who had a party identification and that one-quarter of those who did not, intended to vote straight party tickets in the 1974 election (Table 6.11) indicates that party identification was a fairly strong influence on voting behaviour for the sample.

TABLE 6.11 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET IN 1974 MAYORAL AND COUNCIL ELECTION BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Mayoral and Council Vote	Party Identifiers	Independents
Straight ticket	67%	24%
Split ticket	33	76
	100%	100%
	(N=69)	(N=46)

$\chi^2 = 18.51$ $p<.001$

VOTING IN LOCAL ELECTIONS AND VOTING IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The extent of parliamentary party identification in the North ward sample has already been noted (Table 6.3). Almost 80 per cent of the sample identified with either the Labour or the National Parties, and nearly two-thirds felt either very strongly or fairly strongly towards those parties. But what kind of

relationship exists between party identification at the local level and party identification with respect to politics throughout the country as a whole? How many people have two different party identifications? How many of the local Independents are parliamentary identifiers and what parties do they identify with? It would certainly reduce the costs of becoming informed and the costs of voting if voters had one party identification that they could use in both local and parliamentary elections.

Given that the Labour Party that contestscity council elections is the same Labour Party that contests general elections, and that the Citizens Association roughly corresponds to the National Party (in an ideological way if not in an organisational way),[1] then it would be reasonable to expect that most identifiers at the one level would identify with the corresponding party at the other level.

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1. The relationship between the Citizens Association and the National Party has always been a sensitive issue. The Citizens Association insists that it "is definitely in no way connected with the National Party" (M.O. Holdsworth, Chairman, Christchurch Star, 28 September, 1974), yet there were strong individual links between some of the 1974 Citizens candidates and the National Party (documented in Chapter I), and the President of the Association once remarked that: "While it is not tied up with the National Party its views were generally along the same lines." (E.B.E. Taylor, Address to Annual Meeting of the Christchurch Citizens Association, 27 April 1970, quoted in Christchurch Star, 11 July 1974, p. 1). See p.177-178 in this chapter for further evidence of the electorate's view of the relationship between the Citizens Association and the National Party.

Looking at the identifiers at the local level, most of them identified with the corresponding party at the parliamentary level (Table 6.12). However, 6 per cent of the Citizens identifiers and 3 per cent of the Labour identifiers had twc different party

TABLE 6.12 PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION	LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
	Citizens	Independent	Labour
National	79%	32%	3%
Independent	11	17	2
Labour	6	42	95
Values/Social Credit/ Other	4	9	0
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=48)	(N=99)	(N=62)

χ^2 NV

identifications - one for parliamentary politics and one for local politics. It would be interesting to investigate the origins and development of these two apparently conflicting identifications. Are they a passing reaction to the contemporary events of politics or are they rooted in the longer term? The North ward survey, however, was not designed to investigate the origins and development

of party identification. The relationship in Table 6.12 is stronger for Labour identifiers than for Citizens identifiers; and the Citizens supporters were more likely to be Independents in parliamentary politics. That significantly more local Independents identified with Labour at the parliamentary level than identified with National is surprising, for it is often thought that local Independents are merely National party supporters in disguise. However this is evidently not so. It is also interesting that about one in four of the local Independents still showed their independence from Labour or National at the parliamentary level; they were either Independents once again or supporters of minor parties.

Having seen the parliamentary loyalties of the local identifiers, the local loyalties of the parliamentary identifiers are shown in Table 6.13. (That is, instead of being the dependent variable as in Table 6.12, parliamentary identification is now the independent variable). Only just over half of the National and Labour supporters identified with the corresponding party at the local level. This is more significant in the case of Labour because the parliamentary party is the same party that contests local elections; yet 40 per cent of the parliamentary Labour identifiers did not feel the same

TABLE 6.13 LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION	PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
	National	Independent	Labour	Values/Social Credit/Other
Citizens	53%	22%	3%	18%
Independent	44	74	40	82
Labour	3	4	57	0
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=72)	(N=23)	(N=103)	(N=11)

χ^2 NV

attachment to Labour at the local level. More of the parliamentary Independents felt loyal towards Citizens than Labour at the local level. Perhaps this is because they think Citizens is less of a political party than Labour.

Further light was shed on the relationship between local and parliamentary party loyalties by Warren Head in an analysis of survey data from the 1966 general election in the Fendalton electorate. Forty per cent of the sample thought that a vote for the Citizens Association "was like a vote for the National Party" while 18 per cent thought it was not. Of those who had voted in the 1965

Christchurch City Council election 61 per cent thought that a vote for Citizens was like a vote for National, and 25 per cent of those who had not voted in 1965 thought the same.[1]

The respondents in the North ward sample were asked which party they would vote for if a general election was to be held in the near future. The influence of parliamentary party loyalty on voting in this hypothetical election is shown in Table 6.14. Given

TABLE 6.14 FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE	PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
	National	Independent	Labour
National	90%	36%	1%
Labour	10	64	99
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=62)	(N=14)	(N=94)

$\chi^2 = 128.47$ $p<.001$

$r_s = .75$

the nature of parliamentary party politics compared to local party politics, it could be expected that parliamentary loyalty would be

1. Warren P. Head, "A City Decides : The General Election of 1966 in Christchurch", M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 1967, p. 272.

a stronger influence on voting in general elections than local loyalty would on voting in local elections. This does not appear to be so when comparing the distribution in Table 6.14 with the distribution of local party loyalty and mayoral voting in Table 6.5; however a comparison of the correlation coefficients shows that parliamentary loyalties do appear to be more influential.

The relationship between parliamentary party loyalties and voting in local elections is an interesting one. Party ties at the level of national politics appeared to be very important in structuring the mayoral vote in the 1974 election (Table 6.15). Only small proportions of National and Labour supporters did not

TABLE 6.15 1974 MAYORAL AND CITY COUNCIL VOTES BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

1974 C.C.C. VOTE	PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION National	Independent	Labour	χ^2
MAYORAL				
Citizens	90%	53%	17%	
Labour	10	47	83	68.5
	100%	100%	100%	p<.001
	(N=58)	(N=17)	(N=75)	
COUNCIL				
Straight Citizens	46%	13%	2%	
Split Ticket	49	87	42	NV
Straight Labour	5	0	56	
	100%	100%	100%	
	(N=47)	(N=15)	(N=62)	

vote for the corresponding party candidate in the 1974 mayoral election. Looking at the council voting, parliamentary loyalties were not strong enough to prevent widespread split-ticket voting, but very few parliamentary identifiers voted a straight ticket for the opposing local party. Parliamentary loyalties were not always directly transferable to the local scene especially when the city council election offered the voter more than one vote. While some of the parliamentary Independents were prepared to vote a straight Citizens ticket, none of them were prepared to vote a straight Labour ticket.

Examination of how voters in a local election would behave if a general election was held in the near future should provide further evidence of the relationship between voting behaviour in local and general elections. The best comparison between the two types of elections is between the mayoral election and a general election because in each the voter has only one vote; he cannot give a few votes to each party to satisfy any cross-pressures, he must decide which one party or person he will vote for. Such a comparison is contained in Table 6.16. The significant feature of this table is that almost one-third of those who voted Citizens for mayor said they would vote Labour if a general election was held in the near future. Following Labour's defeat in 1974 (in the

Wellington mayoralty as well as in Christchurch), it was claimed by various people that these losses demonstrated a nationwide swing against the then Labour Government.[1] However this does not seem to

TABLE 6.16 FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE BY 1974 MAYORAL VOTE

FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE	MAYORAL VOTE		
	Citizens (51%)	Labour (49%)	(= 100%)
National (37%)	70%	3%	
Labour (63%)	30	97	
Total (100%)	100%	100%	
	(N=70)	(N=68)	

$\chi^2 = 63.73$ $p<.001$

have been the case in Christchurch when so many of the Citizens mayoral voters intended to vote for a Labour member of parliament. It is also important to note that while the survey accurately showed Hay's lead over Pickering (51 per cent to 49 per cent), it also revealed that 63 per cent of the voters in the mayoral election would vote Labour in a general election (Table 6.16). Labour was

1. See "The Vote in Christchurch", The Press, 14 October 1974, p. 1; R.D. Muldoon quoted in Ibid., p. 1; J.G. Power [N.G. Pickering's former secretary and defeated Labour council candidate], quoted in Christchurch Star, 15 October 1974, p.1.

defeated both in Christchurch in 1974 and in the next general election a year later, but the North ward survey shows that Labour's defeat in Christchurch was not evidence of a swing against the Labour Government. (It should be remembered, however, that the North ward survey was conducted in September 1974, which was almost certainly the high-point of the 'honeymoon period' of the new Prime Minister, W.E. Rowling. From then on the Labour Government's fortunes steadily waned).[1]

The relationship between voting in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election and voting in a general election can be seen clearly in Table 6.17. Only about half of the National and Labour

TABLE 6.17 1974 CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE

1974 CITY COUNCIL VOTE	FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE	
	National	Labour
Straight Citizens	52%	0%
Split Ticket	43	54
Straight Labour	5	46
	100%	100%
	(N=42)	(N=72)

$\chi^2 = 52.99$ $p<.001$

1. See the results of the Herald-NRB (National Research Bureau) political surveys summarised in New Zealand Herald, 12 December 1977.

voters in a general election intended to vote straight party tickets in the 1974 election. In a local election where there are more choices than in a general election party loyalty is not always strong enough to influence straight ticket voting.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The key concept of psychological identification with a political party has been found to be of vital importance in overseas studies in influencing both electoral behaviour and people's perceptions of politics. Party affiliation assists the elector in simplifying the election, for it enables him to behave consistently with his basic political predispositions without spending great effort in seeking information or reaching a voting decision. In New Zealand political parties play a lesser role in local government compared to central government. Only in the four main cities do parties have a significant role where they provide a framework in which electors, personalities and policies can operate. They provide group-labels for the candidates and thus simplify the election for the voter who can then use his standing party loyalty as a guide to voting. A party affiliation with regard to local politics in Christchurch City was accepted by a substantially smaller proportion of the North ward sample compared to the proportion that felt an attachment to a parliamentary party. The

Downsian economic model suggests that this is because of the lesser importance of the issues decided on at the local level in New Zealand. However local party loyalties were as equally strongly held as parliamentary party loyalties.

Given the undeveloped nature of party politics in New Zealand local government and the public uncertainty about political party involvement in local elections, it is surprising that party identification was of such major influence in the 1974 election. In the mayoral election only a few voters deviated from their local party ties. However split ticket voting was quite common amongst party identifiers in the council election. When voting for the mayoral and council elections is examined together, the influence of party is more apparent. In the mayoral election almost all the voters who had a party tie voted in a consistent manner with it. These voters were minimising their costs by behaving in line with their standing party loyalties. Fewer voters in the city council election followed the party line exactly. That so many party identifiers split their tickets suggests that the expected difference in utility income is not so great. That is, the flow of benefits from the city council as a whole seems to depend more on which party's mayoral candidate was elected rather than on which party's council candidates were elected.

It was mentioned earlier on in this chapter that the complexity of a multi-candidate election with its large number of available choices could be expected to lead voters to rely heavily on party identification in voting as a means of reducing the costs of making decisions about the various candidates. However, it seems that the greater the number of choices, the less voters used party affiliation as a guide to voting. In the mayoral election where there were two main choices,party identification was very closely related to voting behaviour. In the city council election where there were, in effect, 31 available choices, party identification was of much less importance in structuring the vote; and in the mayoral and council elections together where there were 124 choices, party loyalty was only slightly more important in structuring the vote. Voters did not rely heavily on party attachments when there were a large number of choices; rather, many apparently based their decisions on non-party factors and took the opportunity to spread their votes around. In the mayoral election voters have, of course, only one vote and they may feel unwilling to be disloyal to their party. In the council election voters could give their main support to their usual party, vote for one or two candidates of either of the other parties, and still call themselves Citizens or Labour supporters. Party loyalty is apparently not as strong when there are a larger number of choices. Whether this split ticket voting is related to

factors such as the personality of the candidates will be investigated in the next chapter.

Overall the relationship between voting in local elections and voting in parliamentary elections is quite close. With regard to local and parliamentary party identifications, the relationship between them appears to be quite peculiar. While most of the local identifiers felt the corresponding attachment to the parliamentary party, only half of the parliamentary identifiers felt loyal to the corresponding local party (Tables 6.12 and 6.13). This is an indication that parties are less important to the voter with regard to local politics. For the North ward sample the role of local party identification in structuring the 1974 mayoral vote was almost as important as the role of parliamentary party identification in structuring voting in a future general election (Tables 6.5 and 6.14). Parliamentary loyalties were quite closely related to voting in the 1974 mayoral election, but distinctly less so in the council election. When there was more than one vote, electors were prepared to be more flexibile in casting their ballots (Table 6.15). Voting in the mayoral election and in a future general election were not closely associated because quite a few voters intended to switch party votes between the two elections

(Table 6.16). Voting in the city council election was also less related to voting in a general election because of the large number of split ticket voters (Table 6.17). In general, voting in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election was quite closely related to voting in parliamentary elections, but there were significant exceptions.

The findings in this chapter support both social-psychological and rational choice theories of voting. Half the sample felt a psychological attachment to a political party with respect to local politics and this attachment appeared to be a strong influence on voting. Rational choice theory leads us to expect that voters, as rational actors, will use this party affiliation as a guide to voting in order to minimise their costs. These party voters are able to use their party identification as an organising precept enabling them to behave consistently with their basic political attitudes without spending great efforts in seeking information or reaching a voting decision. Rational choice theory also leads us to expect that there would be a fairly strong relationship between voting in local elections and voting in parliamentary elections, because the parties contesting both elections roughly correspond and the rational voter would vote the same way in

both elections to minimise his costs. This chapter has shown that social-psychological theory is useful because of its emphasis on partisanship, while rational choice theory is useful because of its assumption of voter rationality. Both perspectives assist in the explanation of voting behaviour. While party has been shown to be of some significance, the fairly large amount of split ticket voting suggests that an examination of the impact of candidate personality would shed further light on the voting decision.

CHAPTER VII

PERSONAL VOTING, TICKET-SPLITTING AND COATTAIL VOTING

Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting are names given to types of voting where the personality of one or more candidates is presumed to be the dominant influence in the voting decision. Personal voting stems from voters' perceptions of the personalities of the candidates rather than their party affiliations or their policy stands. Ticket-splitting and coattail voting are specific kinds of personal voting. Straight and split ticket voting are possible when there is a choice between competing teams of candidates. A split ticket vote can occur when an attractive personality manages to win the support of an otherwise straight party ticket voter. Coattail voting occurs when the personal image of the party leader generates votes for himself and one or more other members of the party ticket who are then said to be 'riding into office on the leader's coattails'. Coattail voting emphasises the importance of party leadership and the role of the leader's personality in winning votes for the other candidates on his ticket. On the other hand split ticket voting emphasises the

role that individual candidates can play through their own personalities by standing out and winning votes against the electoral tide.

Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting were first investigated using the social-psychological approach.[1] This chapter uses this perspective as well as rational choice theory, for the problems raised by the social-psychological studies appear particularly appropriate to investigation using rational choice theory. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the three types of voting at the 1974 Christchurch City Council election using social-psychological and rational choice theories. As well as reviews of the relevant literature and the building of theoretical models, attempts will be made to measure the degree of personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting in the election.

PERSONAL VOTING

The question of the extent to which candidates are able to

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1. See, for example, Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964), chap. 2; Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", American Political Science Review LI (1957), 293-312; Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology", Public Opinion Quarterly XIX (1955), 353-368.

win votes because of their own personal qualities, rather than their party labels or policy proposals, has often been posed but never answered satisfactorily. While few studies have made a detailed analysis of the problem, general commentaries abound with references to the 'personal vote' that individual candidates are supposed to have attracted because of their sincerity, likeability, trustworthiness, strength, past experience, expected performance in office, and the like. The authors of The American Voter have observed:

> "Although a candidate is likely to be seen partly in terms of his connection with party and with issues of public policy and matters of group interest, he will be evaluated as well in terms of personal attributes." 1

While David Butler and Donald Stokes have noted:

> "It would certainly seem that any special appeal exercised by MPs was through their general personal qualities rather than their stand on the issues." 2

V.O. Key, Jr., describes the "responsible voter" as one who casts his ballot in light of "relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance and executive personality."[3]

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1. Campbell et al., American Voter, p. 24 (Emphasis added).

2. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974), p. 356.

3. V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate : Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 7. (Emphasis Added).

Three studies have attempted a more detailed look at the extent of personal voting. In England Philip M. Williams concludes an analysis of aggregate statistics with the generalisation: "A familiar member may in time be worth an extra 2 per cent swing, or 2000 more on his majority."[1] A New Zealand study undertaken by Nigel S. Roberts using survey research concluded: "It appears that McGuigan attracted about 3 per cent of the Lyttelton electorate to give him a personal vote."[2] In a study of the 1968 Christchurch City Council election using polling booth data R.J. Johnston was able to conclude: "Just under 3 per cent of the average [council] candidate's support could be ascribed to a 'friends-and-neighbours' type individual effort."[3] Much remains to be learnt, however, about the

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1. Philip M. Williams, "Two Notes on the British Electoral System", Parliamentary Affairs XX (1966), p. 25.

2. Nigel S. Roberts, "Getting It Right", in Brian Edwards (ed.), Right Out : Labour Victory '72 - The Inside Story (Wellington: Reed, 1973), p. 201.

3. R.J. Johnston, "Spatial Patterns and Influences on Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections : The Christchurch City Council Elections, 1968", Urban Studies X (1973), p. 77. "The 'friends-and-neighbours' effect assumes that information about a candidate emanates from his home, so that ... the nearer one lives to a candidate's home, the more likely one is to know him, to have met him, or to know somebody who knows him. Such interpersonal knowledge is expected to attract support for ... the person rather than for the cause he represents. This hypothesis proposes that people abandon traditional party affiliations to support a known candidate." R.J. Johnston, "Local Effects in Voting at a Local Election", Annals, Association of American Geographers LXIV (1974), p. 419.

personal vote: about voters' perceptions of candidates, how they evaluate them, how they react to them, and why.

Personal voting is thought to be usually small and difficult to discern in many elections. Why, then, is the problem of personal voting worthy of study in this analysis of a New Zealand local election? First, it is important to take a macro-view of the electoral process and consider the interaction of candidates - as the key political actors in the electoral process - with the electorate. Second, in a close election any small gains made by a candidate from personal voting could be decisive in determining the final result. Third, the circumstances surrounding local elections in New Zealand suggest that a higher level of personal voting than occurs in general elections might be expected. This is because party politics are not as important as in general elections, party identification can become less significant, far less is at stake in local elections, and electors have more than one vote and thus the opportunity to split their tickets to vote for an attractive personality of the opposite party. Finally, while there has been much comment that people are more important than parties in local elections, no one has yet employed survey research methods to investigate personal voting in a New Zealand local election.

A Model of Personal Voting

Rational voting theory as applied to the problem of personal voting recognises the effects of information costs on the elector's voting decision.[1] The scarcity and high cost of information about party policies and campaign issues may mean that the personal characteristics of the candidates are almost the only information that reach the voter besides the candidates' party affiliations. Party affiliation is a major factor in influencing voting behaviour because of its low cost.[2] However in local elections, information about candidates' personalities may also be available without great expense.

In a mayoral election party labels are often irrelevant for many voters. In Downsian terms their party differentials[3] are relatively low and it does not make much difference to their expected utility stream which party holds the mayoral office. However, it does make a difference to their expected benefits which particular candidate is elected. If information is

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1. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), chap. 12.

2. See, for example, Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice: Varieties of Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975), pp. 9-10.

3. Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 3.

readily available about the personal qualities of the mayoral candidates, then voters may well base their choice on this information. A voting decision on this basis is the only way a voter can maximise his expected utility when it makes a difference to him which candidate is elected.

In city council elections, where there are many more candidates, far less information is available at low cost. Since costs are higher, personality characteristics may be the only,or at least the dominant,images that are passed on to some voters during the campaign. For these voters personal voting is a rational choice because they can act on the available information and do not have to spend more resources gathering further knowledge about the parties, policies and issues. Personal voting can be a cost-reducing choice.

The question for this section of this chapter to answer is: to what extent and in what circumstances did the qualities of individual candidates affect voting patterns in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election? Past research in electoral behaviour has suggested three main influences affecting voting behaviour: party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation. Party identification

is regarded as a long-term influence,while issues and candidates have been shown to constitute major short-term influences on the vote.[1] It is this 'candidate orientation' factor of The American Voter's 'funnel of causality' model that is hypothesised to be the key factor leading to personal voting. However, candidate orientation tends to be closely involved in the voter's mind with party and with issue factors.[2] Both parties and issues can play a very important role in moulding popular perceptions of candidates. Once a voter identifies with a party, this often includes his acceptance of that party's candidates and its policies. The Survey Research Centre authors found that supporters of a party evaluated their party's candidates more favourably than did supporters of the opposing party.[3] The crucial task, then, is to identify and isolate those voters for whom candidate orientation is an independent vote-determining factor. This can be achieved by examining voters' perceptions of and attitudes towards the candidates, parties and issues, and also the motivations underlying their voting behaviour.

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1. See, for example, Campbell et al., American Voter; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954).

2. Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation", American Political Science Review LXIV (1976), 1167-1185.

3. Campbell et al., American Voter, pp. 33-35.

Evidence is needed that the effect of attitudes towards the candidates is independent of the influence of attitudes towards the parties and the issues.

Two groups of personal voters are likely to be difficult to identify and isolate - those whose 'personal vote' for a candidate happens to reinforce their usual party affiliation, and those whose 'personal vote' happens to reinforce an issue-oriented decision. Amongst these two groups it is hard for the observer to distinguish the candidate-oriented voter from the party voter and the issue voter. It is for this reason that these types of personal voting will not be considered and attention will be focussed on partisan identifiers who abandon traditional affiliations and voting patterns to cast a personal vote for a candidate of the opposing party. These personal voters are: identifiers of Party A or voters who cast an otherwise straight ticket for Part A and who cross party lines to vote for a candidate of Party B because of the personal characteristics of one or more candidates. These voters are influenced by their short-term evaluations of the candidates into deviating from their normal long-term party ties.[1] For these

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1. See Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of A Normal Vote", in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 2.

voters the influence of party has declined and been overtaken by the influence of personalities. It is likely that this kind of voting behaviour will be exhibited by voters with weak party allegiances. It is this kind of voting that R.J. Johnston is hypothesising in his definition of the 'friends-and-neighbours' effect.[1]

Another group of personal voters possibly worth investigation are those Independents who do not accept a party affiliation. As they profess to have no party ties perhaps some of their votes could be personal votes. However Chapter VI showed that almost one in four of the Independents in the North ward sample voted straight party tickets in the 1974 election, thus casting great doubts on their professed 'independence'. As it would be impossible to distinguish the personal voter from the party voter amongst the Independents, they will not be further examined. If self-description is not a good indicator of independence then perhaps voting behaviour is. Those who cast a straight council vote for one party and voted for the mayoral candidate of the opposite party could be personal voters and this will be investigated.

The extent of personal voting in an election and its effects (if any) on the election outcome may be assessed in terms of

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1. See fn. 3, p. 193 above.

candidates' salience to the electorate, the content of the images conveyed, voter reactions to these images, and how unevenly balanced are the favourable and unfavourable elements in the images.[1]

Personal Voting for the Mayoral Candidates

The mayoral candidates can be expected to be more salient to the electorate than the council candidates because they benefit from a number of advantages. The importance of the office they seek plus the fact that there is only one mayor but nineteen councillors usually results in the mayoral race becoming the centre of public attention. The leaders are usually highly visible public figures who can, through their own personalities, excite a great deal of feeling - both positive and negative. In contrast with general elections all electors have the opportunity to cast personal votes for the party leaders. The North ward survey revealed that the mayoral candidates were very well-known to the electorate. Eighty-six per cent of those interviewed knew that Mr Neville Pickering (the incumbent) was the Labour candidate for mayor, and 81 per cent correctly named Mr Hamish Hay as the Citizens candidate. However only 13 per cent knew the name of the Values Party candidate, Mr Gary Williams.

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1. See Butler and Stokes, Political Change, pp. 352, 360.

The respondents' answers to the question "Why do you think you'll vote that way [for mayor]?" revealed the content of the images that the two main candidates had conveyed to the electorate. The number of favourable and unfavourable responses made by each respondent regarding the candidates was recorded. (Although the respondents were giving a reason for voting for a particular candidate, the fact that they made a favourable remark about the other candidate was still noted). In all 192 comments about the personalities of Hay and Pickering were mentioned. Of these 26 per cent were favourable comments about Hay, while only 8 per cent were unfavourable to Hay. In contrast, opinions of Pickering were more polarised; 38 per cent of all the comments were favourable towards him but 28 per cent were unfavourable. The sum of the pro-Hay and anti-Pickering comments is 54 per cent, while the sum of the pro-Pickering and anti-Hay comments is 46 per cent giving by coincidence almost the same margin for Hay that won him the election.

Typical responses favourable to Hay were: "I like him", "I like him better than Pickering", "He is less politically minded than Pickering", "He would be a good mayor" and "He is honest and has the community at heart". The most frequent response disapproving of Hay was that people simply did not like him but without giving specific reasons. Over half the responses favourable to Pickering

mentioned "His good record in office" and that he had "done a good job as mayor". A typical respondent said: "He has a good record, he speaks his mind, ... a bustler, he gets things done, he doesn't mind being unpopular...." Almost two-thirds of the comments against Pickering concerned the fact that people did not like him personally. Typical responses referred to Pickering's "arrogance" and a dislike of his "methods" and his "style". "Pickering's OK", said one person in the sample, "but he's not my idea of a mayor. A mayor needs to be dignified". One elector summed up the attitudes to Pickering when he remarked: "He gets things done, though I don't like him personally." The focus in the mayoral election was certainly on Pickering. Two-thirds of all the responses concerning the two candidates were either pro- or anti-Pickering. The people in the North ward sample certainly liked Pickering better than Hay, but they also disliked Pickering much more than they disliked Hay.

Favourable and unfavourable comments about candidates can indicate potential personal voting if the comments are made by supporters of the opposite party to which the candidate represents. Thus if all the favourable comments about Hay came from Citizens identifiers then it would be difficult to distinguish personal voting from party voting. However Table 7.1 shows that 8 per cent

TABLE 7.1 LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY ATTITUDE TO MAYORAL CANDIDATES

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	ATTITUDE			
	Pro-Hay	Anti-Pickering	Anti-Hay	Pro-Pickering
Citizens	58%	47%	0%	0%
Independent	34	50	71	37
Labour	8	3	29	63
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=26)	(N=30)	(N=7)	(N=43)

χ^2 (Chi-square) not valid (NV) because expected frequencies less than five

of those who were pro-Hay identified with the Labour Party, and 3 per cent of those who were anti-Pickering were also Labour identifiers.[1] In contrast no Citizens identifiers felt unfavourable to Hay or favourable to Pickering. The survey indicates that Hay was more likely than Pickering to receive a personal vote, even though some of these votes seemed to be a reaction against Pickering, rather than a positive vote for Hay's personality.

The reasons given by the sample for their voting choices were

1. These percentages are based on small numbers; they are therefore tentative only.

analysed to assess voters' reactions to the images that the candidates conveyed and how unevenly balanced these images were. However as Roberts has pointed out (regarding the 1972 Lyttelton survey):

> "Most people vote on the basis of several complicated, interconnected reasons. Often no single reason will stand out clearly and separately, and to ask voters to unravel the intertwined strands and to nominate the most important cause can, at best, give us only a rough indication of what lay behind their choice on polling day." 1

Nevertheless, Table 7.2 is able to throw some light on the reasons for voting for Hay and Pickering. As many as 37 per cent of those who intended to vote for Hay were doing so because they disliked Pickering. In contrast only 9 per cent of Pickering's voters did not like Hay. Pickering's personality was invaluable to Hay; Hay received more votes from people who disliked Pickering than for any other reason. Pickering's voters were three times as likely as Hay's voters to say that they liked the candidate's party or that they usually voted for that party. In the case of Pickering and Labour (and to a lesser extent for Hay and Citizens), the dislike of the candidate's party was not as strong as the dislike of the personality that carried the party's banner. Very few persons in the sample mentioned the candidate's stand on the issues as a reason for voting for him.

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1. Roberts,"Getting It Right", p. 200.

TABLE 7.2 MAIN REASON FOR 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY MAYORAL VOTE

REASON	MAYORAL VOTE	
	Hay	Pickering
I like the candidate	32%	54%
I dislike the other candidate	37	9
I like the candidate's party/ I usually vote for this party	6	19
I dislike the other candidate's party	5	2
I like the candidate's stand on the issues	5	2
I dislike the other candidate's stand on the issues	5	0
Other reason/No reason given	10	14
	100%	100%
	(N=83)	(N=81)

χ^2 NV

The problems of isolating personal voters from party voters were discussed earlier in this chapter. It was indicated that attention would be directed to party identifiers who voted for a candidate of the opposing party because of the personality of one or more candidates, and to straight council ticket voters who vote

for the mayoral candidate of the opposite party because of personality factors. We can be confident that these voters would not be influenced by party affiliations in their voting for the mayoralty. Analysis of the Citizens identifiers who crossed party lines to vote for Pickering, and of the Labour identifiers who crossed party lines to vote for Hay because of the personal characteristics of the two candidates, reveals that Hay received a personal vote from this source of four per cent, and that Pickering received no personal vote from this source. (That is, four per cent of Hay's voters were Labour identifiers who crossed party lines because of the personalities of the candidates). Of this four per cent of Hay's voters, three per cent were voters attracted to Hay because of his personal qualities and one per cent were voting for Hay because they did not like Pickering's personality. Analysis of the straight council ticket voters who crossed party lines to vote for the mayoral candidate of the other party reveals that only one per cent of Pickering's votes came from those who voted a straight Citizens ticket for the city council, but this was not because of the candidates' personalities. There were no voters who intended to vote for Hay and a straight Labour ticket for the council.

Given the popular image of local elections where voters are supposed to vote for the person rather than the party, these findings

are surprising. Yet Chapter VI showed that only 2 per cent of the Citizens identifiers intended to vote for Pickering and 10 per cent of the Labour identifiers intended to vote for Hay (Table 6.4). It appears that in this particular mayoral election party identification was clearly the dominant influence on voting, but personal voting for the successful mayoral candidate was evident. With regard to rational choice theory, it appears that party identification is more of a cost-reducing device than candidate orientation. Voters relied far more heavily on party identification as a guide to voting than they relied on their attitudes towards the personalities of the mayoral candidates.

Personal Voting for the City Council Candidates

Public knowledge about the city council candidates is generally lower compared to the mayoral candidates. Little information about their personalities or their policies is available through the mass media during the campaign, and therefore many of them remain unknown. These candidates are, therefore, forced to rely mainly on their party labels for the great bulk of their votes. How, then, can council candidates become well-known in order to benefit from personal voting? There are two answers to this question.

First, they may become well-known in the local area around their homes where information about them can be spread on a face-to-face level. Such knowledge is predicted to attract support for the 'local boy' regardless of the party he represents. The resulting pattern is called the 'friends-and-neighbours' effect and is produced by local flows of information about a candidate.[1]

Some council candidates are able to rely on a second additional source of potential personal votes - the amount of knowledge electors already possess about them. Candidates may be well-known through the mass media because they are long-serving sitting councillors, members of parliament, prominent local businessmen, sports administrators, or they may be well-known for their 'community services'. Such candidates have a distinct advantage over their lesser known counterparts with regard to their personal vote-pulling power and

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1. See fn. 3, p. 193 above. The term "'friends-and-neighbours' effect" was first used by V.O. Key, Jr., in his Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949). The concept was developed by David R. Reynolds ("'A Friends-and-Neighbours' Voting Model as a Spatial Interactional Model for Electoral Geography", in Kevin R. Cox and Reginald G. Golledge (eds.), Behavioural Problems in Geography: A Symposium (Evanston, Ill.: Department of Geography, Northwestern University, Studies in Geography No.17, 1969), pp.81-100; and further tested and extended by R.J. Johnston in his studies of New Zealand local elections. See his "Spatial Elements in Voting Patterns at the 1968 Christchurch City Council Election", Political Science XXIV (April 1972), 49-61; "Spatial Patterns";"Local Effects".

consequently the election outcome, for it often happens that the best-known names poll the heaviest in New Zealand local elections. To enjoy the advantage of notability, a candidate need not be well-known only for political reasons. Almost anything will do: what matters is the extent to which he or she is well-known.[1] Thus a first-time candidate whose name is frequently used in media advertisements for a household product can be more well-known than a candidate who has been a sitting councillor for the previous three years.

In sharp contrast to the mayoral candidates, the council candidates were relatively unknown (Table 7.3). Seventy per cent of

TABLE 7.3 NUMBER OF CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES FOR NORTH WARD CORRECTLY NAMED

	Number of Candidates Correctly Named											
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Percentage of Sample (N=231)	70%	17	7	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	= 100%

those interviewed could not name any of the 10 candidates for North, and only 13 per cent could name 2 or more. These low figures may have

1. G.W.A. Bush, Labour's Lost Loves and the 1971 Auckland Local Body Elections (Auckland: Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland, 1974), pp. 7-8.

been partly due to the fact that only one sitting councillor was standing in North for re-election. However, due to the scarcity of information regarding individual candidates and the newness of the ward system, this picture probably applied to the other wards as well.

It is not possible to test whether the well-known candidates received personal votes through the 'friends-and-neighbours' effect or through being 'city notables'. However, the election results and the survey findings do suggest that being a 'city notable' can be important in an election. Dodge was a well-known manufacturer of venetian blinds who used his own name in advertisements for his product. He was the most well-known candidate in North (Table 7.4),

TABLE 7.4 KNOWLEDGE OF NORTH WARD CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES

Candidate	Percentage of Sample Who Knew Candidate (N=231)
Dodge (C)	16%
Caygill (L)	12
Blaxall (C)	7
Drayton (L)	6
Burn (C)	4
Hawkey (C)	4
Marshall (L)	4
Jackson (L)	3
Wright (V)	0.4
Wilkes (V)	0

C Citizens L Labour V Values

and he received more votes than any other candidate in North. Caygill was a sitting councillor, vocal on many issues, the second best-known candidate and the only Labour candidate elected in North. Blaxall was a former councillor, prominent in welfare services, the third best-known candidate and also elected. The fourth candidate elected was Burn who was fifth equal best-known.

When the party identifications of those who knew any of the candidates are examined, identifiers of one party were more likely to know the names of their party's candidates than the names of candidates of the opposing party (Table 7.5). Citizens identifiers

TABLE 7.5 RESPONDENTS WHO COULD NAME CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

CANDIDATE NAMED BY RESPONDENTS	PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
	Citizens	Independent	Labour
Dodge (C)	28%*	17%	7%
Blaxall (C)	16	5	0
Hawkey (C)	14	2	2
Burn (C)	10	3	2
Jackson (L)	2	5	2
Marshall (L)	2	3	7
Drayton (L)	4	4	13
Caygill (L)	8	13	13
	(N=51)	(N=109)	(N=62)

* i.e. 28 per cent of the Citizens identifiers (N=51) knew Dodge was a candidate.

C Citizens
L Labour

were more likely than anyone else to know the names of the Citizens candidates, and Labour identifiers were more likely to know the Labour candidates. Dodge and Caygill were particularly well-known, not only by their own party supporters, but also by Independents and supporters of the opposite party. In only two cases is knowledge of a candidate by non-supporters of his party greater than or equal to knowledge by his own party supporters. Caygill was equally well-known to Labour supporters and Independents, and Jackson was better-known by Independents than supporters of his own party. These two candidates had somehow managed to make non-Labour identifiers aware of their candidacy, although Caygill was much more effective. These findings support rational choice theory which contends that party identification is a device which electors use to lower the costs of being informed about the candidates, parties and issues. More Citizens identifiers, for example, knew that the names of the Citizens candidates than any other electors because the costs of finding out for the Citizens identifiers were less than for other electors. Just by having a party affiliation the Citizens identifiers already had a stock of political information about the election, and it appears that they minimised their costs by only investing in further information about the Citizens Association (i.e. the names of the Citizens candidates). Dodge and Caygill were well-known by non-Citizens and non-Labour supporters because the costs of finding out that they were candidates had been reduced. As already mentioned Dodge's name was often heard over the radio in advertising household products and Caygill was a sitting councillor.

Personal voters for the council candidates are those who intend voting mainly for one party ticket, but who will spilit their

ballots and vote for one candidate of the opposing party because they like his personal qualities. Those city council voters who said they intended to vote for a main party group for the council were asked if they intended to vote for any other candidates who were not members of the party ticket. Those who answered "Yes" were asked who and why? Of those who said they would vote for a main party group (N=126) 40 per cent said they would split their tickets and vote for another candidate, 51 per cent said they would not, and 9 per cent did not know. When those who said yes they would split their tickets were asked who they would vote for, only 16 per cent of this group could name a candidate (Table 7.6).

TABLE 7.6 RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION 'IF YOU INTEND VOTING FOR ANY NON-... [CHOSEN GROUP] CANDIDATES FOR THE CITY COUNCIL: WHO?'

Response	Percentage of Those Who Intended to Vote for Other Candidates
Caygill	12%
Dodge	2
Jackson	2
Person rather than party	16
Labour	8
Values	8
Other (Did not name a candidate)	2
Don't know who yet	50
	100%
	(N=50)

Half the group did not know yet who they would vote for, and one in six just said they would vote for the person rather than the party.

Caygill (Labour) was the candidate whom most voters were prepared to cross party lines and split their tickets for.[1] Two-thirds of these voters were voting straight Citizens tickets except for Caygill, and the rest were voting straight Values tickets except for Caygill. Although Dodge was the most well-known candidate, only one person in the sample said they would cross party lines to vote for him. Dodge's appeal appears to have been restricted to Citizens supporters, whereas Caygill's appeal transcended party lines. When asked why they would vote for Caygill the three main reasons mentioned were that the respondents "liked him", he had "done a good job" and because he was "a young person". This evidence suggests that Caygill received a definite personal vote in North ward, but without knowing the exact number in the sample who may have voted Caygill it is not possible to measure what proportion of Caygill's votes were personal votes. Further evidence that these votes for Caygill were personal votes comes from an examination of the party identifications of the Caygill voters. One-third of them were Citizens identifiers and the rest were Independents; none of them were Labour identifiers. Caygill's voters were also more likely to have voted Citizens in the mayoralty. Five out of six voted for Citizens and the remainder voted for the Values mayoral candidate.

The North ward city council candidates in the 1974 election were relatively unknown compared to the mayoral candidates. However

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1. Since the number of respondents who said they would vote for Caygill was small the following conclusions can only be tentative.

a few candidates were well-known to the sample and were elected to the council. Party identifiers were more likely to know their party's candidates than any other candidates. This finding supports rational choice theory which contends that party identification is a problem-solving device which electors use to lower the costs of being informed about the candidates, parties and issues. Two out of five of the straight ticket voters for the council said they would split their tickets and vote for another candidate. Of these voters 12 per cent said they would vote for Caygill and this is evidence of a definite personal vote for him. For those voters who have knowledge of a candidate such as Caygill and who like his personal qualities, a personal vote for him is a vote aimed at maximising the voter's utility stream from the city council.

TICKET-SPLITTING

It was pointed out in Chapter I that Christchurch City had a Labour mayor for 21 of the 27 years between 1947 and 1974, but that the Citizens Association had a majority on the council for 18 of those 27 years (see Table 1.1). Christchurch voters have apparently been quite prepared to split their ballots between the two parties in a number of elections. Even though the 1974 election did not produce a split result (for example, a Labour mayor and Citizens council), the North ward survey revealed that there were more voters who intended to split their votes between the parties than there were who intended to vote straight party tickets. Fifty-three per cent of those who knew their voting intention said they would vote a split ticket for the mayoral and city council elections and 47 per cent said they would vote straight party tickets. This evidence of ticket-splitting suggests that Christchurch City Council elections

offer a fruitful area for research into the phenomenon. A local election in New Zealand is an ideal place to study ticket-splitting, for local elections are the only opportunity the New Zealand voter has to split his ballot and vote for two or more parties in the one election. In parliamentary elections there is of course only one vote, but in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election, the voter could cast four votes for the city council and one for the mayoralty. Voting for the mayor and council in a New Zealand local election is thus analogous to voting for the president and congress in the United States.

The Campbell-Miller Model

From their surveys of the 1952 and 1956 United States presidential elections[1] Campbell and Miller distinguish four basic types of straight and split ticket voters: (1) The 'indifferent straight ticket voter' has little concern with the election outcome, he has no strong feelings towards parties, candidates or issues and casts a vote requiring least effort - a straight ticket. (2) The 'indifferent split ticket voter' picks out particular candidates as a favour to a friend or because he likes the candidate's name, for example. His vote is not party oriented. (3) The 'motivated straight ticket voter' holds partisan views towards parties, candidates or issues or all three and uses his vote to implement his political orientations. (4) The 'motivated split ticket voter' is politically involved but his political motives conflict. He tries to satisfy both components of the conflict by supporting candidates from both parties.

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1. Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", American Political Science Review LI (1957), 293-312.

According to Campbell and Miller the motivational basis of straight and split ticket voting can be understood in terms of three underlying generalisations:

> "(1) In the presence of specific goal-directed motivation, behaviour tends to be organised toward the achievement of the goal, and the stronger the motivation the less the deviation from the goal. (2) Conflict between motives reduces the strength of goal-directed motivation and produces ambiguities in behaviour. (3) In the absence of specific goal-directed motivation, behaviour tends to be governed by a principle of least effort." 1

As measures of political motivations the authors use the variables party identification, candidate partisanship, and issue partisanship. When a voter's political motivations combine in a mutually supportive manner in one partisan direction, the pressure towards full support for one party is increased. Straight ticket voting is highest amongst voters whose party,candidate and issue motivations all impel them to support the same party. Straight ticket voting is lowest amongst voters for whom none of these motives are present. The most significant variable associated with straight and split ticket voting is party identification. It exercises a "controlling influence"[2] on the way the voter marks his ballot. Candidate and issue factors both appear to have an independent influence on the tendency to vote a straight ticket, but they are less important than the party factor. However, when candidate and issue partisanship conflict with party identification, the resulting cross-pressures influence the voter to try to satisfy

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1. Ibid., p. 310.
2. Ibid., p. 311.

both components of the conflict by supporting candidates from both parties. Conflicting motivations reduce the pressure toward a party oriented vote and open the way to split ticket voting.

Campbell and Miller investigate the effects of the physical layout of the ballot paper on straight and split ticket voting. Research into the effects of ballot form on voting behaviour is not uncommon and has indicated that certain ballot forms can influence voting behaviour.[1] The voter's ability to make a rational choice in the voting booth is dependent, not only on his own personal characteristics, but also on the electoral context, and the form of the ballot can be an important part of that context. In the United States there are two basic types of voting paper in use in the various states. (1) The 'party column' or 'single-choice ballot' groups the names of all candidates in columns according to party affiliation. On this type of ballot it is usually possible and simple to vote a straight ticket for every office by making a single mark. (2) The 'office-block' or 'multiple-choice ballot' groups all candidates according to the office they seek rather than by their party. To vote a straight ticket on this ballot requires every office to be voted on separately and therefore requires more effort. (This second ballot form is used in New Zealand local elections).

Campbell and Miller found that the proportions of straight and split ticket voting depended on the form of the ballot. Straight ticket voting was significantly higher in states with single choice ballots than in states with multiple choice ballots, and this

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1. See, for example, Jerrold G. Rusk, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting : 1876 1908", American Political Science Review LXIV (1970), 1220-1238. For a New Zealand study see John C. Blydenburgh, "The Effect of Ballot Form on City Council Elections", Political Science XXVI (July 1974), 47-55.

difference depended on the voters' strength of party identification. Those with weak levels of party identification and Independents were most influenced into voting a straight ticket where it was easier for them to do so by making a single mark. In multiple choice ballots where the weak identifiers and Independents were denied the easy method of voting, the likelihood of split ticket voting increased.[1] In the absence of partisan influences the form of the ballot, essentially a non-political variable, acted as an influence on the vote in facilitating or inhibiting straight or split ticket voting.

A Rational Choice Explanation

Rational choice theory can help explain why people behave in certain ways when confronted with the opportunity to split their ballots. Campbell and Miller's four basic types of straight and split ticket voters are re-examined applying the assumptions of rational wealth-maximising behaviour and consideration of the effect of ballot form.

First, consider the indifferent voter in general. The indifferent voter has a low interest in politics, little political information, a lack of concern regarding the election outcome and the parties, personalities and issues involved, no goal-directed motivations, and a nil party differential.[2] He has little information with which to discriminate between candidates and he is unwilling to make such an effort. Because he is so uninformed the costs of

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1. Campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", p. 307; see also Campbell et al., American Voter, pp. 148-149, 154.

2. However, it is assumed the indifferent voter has sufficient interest and motivation to actually turnout on election day.

obtaining information in order to organise his ballot toward any political objective are so high that he does not bother. Since his party differential is nil, whichever party wins the election will not interrupt his expected utility flow from the government. He expects no extra benefits from either party. Therefore he would be irrational to invest in costly information and he remains uninformed.[1]

Once the indifferent rational voter has got to the polls he will be searching for a method of voting involving the least effort and lowest cost in time and energy. He finds such a cost-reducing method in the form of the ballot. If the indifferent voter is confronted with a single-choice ballot he will find that the method of voting involving the least effort and lowest cost is to cast a straight ticket vote by making a single mark. Thus we have the 'indifferent straight ticket voter'.

If the indifferent rational voter is confronted with a multiple choice ballot, as he is in local elections in New Zealand, then he will find that voting a straight ticket involves more effort and more investment in time and energy. He would have to go through all the ballots for each office voting for each one in terms of some consistent principle such as party identification. Since this is too costly, and therefore irrational, he splits his ballot and makes his selections on a "capricious quasi random basis",[2] perhaps selecting one candidate because he has heard of him, and another because of his position on the ballot. Thus we have the 'indifferent split ticket voter'.

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1. This conclusion follows from Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 13.

2. Campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", p. 300.

Now consider the motivated voter. The motivated voter has a high interest in politics, a high degree of political information, a concern for the election outcome derived from his interest in parties, personalities and issues, motivations directed toward specific goals, and a reasonably high party differential. He is the voter most willing to make an effort to discriminate between candidates either on the basis of party loyalties, personality factors or issue factors.

Whether the motivated voter votes a straight or split ticket depends on the size of his party differential. If his party differential is large, then it means that it makes a big difference to his expected utility stream which party's candidates are elected. Therefore, if he expects his utility to decrease if a candidate from the less-favoured party is elected, he will vote a straight party ticket. He cannot afford the risk of a candidate from the opposing party being elected. The costs of this happening would be too high - higher in fact than the costs of going through the ballot and organising it in the form of a straight party ticket. Not even the form of the ballot will prevent the motivated voter from voting a straight ticket even if he has to go through and vote for each candidate for each office.

The motivated voter's party differential is often not large enough to influence him into voting a straight party ticket. The motivated voter may have conflicting motivations stemming from his high interest in politics which act to reduce his party differential. That is, it does not make quite so much difference to his expected utility stream which party is elected; it is more a question of which candidates will give him the greatest benefits if elected.

Thus to satisfy his conflicting motivations and to increase his utility stream,the motivated voter splits his ballot between the two parties. The less the motivated voter's party differential and the more conflicting his motivations, the more he will cross party lines to split his ballot.

It is suggested that there would be greater reliance on cost-reducing methods of voting in multi-candidate elections than in single member elections. E.E. Schattschneider and others have argued that the proverb 'there's two sides to every story' is seen as an inherent fact of life by many people.[1] The human actor, as a voter or in whatever role he plays, tends to seek and expect two-sided stories: for-against, postive-negative, good-bad, more-less, have-have not. When there are more than two opinions or points of view as there are in multi-candidate elections, the costs of decision-making are greater than in simple decision problems. So in a multi-candidate election, and therefore one of greater complexity, there would be a greater reliance on cost-reducing decision rules.[2] It is suggested, therefore, that for those voters in New Zealand local elections who are without very strong party identifications, a cost-reducing method of voting is to vote a split ballot. For those voters with a strong party identification a cost-reducing method of voting is to vote a straight party ticket, for using party identification as a guide to action lowers the costs

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1. E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942); Robert A. Goldwin ed., Political Parties, U.S.A. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, Toward A More Responsible Party System (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

2. See Blydenburgh, "Ballot Form", p. 54.

of voting. The analysis of straight and split ticket voting is a good example of how rational choice theory permits political participation to be viewed as a problem-solving device induced by costs and benefits of particular kinds of activity.

The Findings

It has been suggested that the unmotivated, indifferent voter who has a low interest in politics and little political information will vote a split ticket, because voting a straight ticket requires more effort in that the voter has to go through the ballot papers marking each candidate of the same party. This hypothesis is partly confirmed by Table 7.7 which shows that those in the North ward sample who had a low interest in politics were more likely to be split ticket voters. However, those electors

TABLE 7.7 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY INTEREST IN CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL POLITICS

STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET (MAYORAL AND COUNCIL ELECTIONS)	INTEREST IN POLITICS None/Some	Great Deal/ Quite a lot
Straight Ticket	46%	56%
Split Ticket	54	44
	100%	100%
	(N=74)	(N=45)

$\chi^2 = 1.03$ $.30<p<.50$

who were poorly informed about the candidates for the city council were more likely to vote straight tickets than split tickets (Table 7.8). The split ticket voters were generally more informed

TABLE 7.8 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY NUMBER OF CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES CORRECTLY NAMED

Straight or Split Ticket (City Council Election)	Number of City Council Candidates 0	1	2	3-10
Straight Ticket	52%	38%	29%	42%
Split Ticket	48	62	71	58
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=83)	(N=26)	(N=14)	(N=12)

χ^2 NV

about who was contesting the election than the straight ticket voters; and the chances of splitting a ticket increased as voters could name more and more candidates. It appears that it is the influence of candidate personality that is influencing ticket-splitting. For these ticket-splitters personalities seem to have become more important than parties. That is, it does not make quite so much difference to their flow of benefits from the government which particular party is elected; it is more a question of which candidates will give them the greatest benefits if elected. Those who were not well-informed in general about all the candidates and the issues were also more likely to vote straight tickets than split tickets (Table 7.9). There does not appear to be conclusive evidence that indifferent voters were more likely to split their ballots. Rather Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show that the more voters were motivated into being well-informed about the election, the more likely they would split their ballots. Ignorance about the election does not seem to be a good explanation for splitting.

TABLE 7.9 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY POLITICAL AWARENESS

Straight or Split Ticket (Mayoral and Council Elections)	Score on Scale of Political Awareness*		
	0 1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
Straight Ticket	54%	48%	38%
Split Ticket	46	52	62
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=57)	(N=46)	(N=16)

$\chi^2 = 1.51$ $.20<p<.30$

* Each respondent's score on this scale is the sum of the number of mayoral candidates, city council candidates and issues that he/she could name.

Paradoxically it appears from Tables 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 that while some people may have voted a split ticket because they were not highly politically motivated, others voted a split ticket for the very reason that they were so motivated. In order to test this latter proposition more adequately, further measures of political motivation need to be constructed. According to the social-psychological school, the three main political motives which influence voting are: party identification, candidate orientation and issue orientation.[1] (Since the North ward survey did not contain questions designed to test respondents' concern with issues and the association of one or other party or candidate with these issues in a favourable or unfavourable way, issue orientation as a measure of motivation will not be examined). The political motive of candidate orientation amongst the North ward sample was assessed by the extent to which respondents

1. See, for example, Campbell et al., American Voter.

reacted to the personal qualities of the two mayoral candidates and the relative attractiveness of one over the other. Respondents answers to the open-ended question: "Why do you think you'll vote that way [for mayor]?" were used. Candidate orientation as a political motivation was associated with both straight and split ticket voting (Table 7.10). The tendency to vote a straight party

TABLE 7.10 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY CANDIDATE ORIENTATION

STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET (MAYORAL AND COUNCIL ELECTIONS)	CANDIDATE ORIENTATION	
	Pro-Hay or Anti-Pickering	Pro-Pickering or Anti-Hay
Straight Ticket	40%	60%
Straight Ticket except for one council candidate	38	23
Split ticket	22	17
	100%	100%
	(N=45)	(N=40)

$\chi^2 = 3.58$ $.30<p<.50$

ticket increased amongst those who felt either favourably or unfavourably towards the mayoral candidates. However, there were more pro-Hay or anti-Pickering split ticket voters than there were straight ticket voters.

When the two motives of candidate orientation and party identification are used together to investigate straight and split ticket voting some interesting findings result (Table 7.11). Where

TABLE 7.11 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY CANDIDATE ORIENTATION BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

CANDIDATE ORIENTATION	PARTY IDENTIFICATION					
	Citizens		Independent		Labour	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
PERCENTAGE VOTING A STRAIGHT TICKET*						
Pro-Hay or Anti-Pickering	57	(13)	16	(3)	0	(0)
Pro-Pickering or Anti-Hay	0	(0)	29	(4)	80	(25)
PERCENTAGE VOTING A SPLIT TICKET*						
Pro-Hay or Anti-Pickering	43	(10)	84	(16)	0	(0)
Pro-Pickering or Anti-Hay	0	(0)	71	(10)	20	(5)

χ^2 NV

* In mayoral and council elections

the two vote-supporting motives intersect, straight ticket voting was highest and split ticket voting was lowest. Where there was no party motivation (i.e. the Independents) straight ticket voting was lowest and ticket-splitting was highest. "Motivated straight ticket voting appears to reflect an intention on the part of the voter to accomplish his political purpose as fully as possible."[1] Such voters did not scatter their choices casually; they seemed to have a political direction in mind and implemented it through the choice of one party or the other. It would also seem that the costs of voting would be lowest for those whose party identification and

1. Campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", p. 303.

candidate orientation coincided. For those people a straight ticket vote is the choice with the least cost.

Table 7.11 suggests that party identification was an important variable in influencing the proportions of straight and split ticket voting. Campbell and Miller point out that:

> "There are both rational and empirical reasons to expect that party identification would prove to be the key factor in the explanation of the motivated straight ticket. A straight ticket is after all a straight party ticket, not a candidate ticket or an issue ticket." 1

TABLE 7.12 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET (MAYORAL & COUNCIL ELECTIONS)	STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
	Very Strong	Fairly Strong	Not Very Strong	Independent
Straight Ticket	78%	71%	27%	24%
Split Ticket	22	29	73	76
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=23)	(N=35)	(N=11)	(N=46)

$\chi^2 = 28.56$ $p<.001$

Party identification does not prove to be an important influence on straight and split ticket voting (Table 7.12). Straight ticket voting was very high among very strong identifiers, and ticket-splitting was very high among not very strong identifiers and

1. Ibid., p. 305.

Independents. This would appear to confirm the hypothesis that the motivated voter with a large party differential will make the effort to vote a straight party ticket. Having a large party differential means it will make a big difference to the voter's expected utility stream if his party's candidates are not elected. The cost of this happening would be greater than the cost of organising his ballot in the form of a straight party ticket. By voting a straight ticket he is minimising his costs. For those without a large party differential, it does not make quite as much difference to their expected utility stream which party is elected. Therefore, organising their ballot in the form of a straight ticket would be irrational.

The Independent voters provide a useful test of what happens when party attachment is not present. As their name implies, the Independents appear to be relatively free of party discipline, with a high level of ticket-splitting. However one-quarter of the Independents intended to vote a straight ticket. Some of them may have no party differential and are not concerned with the election outcome, but are voting a party ticket because that alternative appears to be the least costly. Some of the Independents may be using their straight ticket vote to support an issue position or a candidate preference they may have. While some of them are probably not as independent of the parties as they say they are. "The lifetime party follower who calls himself an Independent is not an unfamiliar phenomenon."[1]

To summarise the findings, split ticket voters were: less

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1. Ibid., p. 307.

interested in politics, more informed about the candidates and issues, less likely to have positive or negative feelings towards the mayoral candidates, more likely not to have both party identification and candidate orientation intersecting as vote-supporting motives, and more likely to be weak party identifiers and Independents. Straight ticket voters were: more interested in politics, not very well-informed about the candidates and issues, more likely to have positive or negative feelings towards the mayoral candidates, more likely to have both party identification and candidate orientation intersecting as vote supporting motives, and more likely to be strong party identifiers.

There appear to be two types of motivated voter. Those who were strongly motivated towards the political parties contesting the election were more likely to vote a straight ticket than those less motivated. That is, the voter with a large party differential was prepared to go through his ballot and organise it into a straight ticket. The costs of organising his ballot into a straight ticket are less than he would incur if his favoured party's candidates were not elected. The second type of motivated voter was not motivated by party identification, rather he was motivated by his knowledge of the candidates and issues into voting a split ticket. Since this voter had a low party differential,he would be wasting his resources by voting a straight ticket as it mattered little to him which party was elected. This voter was using his knowledge of the candidates and issues in implementing his vote. The influence of personality was more important than party. There is also evidence that the motivated split ticket voter has conflicting motivations. Those who were independent with regard to city council politics and felt favourably or unfavourably towards either of the mayoral candidates,

were more likely to vote a split ticket, than those who identified with a party and felt favourably towards that party's mayoral candidate or unfavourably towards the other party's mayoral candidate.

There also appear to be two types of indifferent voter. Those who were indifferent towards the parties tended to vote split tickets. These voters have small party differentials and, considering the form of the ballot, it would be too costly for them to go through and vote for each candidate of the one party, since it matters little to them which party is elected. In Campbell and Miller's words they make their selections on a "capricious quasi random basis".[1] The second type of indifferent voter is the one who is indifferent to the candidates and issues. He has little knowledge of either. However he is sufficiently motivated into voting a straight ticket. He may have a party differential and is influenced by this, or he may have no party differential and is voting a straight ticket because that alternative appears the least costly. Since he has little knowledge of candidates or issues he is unlikely to be voting a straight ticket to support an issue position or a candidate preference.

The four types of voter distinguished by Campbell and Miller in their study of straight and split ticket voting can be distinguished amongst the voters in the North ward sample. As well, Campbell and Miller's three underlying generalisations about goal-directed motivation are appropriate to an understanding of the straight and split ticket voters in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election.

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1. Ibid., p. 300.

Rational choice theory with its assumptions of rational political behaviour and self-interest on the part of the elector has provided a different and helpful insight into the theoretical problems involved. The findings support both rational choice theory - by showing that voters act so as to maximise their expected utility - and social-psychological theory - by showing that the psychological variable of motivation can be related to voting behaviour. The analysis of straight and split ticket voting is a good example of how social-psychological and rational choice theories can complement each other in the search for explanations of political behaviour.

COATTAIL VOTING

Coattail voting is caused by the personal appeal, magnetism or charisma of the party leader when this can be translated into the sort of allegiance which influences voters to give support to his team mates on the ballot. It is a direct expression of candidate partisanship; the party leader contributes the unique component of his own personality to the influences on the voters. In New Zealand coattail voting can only occur at local elections where the voter can vote for the party leader and the other members of his ticket. Thus this study of the 1974 Christchurch City Council election is a good opportunity to investigate coattails in New Zealand.

Warren E. Miller of the Survey Research Centre has pointed out that:

> "The crucial point to be noted about the existence of coattail influence is that it means that congressional candidates of Party A, for example, receive votes which they would not have received if it had not been for the candidacy of their presidential nominee." 1

It then follows that coattail influence must be reflected in straight ticket voting:

> "Coattail influence can only exist where straight ticket voting prevails; its incidence cannot reasonably be equated with deviations from that behaviour." 2

Miller correctly points out that of course not all straight ticket voting can be attributed to the influence of coattails. There are many other factors that could lead to straight ticket voting. The problem is, therefore, to isolate from all behaviour consonant with coattail influence (all straight ticket voting), that behaviour uniquely related to such coattail influence rather than to the influence of party, issues, or other potentially confounding factors. Thus to identify and analyse the vote-pulling power of the mayoral candidates the question becomes what proportion of all straight ticket voting for the mayor and council is attributable to the coattail effect?

Previous Studies

Miller's study investigates the relationship between political motivations, voting behaviour and coattails. Miller's method of

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1. Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology", Public Opinion Quarterly XIX (1965), p. 354.

2. Ibid., p. 357.

measuring coattails relies on two sets of survey interviews with which he is able to identify those straight ticket voters who made their voting decision for president before their voting decision for congress. It can then be inferred that the motivations leading to the presidential decision played a significant role in the congressional decision. Once the people who voted a straight ticket and made their congressional decision after their presidential decision have been identified, their motivations need to be examined to see whether parties or issues may have promoted the development of candidate partisanship. The presidential candidate's appeal may be a product of his party affiliation or his stand on the issues and, according to our definition, this would not produce coattail voting. Miller constructs a distribution of motivational factors among possible coattail voters. The extreme test of coattail influence is where candidate partisanship is the only factor consistent with the vote. Coattail influence is also possible where candidate partisanship and party or issue orientation, or both are consistent with the vote.

Campbell and Miller,[1] using survey research data, point out that coattail voters are voters who defect from their preferred party (that is, the party they identified with) in the presidential election because of the personality of the other party's candidate, and who also deviate at the congressional level. In the 1956 presidential election many Democratic identifiers voted for Eisenhower because of his personal attractiveness, and one-third of these voters also voted Republican for congress. It seems that for these Democratic identifiers, their vote for president influenced their vote for congress; and this is evidence

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1. Campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", pp. 309-310.

of a visible coattail effect. The authors note that there are other coattail effects which cannot be easily assessed. The ability of a presidential candidate to hold supporters of his own party in line is an important aspect of his influence on the vote. His success in winning the votes of Independents to his ticket may be more significant than the defectors he may attract from the other party.

Charles Press re-examined the Campbell-Miller survey research data from the 1956 election.[1] He deduces a trend, which is quite consistent with our findings this far, that presidential-coattails are apparently most operative where the influence of party identification is weakest. It is the weak identifiers who were first attracted by the presidential candidate, and then because of his personal qualities they decided to cross over party lines completely and vote a straight ticket. Press suggests that since many marginal seats lie within areas where party identification is traditionally weak, coattail influence may be significant in determining the outcome of those elections. He tries to find any special factors peculiar to the districts or candidates which were associated with success in coattail riding, and concludes that the seniority of the sitting member and the statewide voting pattern have some, but only limited, influence.

Stan Kaplowitz used aggregate data to measure presidential

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1. Charles Press, "Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails", American Political Science Review LII (1958), 1041-1050.

coattail effects.[1] If the short-term forces associated with the presidential contest such as the presidential candidates' personalities influenced the congressional contests, then where a presidential candidate received many votes attributable to short-term forces, the congressional candidate of his party should have also received many votes attributable to short-term forces. This suggests that coattails could be measured by some measure of association between that part of the presidential vote attributable to short-term forces and that part of the senatorial vote also attributable to short-term forces. A statistic is computed which is the correlation between P-N and S-N, where P is the proportion Democratic of the total presidential vote in a state, S the proportion Democratic of the senate vote, and N an index of the normal Democratic vote in that state. A high correlation indicates a clear coattail effect. However the correlation does not measure how much difference the presidential contest made in the outcome of any senate race.

Gary Jacobson examines the length of Richard Nixon's coattails in the 1972 presidential election.[2] He uses several kinds of evidence to suggest that Nixon's pulling power had been underestimated. The most relevant evidence (to this study) is his survey research data showing that voters who defected from their preferred party (that is,

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1. Stan Kaplowitz, "Using Aggregate Voting Data to Measure Presidential Coattail Effects", Public Opinion Quarterly XXXV (1971), 415-419.

2. Gary C. Jacobson, "Presidential Coattails in 1972", Public Opinion Quarterly XL (1976), 194-200.

the party they identified with) in the presidential election were significantly more likely to deviate at the congressional level as well. However Jacobson does not say whether these voters were influenced into defecting by the personality of the presidential candidate which is a crucial part of coattail influence.

A Rational Choice Explanation

Rational choice theory can provide some answers to the question: Why are people influenced by the party leader into voting for at least some of the members of his ticket? The costs of political information are generally high, but the costs of obtaining information about party leaders is very often less than that for the other members of his ticket. Therefore, electors are likely to know more about the leaders than about the other candidates. The leaders are the focus of attention during an election campaign, and their views on the issues are communicated to the electors far more effectively than the opinions of the rest of the ticket. The leader is the main image of the party projected on to the electorate. Malcolm Moos argues that: "In a sense the party as a whole is personified in the leader".[1]

Since electors know more about the party leader, they may be likely to make their voting decisions based on this knowledge. Once the vote for leader has been decided, for those without much knowledge of the candidates for lower office and for those without a strong party

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1. Malcolm C. Moos, Politics, Presidents and Coattails (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 136.

loyalty to influence them into voting a straight ticket, a cost-reducing choice is to vote for the remaining members of the leader's ticket. The rational voter is allowing his positive feelings towards the party leader to determine his vote for the whole ticket. For the voter coattail voting is a rational means of saving time and effort in making individual decisions for each of the other candidates.

Coattail Voting in Christchurch City

The 1974 Christchurch City Council election was centred on the personalities of the mayoral candidates. As the Christchurch Star commented:

> "Hay or Pickering? That is the inevitable - in fact almost the only - question that arises when the local body elections are discussed." 1

It is possible therefore that there was some coattail voting in the election. The method used to identify some of the coattail voting is that used by Campbell and Miller, and Jacobson. Coattail voters are defined as: identifiers of Party A or Independents who cross party lines to vote for the mayoral candidate of Party B because of his personal qualities, and decide to vote for city council candidates of Party B because of the mayoral candidate. In the multi-candidate election for Christchurch City the voter does not have to vote a completely straight ticket for mayor and council for there to be coattails operating. A mayoral candidate's personality could influence a voter to vote for only one out of the four possible

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1. Christchurch Star, 10 October 1974, p. 8. (Emphasis added).

candidates for council. This is still coattail-influenced voting.

Since coattail voters are also mayoral personal voters, and since it was pointed out earlier in this chapter that there were very few mayoral personal voters who defected from their preferred party, it could be expected that there would be very few coattail voters who defected from their preferred party. This expectation is exceeded. In fact there were no Citizens or Labour identifiers in the North ward sample who crossed party lines to vote for the mayoral candidate of the other party because of his personal qualities, and also voted a straight council ticket for that party or a straight council ticket except for one candidate. However, when the Independents are examined some coattail influence is visible. Doubts have been cast elsewhere in this thesis about the 'independence' of the self-proclaimed Independents. We do not know whether they have truly made an independent judgement or whether they are influenced only by party. The following findings, therefore, must be considered with these thoughts in mind.[1]

A number of Independents voted for Hay because of his personal attractiveness as a candidate (N = 9). Many of these Independents split their ballots, but 22 per cent of the Independents who voted for Hay because they liked him voted a straight Citizens ticket for the council. As well, 33 per cent of these Independents voted a straight Citizens ticket except for one candidate. (That is, Hay's personality influenced voters to vote for all the members of

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1. As the number of cases in this analysis is small, the conclusions can only be tentative.

the Citizens ticket except one). These Independents who voted Hay because they liked him and voted a straight Citizens ticket for the council constituted 2 per cent of the total number of Hay voters (N = 83). As well the Independents who voted Hay because they liked him and voted a straight Citizens ticket except for one candidate constituted 4 per cent of the total number of Hay voters. Adding these two figures, we can say that 6 per cent of Hay's voters were coattail voters.

Pickering's coattails were far less visible. There were no Independents in the sample who voted Pickering because of his personal attractiveness and voted a straight Labour ticket for the council. However, 13 per cent of the Independents who voted Pickering because they liked him (N = 16) voted a straight Labour ticket except for one candidate. These Independents constituted 3 per cent of the total number of Pickering voters (N = 81).

From this analysis it seems that Hay's coattails were longer than Pickering's. Hay's personality appears to have influenced a visible proportion (6 per cent) of his voters into voting a straight or nearly straight council ticket for Citizens. In contrast Pickering's personality influenced only half as many of his voters into voting a nearly straight Labour ticket for the council. Although rational choice theory provides an explanation for coattail influence, it would seem that only a few voters allowed their positive feelings toward the party leaders to determine their vote for the whole ticket. These people were

Independents and not party identifiers. It has been assumed that they are relatively free of the influence of party and they are voting a straight or nearly straight ticket because it is a cost-reducing choice.

Although it has been shown that a number of Independents liked a mayoral candidate, voted for him and voted for all or nearly all the other members of his ticket, it cannot be shown that there is a causal relationship in any one direction. That is,we cannot tell whether the mayoral candidates' personalities influenced voting in the council election or whether the council candidates' personalities influenced the mayoral election. However, the mayoral candidates were the focus of attention in the 1974 election. They were the most salient aspects of the whole election, and they were extremely well-known to the North ward sample compared to the city council candidates, as was shown earlier in this chapter. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the mayoral race influenced the council election.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting are types of voting behaviour where the personality of the candidates is presumed to be the dominant influence on the voting decision, while party identification is presumed to be of relatively minor importance. Rational choice theory contends that where information about the candidates' personalities is available at low cost and where the

voter's party differential is small, the rational voter will give a personal vote, split his ticket,or give a coattail vote to the candidate or candidates whom he believes will increase his utility stream from the government.

Given the popular image of local elections where voters are supposed to vote for the person rather than the party it was surprising that there was little personal voting for the mayoral candidates. Hay was the only mayoral candidate to receive a personal vote from the North ward sample and this amounted to four per cent of his total vote. Personal voting for only one council candidate was clearly evident. Of the voters who intended to split their tickets for the city council, 12 per cent said they would vote for Caygill,a Labour candidate. It is significant that Caygill was the only Labour candidate elected in North.

There were four types of straight and split ticket voters. The motivated straight ticket voter was strongly motivated by his party differential into voting a straight ticket because the costs were less than he would incur if his favoured party's candidates were not elected. The motivated split ticket voter was knowledgeable about the candidates and issues and often had conflicting motivations. He tried to satisfy the components of the conflict by supporting candidates from both parties. The indifferent split ticket voter had a small party differential and split his ballot because it would be too costly to organise his ballot in the form of a straight ticket, since it mattered little to him which candidates were elected. The indifferent

straight ticket voter knew little of the candidates and issues, but voted a straight ticket either because this appeared to be the least costly alternative or because he was influenced by party.

There were no party identifiers who were influenced by mayoral coattails, but there were Independents who appeared to be influenced by coattails. Six per cent of Hay's voters were Independents who were voting for him because they liked him and who voted a straight or nearly straight Citizens ticket for the council. Three per cent of Pickering's voters were similarly coattail influenced. In short, Hay's coattails were longer than Pickering's; Hay was more of an asset to the other members of his party ticket than Pickering was to the other members of the Labour ticket.

The problems of personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting were first investigated by advocates of the social-psychological approach to electoral behaviour. They suggested explanations for the problems mainly in terms of psychological variables such as candidate orientation, political motivation and party identification. Rational choice theory with its assumptions of rational political behaviour and self-interest on the part of the voter has suggested explanations centering on economic variables such as the costs of information, the costs of voting, utility stream and party differential. This chapter has tried to show that the approaches do not conflict; rather they can both be used in a mutually helpful and complementary way to further our understanding of electoral behaviour.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This thesis has considered two general theories of voting - the 'social and psychological determinism' and 'rationality' theories of voting. Theories of social and psychological determinism imply that to a large extent social and psychological characteristics structure the vote, while rationality theories imply that individuals are free to use individual perception and motivation in making their voting decisions. Early voting studies attempted to predict preferences by relying on either socio-economic variables, or psychological variables or a combination of social, psychological and political variables. Later writers questioned the adequacy of the social-psychological model and suggested economic explanations for voting behaviour using the notions of choice and rationality. This thesis has applied the theoretical concepts of rationality to some specific problems of electoral behaviour which have important influences on individual voting choices and election outcomes. The problems that have been investigated are voter turnout, the surge and decline of turnout, the role of party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting. Although the problems were initially studied by advocates of the social-psychological approach, rational choice theory was employed to provide a different perspective to the same problems. These problems are particularly relevant to the study of New Zealand local elections

mainly because local elections provide the only opportunity for the New Zealand voter to vote for the party leader and the other members of his ticket. The study of local elections is important if we are to further our understanding of who gets elected to local government in New Zealand and why.

Survey research complemented by aggregate statistics are the main sources of data for this study. The North ward survey consisted of interviews carried out just prior to the election using a prepared questionnaire. The master roll survey was an analysis of the electoral roll to find out more about voter turnout. The accuracy of both surveys was demonstrated, although the small size of the North ward sample meant that some conclusions from the survey's data had to be tentative.

The study of voter turnout revealed that a number of social characteristics (neighbourhood, occupation, age, marital status and length of residence) were related to turnout although none of the relationships were very strong. Measures of psychological involvement (interest in politics, political awareness, cross-pressures) had stronger relationships with turnout. The political considerations of type of election and electoral qualification were also found to be related to turnout. The rational choice model was not very successful in explaining the different rates of voting participation among different social groups and categories. The investigation into psychological involvement and turnout supported both rational choice theory - by showing that people act so as to maximise their expected

utility - and the social psychological model - by showing that psychological involvement in politics was related to voting behaviour. Political factors and rational choice theory were partially successful in accounting for different rates of turnout. The study of turnout did not provide a clear answer to the question 'Who participates in elections and why?' but some possible answers were suggested.

The model of surge and decline was developed by a leading scholar of the social-psychological school using psychological variables such as political stimulation, political interest and party identification. It is proposed that fluctuations in turnout and partisanship result from a combination of short-term political forces superimposed on the underlying level of political interest and on the long-term party identifications of the electorate. A rational choice approach emphasises the cost of political information at high and low-stimulus elections. Both explanations help us to understand the surge and counter-surge that occurred in Christchurch in the 1971 and 1974 elections respectively. The surge in partisanship between 1968 and 1971 which gave Pickering his victory was mainly due to Independents who swung to Labour, presumably having voted for Guthrey in 1968. The counter-surge in partisanship between 1971 and 1974 which favoured Hay came mainly from new voters and switchers, who were mostly Independents and who also were more likely to split their tickets. The increases in turnout in 1971 and 1974 were brought about by high-stimulus elections which reduced the costs of obtaining information and thus the costs of voting.

The swings in partisanship in 1971 and 1974 occurred because the low cost information available favoured one party at the expense of the other, and this resulted in a surge of support for the favoured party.

The key concept of psychological identification with a political party has been found to be of vital importance in overseas studies in influencing both electoral behaviour and people's perceptions of politics. The economic theorists view party identification as a problem-solving device that is instrumental in advancing the voters own particular set of values. Party affiliation assists the elector in simplifying the election for it enables him to behave consistently with his basic political predispositions without spending great efforts in seeking information or reaching a voting decision. A party affiliation with regard to local politics in Christchurch City was accepted by a substantially smaller proporation of the North ward sample compared to the proportion that felt an attachment to a parliamentary party. The economic model suggests that this is because of the lesser importance of the issues decided on at the local level in New Zealand. Party identification was of major importance in influencing voting behaviour in the 1974 mayoral election and of somewhat less importance in the city council election. That so many party identifiers split their tickets in the city council election suggests that their party differentials with regard to the city council were not large. That is, their expected difference in utility income was not so great. The flow of benefits from the city council as a whole seemed to depend more on which

party's mayoral candidate was elected rather than on which party's council candidates were elected. In general, voting in the 1974 election and voting in a future general election were closely related, but there were some exceptions. Only half of the parliamentary identifiers felt loyal to the corresponding local party. Parliamentary loyalties were quite closely related to voting in the mayoral election, but distinctly less so in the council election. Voting in the mayoral election and in a future general election were not closely associated because quite a few voters intended to switch party votes between the two elections. Party identification can be viewed both as a psychological attachment to a party and as a rational means of reducing the costs of voting. The rational choice model is quite successful in explaining the high relationship between party identification and voting behaviour in the 1974 election. Social-psychological theory is also important because of its emphasis on partisanship. Both perspectives assist in the explanation of voting behaviour.

Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting are types of voting behaviour where the influence of party is presumed to have been overtaken by the influence of personality. Rational choice theory contends that where information about the candidates' personalities is available at low cost and where the voter's party differential is small, the rational voter will give a personal vote, or split his ticket, or give a coattail vote to the candidate or candidates whom he believes will increase his stream of benefits from the government. Hay was the only mayoral candidate to receive

a personal vote and this amounted to four per cent of his total vote. Personal voting for only one council candidate was clearly evident. There were four types of straight and split ticket voter who were influenced by motivations relating to candidates and parties. When there was specific goal-directed motivation, behaviour tended to be organised toward the achievement of the goal; when there was conflict between motives, split ticket voting tended to result; and when there was no goal-directed motivation, behaviour tended to be governed by the principle of least effort. There were no party identifiers who were influenced by mayoral coattails, but there appeared to be some Independents who were coattail influenced. Hay's coattails turned out to be longer than Pickering's, and we can conclude that Hay was more of an asset to the other members of his party ticket than Pickering was to the other members of the Labour ticket.

Some of the more important empirical findings from this thesis from the perspective of Christchurch City Council politics are listed below. (1) The swing to Pickering and Labour in the 1971 mayoral election did not come from those 1968 non-voters who surged to the polls in 1971. Rather the swing came from those who had apparently voted Guthrey in 1968. (2) The swing to Hay and Citizens in the 1974 mayoral election was brought about by a combination of 1971 non-voters who were attracted to the polls and 1971-74, Pickering-Hay vote switchers. (3) Only half the North ward sample identified with any of the parties contesting the 1974 election. (4) Very few of the party identifiers did not intend to vote for their

party's mayoral candidate in the mayoral election, while the Independents divided about evenly between the candidates. Two-thirds of those who had a party identification and one-quarter of those who did not (the Independents) intended to vote straight party tickets in the 1974 mayoral and council elections; the remainder in each case intended to vote split tickets. (5) The local Independents were not all National Party supporters in disguise; in fact 10 per cent more of the local Independents identified with the Labour Party at the parliamentary level than identified with National. (6) Almost one-third of those who intended to vote Citizens in the mayoral election said they would vote Labour if a general election were held soon. (7) Hay received a small personal vote in the election but Pickering received no discernible personal vote. In fact Pickering's personality was more likely to repel voters away from himself towards Hay. (8) In addition Hay's coattails were more effective than Pickering's. His personality assisted the members of his council team more than Pickering's personality assisted the members of his ticket.

Some of the more important findings from a theoretical perspective are now listed. (1) The turnout for electors with low occupational status was higher if they lived in a higher status area than if they lived in a lower status area. Explanations for this phenomenon centred around the roles of spatial influences and party organisation. (2) The turnout for those who had two different party identifications (one for the local level and one for the parliamentary level of politics) was considerably less than the turnout

for those who had correspondingly similar party identifications. It is suggested that psychological cross-pressures between the two different party identifications were responsible for the lower turnout. (3) The model of surge and decline predicted that the increase in the motivation to vote in the 1971 election would generate a surge of electors into voting and would also swing the partisan division of the vote to the advantaged party (Labour). However this increase in the motivation to vote in 1971 did not swing the partisan division of the vote to Labour. While the surge in turnout did not contribute to Pickering's victory, the political circumstances that created the surge did swing the vote. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that a surge in turnout does not always on its own contribute to a swing in partisanship. (4) The complexity of the multi-candidate election could be expected to lead voters to rely heavily on party identification as a cost-reducing choice. Yet the greater the number of choices, the less voters used party identification as a guide to voting. Party loyalty was not as strong when there was a large number of choices. (5) Identifiers of one party were more likely to know the names of their party's candidates than the names of candidates of the opposing party. This finding supports rational choice theory which contends that party identification is a device which electors use to lower the costs of being informed about the candidates. The identifiers of one party knew more of the candidates for their party than any other electors because the costs of finding out were less than for the other electors.

While social-psychological and rationality theories of voting are often thought of as being in conflict, this thesis has shown that, far from conflicting, both theoretical perspectives can, in conjunction with each other, contribute much to the understanding of political behaviour. Many of the findings in this thesis support both social-psychological and rational choice theories. This is a good indication of their joint applicability to the study of electoral behaviour. It has been shown that a series of problems that were first investigated using one theoretical perspective can be re-examined using both the old perspective and a different, relatively new one. The result is a greater understanding of why people behaved in the ways they did in the 1974 election. The social-psychological model emphasises the role of partisanship in voting, but says little about the rationality of the voting act. The economic models emphasise the rationality of voting, but say little about the role of partisanship as a rational means of reducing the costs of voting. This thesis has shown that both perspectives are essential for a more complete understanding of electoral behaviour. It has been shown that further research into electoral behaviour, especially research into New Zealand local elections, must take account of social-psychological and rationality theories of voting.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

A SUMMARY OF STATISTICS

RELATING TO THE

1974 CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL ELECTION

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The 1974 Christchurch City Council election was the first to be conducted under a ward system for over fifty years. For the purposes of the election the city was divided into five wards: four of which elected four councillors and the fifth elected three councillors. The mayoral election was unaffected by the ward system and was conducted over the entire city area as before.

A number of tables that follow refer to the "two-party swing" that occurred in an election or the "two-party swing required to lose" an election.

The two-party swing occurring in a mayoral or council election is a simple statistic that describes the change in either major party's share of the two-party vote. Put another way it is the net gain by one party over another, or the average of the Citizens per cent gain and the Labour per cent loss.

"Two-party" swing is used because a vote for a minor party or an Independent - in what is essentially a two-party political system - has the same effect on the immediate fortunes of the two main parties as a decision to abstain. However unpalatable it may be to supporters of Independent or Values Party candidates, there is no reason why a decision to vote Independent or Values should appear as a swing to Citizens or to Labour, when a decision by the same people to abstain gives rise to no swing at all.*

In mayoral elections the two-party swing required for the sitting mayor to lose is the reduction in his percentage share of the two-party vote which would bring it to 49.9 per cent. For example, Mr Hamish Hay the present Mayor gained 52.0 per cent of the two-party vote in 1974. The swing required against him for him to lose the mayoralty is only 2.1 per cent. This means that if just over 2 in every 100 of those who voted for Hay in 1974 vote Labour in 1977, then Christchurch will have a new mayor.

In council elections the "swing required to lose" figures for each ward do not show the swing required for the leading party to lose all its seats. Since a party does not need 50 per cent of the vote to win a seat, the swing figures can only show the swing required for the leading party in the ward to lose its majority of the vote.

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* For more on two-party swing see Hugh Berrington, "The General Election of 1964", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society vol. 125 (1965), 17-66; Malcolm Mackerras and Nigel S. Roberts, "The Utility of Swing in the Analysis of General Elections in New Zealand", Landfall vol. 24 (March 1975), 56-68.

For example, in 1974 the four Citizens candidates in North ward together gained 54.9 per cent of the two-party vote and 3 seats. The swing required against Citizens (and to Labour) for Citizens to lose their majority of the vote is 5.0 per cent. That is, if 5 in every 100 of those who voted Citizens in 1974 vote Labour in 1977 then Labour would become the majority party in terms of votes. However, this is no guarantee that Labour would become the majority party in terms of seats. But they would be sure to win at least one seat from Citizens.

Figures 2, 3 and Table 10 contain results of the 1971 council election classified by ward. These figures were obtained by examining results at the level of individual polling booths for the 1971 'at-large' election and reworking them into 1974's ward boundaries.

This redistribution of the 1971 booth figures results in a few minor discrepancies between the tables. The total two-party vote figures for 1971 given in Table 10 are slightly different from those given in Table 11 because the Table 10 figures for 1971 exclude special votes and early votes. The swing figures given in Tables 7, 10 and Figure 3 vary because special votes are excluded from consideration in Figure 3.

For comparative purposes results of the 1968 and 1971 elections are included.

Abbreviations

C - Citizens
I - Independent
L - Labour
V - Values

TABLE 1

1974 MAYORAL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE

CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTE	%	% TWO-PARTY
Hay, H.G.	C	29 482	49.9	52.0
Pickering, N.G.	L	27 237	46.1	48.0
Williams, G.J.	V	2 068	3.5	
Hansen, C.M.	I	325	0.5	
Informal		212		
Total two-party		56 719		100.0
Total valid votes		59 112	100.0	
Total votes recorded		59 324		
Majority for Hay				2245
Two-party swing to Citizens				4.0%
Two-party swing (to Labour) required to lose				2.1%
No. of electors on roll				98039
% of electors who voted				60.5%

TABLE 2

1974 MAYORAL ELECTION BY WARD

	HANSEN		HAY		PICKERING		WILLIAMS		INFORMAL	TOTAL VALID VOTES
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N		
West	0.4	42	68.1	6 653	27.5	2 685	4.0	391	27	9 771
North	0.5	57	50.3	5 315	45.6	4 821	3.6	381	40	10 574
Pegasus	0.6	57	35.8	3 673	60.2	6 173	3.4	347	33	10 250
East	0.5	62	47.6	5 601	48.5	5 703	3.4	405	48	11 771
South	0.7	86	48.0	5 918	47.5	5 853	3.8	468	42	12 325
Total	0.5	304	49.7	27 160	46.2	25 235	3.6	1 992	190	54 691
Special Votes	0.5	21	52.5	2 322	45.3	2 002	1.7	76	22	4 421
GRAND TOTAL	0.5	325	49.9	29 482	46.1	27 237	3.5	2 068	212	59 112

TABLE 3

1971 MAYORAL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE

CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTE	%	% TWO-PARTY
Pickering, N.G.	L	25 121	51.3	52.0
Guthrey, A.R.	C	23 212	47.4	48.0
Hansen, C.M.	I	618	1.3	
Informal		359		
Total two-party		48 333		100.0
Total valid votes		48 951	100.0	
Total votes recorded		49 310		
Majority for Pickering				1 909
Two-party swing to Labour				16.3%
Two-party swing (to Citizens) required to lose				2.1%
No. of electors on roll				84 273
% of electors who voted				58.5%

TABLE 4

1968 MAYORAL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE

CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTE	%	% TWO-PARTY
Guthrey, A.R.	C	23 273	64.3	64.3
Mathison, J.	L	12 910	35.7	35.7
Informal		263		
Total two-party		36 183		100.0
Total valid votes		36 183	100.0	
Total votes recorded		36 446		
Majority for Guthrey				10 363
Two-party swing to Citizens				29.4%
Two-party swing (to Labour) required to lose				14.4%
No. of electors on roll				85 470
% of electors who voted				42.6%

TABLE 5

1968-1974 MAYORAL ELECTIONS : TWO-PARTY VOTE

	CITIZENS		LABOUR		TWO-PARTY SWING
1968	23 273	64.3%	12 910	35.7%	
1971	23 212	48.0%	25 121	52.0%	-16.3% (to Labour)
1974	29 482	52.0%	27 237	48.0%	+ 4.0% (to Citizens)

TABLE 6

1974 COUNCIL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE

WARD	RANK	CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTE	%	ELECTED	MAJORITY
West	1	Garrett Mrs HL	C	6 747	24.2	C	
	2	Carter, M.R.	C	6 678	23.9	C	
	3	Hattaway, N.G.	C	6 506	23.3	C	3908
	4	Orme, A.F.	L	2 598	9.3		
	5	Gavigan, J.P.	L	2 326	8.3		
	6	Mahoney, L.A.	L	2 061	7.4		
	7	Jack, J.C.	V	1 019	3.6		
		TOTAL		27 935	100.0		
North	1	Dodge, N.	C	6 246	13.8	C	
	2	Blaxall ,P.N.G.	C	6 235	13.8	C	
	3	Burn, J.F.	C	5 824	12.8	C	
	4	Caygill, D.F.	L	5 800	12.8	L	502
	5	Hawkey, W.R.	C	5 298	11.7		
	6	Drayton, M.G.R.	L	5 226	11.5		
	7	Jackson , D.I.	L	4 256	9.4		
	8	Marshall, M.C.T.	L	4 113	9.1		
	9	Wright, H.M.	V	1 239	2.7		
	10	Wilkes , C.D.	V	1 096	2.4		
		TOTAL		45 333	100.0		
Pegasus	1	Batchelor, Mrs MD	L	6 131	14.6	L	
	2	Dunbar , P.D.	C	5 958	14.2	C	
	3	Massey , W.	L	5 700	13.6	L	
	4	Anderson, P.W.	L	5 652	13.5	L	125
	5	Buck, Ms V.S.	L	5 527	13.2		
	6	Cockburn, A.S.	C	4 076	9.7		
	7	Evans , Mrs C.J.	C	3 836	9.2		
	8	Hogue , A.D.	C	3 250	7.8		
	9	Clarkson, R.S.	V	1 180	2.8		
	10	Easterbrook, A.C.	I	580	1.4		
		TOTAL		41 890	100.0		
East	1	Skellerup, P.J.R.	C	7 114	14.9	C	
	2	Brittenden,W.J.A.	C	6 596	13.9	C	
	3	Alderdice,B.	L	5 730	12.0	L	
	4	Arbuckle, R.H.	C	5 472	11.5	C	129
	5	Ansel, A.E.	C	5 343	11.2		
	6	Davidson, J.F.	L	4 780	10.1		
	7	Todd, R.J.	L	4 702	9.9		
	8	Power, J.G.	L	4 542	9.5		
	9	TePuke-Watson,T.	I	1 241	2.6		
	10	Lea, A.	V	1 150	2.4		
	11	Taylor, L.F.	V	964	2.0		
		TOTAL		47 634	100.0		
South	1	Clark, M.M.	L	6 679	14.4	L	
	2	Britten, B.J.	C	6 587	14.2	C	
	3	Macfarlane,R.M.	L	6 147	13.2	L	
	4	Sutherland,NMW	L	5 518	11.9	L	252
	5	Clark, H.A.	L	5 266	11.4		
	6	Doyle, D.A.	C	5 080	10.9		
	7	Tutengaehe, H.	C	5 035	10.8		
	8	Crawford, C.E.	C	4 758	10.2		
	9	Heal, P.J.	V	1 404	3.0		
		TOTAL		46 474	100.0		

TABLE 7

1974 COUNCIL ELECTION BY PARTY

		Vote	% Total vote	% Two-party vote	Seats	Two-party swing (%)*
West	Labour	6 985	25.0	26.0	-	
	Citizens	19 931	71.4	74.0	3	24.1
	Values	1 019	3.6			
	Total vote	27 935	100.0			
	Total 2-party	26 916		100.0		
North	Labour	19 395	42.8	45.1	1	
	Citizens	23 603	52.1	54.9	3	5.0
	Values	2 335	5.1			
	Total vote	45 333	100.0			
	Total 2-party	42 998		100.0		
Pegasus	Labour	23 010	54.9	57.3	3	7.4
	Citizens	17 120	40.9	42.7	1	
	Values	1 180	2.8			
	Independent	580	1.4			
	Total vote	41 890	100.0			
	Total 2-party	40 130		100.0		
East	Labour	19 754	41.5	44.6	1	
	Citizens	24 525	51.5	55.4	3	5.5
	Values	2 114	4.4			
	Independent	1 241	2.6			
	Total vote	47 634	100.0			
	Total 2-party	44 279		100.0		
South	Labour	23 610	50.8	52.4	3	2.5
	Citizens	21 460	46.2	47.6	1	
	Values	1 404	3.0			
	Total vote	46 474	100.0			
	Total 2-party	45 070		100.0		
CITY TOTAL	Labour	92 754	44.3	46.5	8	
	Citizens	106 639	51.0	53.5	11	3.6
	Values	8 052	3.8			
	Independent	1 821	0.9			
	Total vote	209 266	100.0			
	Total 2-party	199 393		100.0		

* Percentage swing required to lose the majority of the votes.

FIGURE 1

1974 COUNCIL ELECTION - WARD BOUNDARIES



TABLE 8

1974 MAYORAL AND COUNCIL ELECTIONS BY WARD

	CITIZENS		LABOUR	
	Mayor %	Council %	Mayor %	Council %
West	71	74	29	26
North	52	55	48	45
Pegasus	37	43	63	57
East	50	55	50	45
South	50	48	50	52
CITY	52	54	48	46

TABLE 9

1975 PEGASUS BY-ELECTION

CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTE	%	% TWO-PARTY
Buck, Ms V.S.	L	3 484	57.0	59.4
Cockburn, A.S.	C	2 381	39.0	40.6
Clarkson, R.S.	V	162	2.7	
Crawford, D.J.	I	82	1.3	
TOTALS		6 109	100.0	100.0
Majority for elected candidate				1 103
Two-party swing to Labour				2.1%
Number of electors on roll				20 780
% of electors who voted				29.4%

FIGURE 2

1971 - 1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS

BY CANDIDATE, PARTY AND WARD



FIGURE 2 CONTD.



These scattergrams give a visual impression of the strength of the two main parties in each ward for 1971 and 1974. They are compiled from the figures in Table 6 that give each candidate's percentage of the total vote in the wards. Each candidate is represented by a dot, and each party's candidates are grouped together: Labour on the left and Citizens on the right. Candidates are ranked within the party grouping. The vertical axis shows each candidate's percentage of the total ward vote.

TABLE 10

1971 - 1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS BY PARTY

		Total vote (%) 1971	Total vote (%) 1974	Two-party vote (%) 1971	Two-party vote (%) 1974	Two-party swing to Citizens (%)
West	Labour	32.7	25.0	34.0	26.0	
	Citizens	63.7	71.4	66.0	74.0	8.0
	Values	-	3.6			
	Independent	3.6	-			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
North	Labour	48.8	42.8	48.8	45.1	
	Citizens	51.2	52.1	51.2	54.9	3.7
	Values	-	5.1			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Pegasus	Labour	60.9	54.9	60.9	57.3	
	Citizens	39.1	40.9	39.1	42.7	3.6
	Values	-	2.8			
	Independent	-	1.4			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
East	Labour	47.3	41.5	50.9	44.6	
	Citizens	45.5	51.5	49.1	55.4	6.3
	Values	-	4.4			
	Independent	7.2	2.6			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
South	Labour	51.0	50.8	57.7	52.4	
	Citizens	37.4	46.2	42.3	47.6	5.3
	Values	-	3.0			
	Independent	11.6	-			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
CITY TOTAL	Labour	49.2	44.3	51.8	46.5	
	Citizens	45.7	51.0	48.2	53.5	5.3
	Values	-	3.8			
	Independent	5.1	0.9			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

FIGURE 3

1971-1977 COUNCIL ELECTIONS : TWO-PARTY SWING



All figures exclude special votes except for South and the city in 1974 and 1977.

TABLE 11

1968 - 1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS : TWO-PARTY VOTE

	CITIZENS			LABOUR			TWO-PARTY
	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	SWING(%)
1968	337 973	56.5	16	260 213	43.5	3	
1971	380 877	49.0	8	397 184	51.0	11	7.5 (to Labour)
1974	106 639	53.5	11	92 754	46.5	8	4.5 (to Citizens)

TABLE 12

VOTER TURNOUT 1974

BY WARD

	%
West	65.5
North	52.3
Pegasus	50.7
East	55.4
South	58.3
Total - Ordinary Voters	56.0
Special Voters as percent of total no. of electors	4.5
Total - All Voters	60.5

These are not exact turnout figures for the wards because: (1) they are calculated from polling booth returns, (2) electors did not always vote at polling places within their ward, and (3) special votes are excluded from the ward figures.

TABLE 13

VOTER TURNOUT 1974

BY ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION

	%
Resident	54.4
Ratepayer	61.4

TABLE 14

VOTER TURNOUT 1974 BY TIME OF VOTING

	% of Electors	% of Voters	(N)
Special	4.5	7.5	(4 421)
Early	8.7	14.3	(8 482)
Saturday	47.3	78.2	(46 421)
Non-voters	39.5		(38 715)
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	(98 039)

Special - from 30 September
Early - 9 October to 11 October
Saturday- 12 October (polling day)

FIGURE 4

VOTER TURNOUT 1950-1974



TABLE 15

NUMBER OF ELECTORS (1974)

BY WARD AND ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION

	RESIDENT		RATEPAYER		NOMINEE		TOTAL
	%	N	%	N	%	N	
West	60.3	9 019	39.2	5 868	0.5	69	14 956
North	60.4	12 253	39.4	7 979	0.2	45	20 277
Pegasus	52.5	10 649	47.4	9 612	0.1	12	20 273
East	53.9	11 502	45.4	9 686	0.7	144	21 332
South	53.7	11 394	44.2	9 359	2.1	448	21 201
TOTAL	55.9	54 817	43.4	42 504	0.7	718	98 039

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE DESIGNS

NORTH WARD SURVEY

Description of the Universe

Adult population of Christchurch City aged 18 years and over. (Population size: 170 600, 1974 estimate).

Sample Population

Adult population of North ward aged 18 years and over.

Population Size

No. of registered electors	20 277 (1974 election).
Total population	34 366 (1971 census).
Total population	34 425 (1976 census).

Sample Size

231

Sampling Fraction

1% (1 in 100) approximately.

Sampling Method

Random-cluster-quota sampling.

Selection Method

Three stage systematic selection:

1st stage : Random selection of starting points. (Addresses where interviewing is to commence).

2nd stage : Selection of dwelling places. (Random-walk pattern: every third house beginning from the starting point until five interviews are completed).

3rd stage : Quota sampling of respondents by sex. (i.e. alternating male/female etc.).

Sampling Error

Unknown - due to sampling method used. Could be as high as $\pm$ 7 per cent, but the results of the survey show that it seemed to be extremely accurate. For example, Hay (Citizens) won 52.4 per cent of the two-party vote in North, and over the whole city he won 52.0 per cent. In the sample 50.6 per cent of those intending to vote for either two main parties said they would vote for Hay.

Date of Interviewing

28 September 1974.

Date of Election

9 to 12 October 1974.

Pretesting

Pegasus ward, 14 September 1974.
Sample size: 20.

MASTER ROLL SURVEY

Description of the Universe

District Electors' Roll (Master Copy) for the City of Christchurch compiled for the election of the City Council held from October 9 to October 12 1974. Contains the combined rolls for the five electoral wards ordered alphabetically. Total number of registered electors : 98 039.

Sample Population

1. District Electors' Roll for West ward 1974.
   Population size: 14 956.

2. District Electors' Roll for Pegasus ward 1974.
   Population size: 20 273.

3. Total population size: 35 229.

Sample Size

Total sample : 1 769
West subsample : 751 which is 5% ($\frac{751}{14\ 956}$) of the ward population.
Pegasus subsample : 1 018 which is 5% ($\frac{1\ 018}{20\ 273}$) of the ward population.

Sampling Fraction: 5% (1 in 20)

Sampling Method: Proportional stratified random probability sampling.

Selection Method

Three stage systematic selection:

1st stage : page selection.
2nd stage : electors in the ward on that page.
3rd stage : respondent selection from the electors in the ward on that page.

Sampling Error: $\pm$ 3%

Confidence Limits: 'Very sure': 99 chances in 100 of accuracy to within the specified limits of error ($\pm$ 3%)

Date of Sampling: September 1976.

Information Retrieved

For each respondent: ward, sex, marital status (females only), occupational status, age (students and retired only), electoral qualification, voted?, polling booth where voted, time of voting (early (Wednesday to Friday) or on polling day (Saturday)), special vote?

APPENDIX C

NORTH WARD QUESTIONNAIRE

Below is the text of the questionnaire administered in North ward. Where possible the percentage distributions of replies have been interspersed in the text of the questions. Since a great deal more room would be needed to give the distributions of replies coded from the 'open-ended' questions, the percentages have been limited to the 'closed' questions. In each case the distribution refers to the replies given by the whole sample. The proportion who 'don't know' is listed (where applicable), but the proportion 'not ascertained' or 'no answer' or 'not applicable' is not. Thus where the sum of percentages given for any question is not 100 per cent, the difference can usually be accounted for by the 'not ascertained' etc.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Good day. I am working on some research being conducted by the Political Science Department at the University of Canterbury. I would be most grateful if you could help me.

I have to interview one of the men/women in this household aged 18 years and over.

I can assure you that all answers and views will be regarded as fully confidential. Thank you very much.

Respondent Selection:

Would you tell me how many men/women there are in this household aged 18 years and over?

1 : Interview. 2 or more : List the actual number here:_____

THEN SAY: Well, of the ... (GIVE NUMBER), I'd be most grateful if I could interview the one whose birthday comes next after today. Thank you.

The Interview Schedule:

1. First of all, I would like to ask roughly how long have you been living in Christchurch? (Moved into Christchurch during 1974 8%, moved in during 1973 and 1972 6%, 3 to 15 years 22%, 16 to 21 years 13%, 22 years or more 28%, "All my life" 23%)

2. Generally speaking, how much interest do you have in what goes on in politics - a great deal (10%), quite a lot (28%), some (53%), or none at all (9%)?

3. And what about local body politics : how much interest do you generally have in what goes on in Christchurch City Council politics - a great deal (10%), quite a lot (21%), some (56%), or none at all (13%)?

4. I know it's a long time ago, but thinking back to the last Christchurch City Council elections in 1971, I was wondering if you could tell me what you thought the issues were at that election?

   IF RESPONDENT ASKS "WHAT ARE 'ISSUES'?", REPLY: Oh, by issues I mean the points of conflict between the parties, or the factors that made people cast their votes in one way or another.

5. How much interest did you have in that election - a great deal (13%), quite a lot (23%), some (37%), or none at all (18%)?

6. And what about this time : Would you say that you have more interest (39%) or less interest (13%), or about the same amount of interest (40%)? (DK 1%)

7. And what do you think the issues are at this election?

   IF LATER IN THE COURSE OF THE INTERVIEW THE RESPONDENT SPONTANEOUSLY MENTIONS MORE ISSUES OR ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME, RECORD THEM BELOW:-

8. With regard to politics throughout the country as a whole, do you usually think of yourself as National (32%), Labour (46%), Social Credit (1%), Values (4%), or what? (Other 1%, Independent 10%, DK 4%)

9. IF PARTY CHOSEN : Well, how strongly (chosen party) do you feel - very strongly (18%), fairly strongly (43%), or not very strongly (22%)?

10. And getting back to local body politics, do you usually think of yourself as Labour (27%) or Citizens Association (22%), or dont you think of yourself in these terms (39%)? (Other party 2%, Independent 8%, DK 1%)

11. IF LOCAL PARTY CHOSEN : And how strongly (chosen party) do you feel - very strongly (15%), fairly strongly (24%), or not very strongly (12%)?

12. Getting back to the last Christchurch City Council elections in 1971, I was wondering if you could tell me whether or not you voted in those elections? (Yes 57%)

13. IF DIDN'T VOTE: Could you say why?

14. IF DID VOTE IN 1971: Well, you'll remember that Mr Guthrey was the Citizens Association candidate for Mayor, and Mr Pickering Labour's candidate. I was wondering if you could tell me who you voted for? (Guthrey 26%, Pickering 28%, DK 0%, Did not vote 46%)

15. And what about the City Council - did you vote mainly for Citizens Association candidates (16%) or mainly for Labour candidates (25%)? (Neither 8%, DK 6%)

16a. IF CITIZENS: Did you vote for any Labour candidates? (Yes 6%, No 7%, DK 4%)

16b. IF LABOUR: Did you vote for any Citizens candidates? (Yes 5%, No 17%, DK 5%)

17. And what about City Council elections before 1971 : did you vote in any of them? (Yes 44%)

18. IF NO: Could you say why?

19. IF YES: Which ones did you vote in?

20. AGAIN, ONLY FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERED 'YES': Could you tell me why you have generally voted in City Council elections? OR, IF MORE APPROPRIATE, ASK: Could you tell me why you voted in that election?

21. Well, let's discuss this year's election: Do you know the name of the Citizens Association's candidate for Mayor? (Hay 81%)

22. And what about the Labour Party's candidate for Mayor: do you know his name? (Pickering 86%)

23. And do you perhaps know the name of the Values Party candidate for Mayor? (Williams 13%)

IF RESPONDENT DOESN'T KNOW ANY/SOME NAMES: Well, names aren't too important, of course, but Mr Hamish Hay is the Citizens Association candidate; Mr Neville Pickering the Labour candidate; and Mr Gary Williams is the Values candidate.

24. Do you intend to vote in this year's Mayoral election? (Yes 81%)

25. IF NO: Could you say why?

26. IF 'YES' OR 'DON'T KNOW': Would you mind telling me which of the Mayoral candidates you think you'll vote for? (Hay 36%, Pickering 35%, Williams 5%, DK 10%)

27. AGAIN, IF 'YES' OR IF DEFINITE CHOICE GIVEN: Could you say why you think you'll vote that way?

28. Do you know the names of any of the candidates for the City Council in this ward?

29. And do you intend to vote in the City Council elections? (Yes 78%)

30. IF NO: Could you say why?

31. IF YES: Do you intend to vote mainly for Citizens Association candidates (23%), Labour candidates (27%), or Values candidates (4%)? (Some of each 11%, About 50:50 3%, Other 2%, DK 8%)

32. IF MAIN GROUP IS CHOSEN: Do you intend to vote for any other candidates - that is, do you intend to vote for any non-(chosen group) candidates for the City Council? (Yes 17%, No 28%, DK 10%)

33. IF YES: Who? Why?

34. Are there any comments that you would like to make about this year's election?

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS:

Finally, a few questions for statistical purposes.

35. SEX -- BY OBSERVATION (Male 50%, Female 50%)

36a. Would you mind telling me what your occupation is? (PROBE FOR SPECIFICS IF NECESSARY)

36b. IF NECESSARY, ADD: And your husband's (OR,IF NECESSARY, "father's") occupation? (PROBE FOR SPECIFICS IF NECESSARY)

37. How old were you when you left school?

38. Did you have any full-time or part-time education after leaving school? (Yes 52%)

39. IF YES: Full-time (28%) or part-time (25%)

40. AGAIN, IF YES: What further education was that? (PROBE FOR SPECIFICS)

41. Did you vote at the last general election? (Yes 78%)

42. IF YES: Which party did you vote for? (National 27%, Labour 46%, Social Credit 2%, Values 0.5%)

43. IF NO(i.e. IF DID NOT VOTE): Could you tell me why?

44. Would you mind telling me how old you are?

45. There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. If you had to make a choice, would you describe yourself as working class (48%) or middle class (41%)? (DK 4%)

46. What is your religion? (AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE, PLEASE)

47. UNLESS 'NO RELIGION' (OR 'AGNOSTIC', ETC.): How often do you attend church? (FOR JEWS, "Synagogue")

48. And, finally, if there were a general election in the near future, which party do you think you would vote for? (National 28%, Labour 49%, Social credit 0.5%, Values 6%, DK 13%, Would not vote 2%)

(Remember to thank the respondent, and - if necessary - assure him/her of the confidentiality of the interview.)

49. GIVE THE EXACT AND FULL ADDRESS OF THE INTERVIEW HERE:

50. GIVE HERE ANY COMMENTS WHICH YOU FEEL COULD HELP WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS INTERVIEW. FOR EXAMPLE, A BRIEF PERSONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENT, THE TYPE OF HOUSE, CONSUMER DURABLES, ETC. ETC.:

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